Barrett v. Barrett
| Citation | 878 P.2d 1051,1994 OK 92 |
| Decision Date | 19 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 75014,75014 |
| Parties | Patricia K. BARRETT, now, Patricia K. Sulcer, Appellant, v. John A. BARRETT, Jr., Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Oklahoma |
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Temporary Division No. 14, Appeal from the District Court of Cleveland County; Edward M. McDanel, Trial Judge.
Certiorari to review opinion of Court of Appeals which reversed an order entered by the trial court dismissing appellant's action for divorce on the grounds that the District Court of the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma had already issued a consent divorce decree to the parties.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED. COURT OF APPEALS OPINION VACATED. ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
David J. Batton, Norman, for appellant.
Charles M. Laster, Shawnee, for appellee.
Michael Minnis, David McCullough, Michael Minnis & Associates, P.C., Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae, Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.
Patricia K. Sulcer, formerly Patricia K. Barrett (Sulcer), appeals the order of the Cleveland County District Court (the District Court) dismissing her petition for divorce from appellee, John A. Barrett (Barrett). The District Court granted Barrett's dismissal motion on the grounds that the Tribal District Court for the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (the Tribal Court) had previously granted a divorce to the parties and that such divorce decree was binding.
The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's order and remanded the cause to the District Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the "foreign judgment" (the Tribal Court divorce decree). We granted certiorari to consider the first impression question of whether the judgments of Tribal Courts are entitled to Full Faith and Credit in the courts of the State of Oklahoma. The facts are as follows.
Barrett is a member of Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma (the Tribe) and was elected as Business Manager of the Tribe. Sulcer was an employee of the Tribe but was not an enrolled member. Sulcer and Barrett married, but the couple did not have a tribal ceremonial wedding nor did the wedding occur on the Tribe's reservation. They were neither domiciled within the boundaries of Tribal reservation nor were any of their property or business holdings located within such boundaries. After one-and-a-half years of marriage, Barrett filed for divorce in the Tribal Court. Neither party was represented by counsel, and both appeared personally for a hearing on the divorce petition. The Tribal Court granted a consent divorce and divided the property of the couple according to their expressed wishes.
Ten months later, Sulcer filed a petition for divorce in Cleveland County District Court (District Court) alleging Barrett procured a foreign divorce not recognized by Oklahoma by using duress, fraud and threats against Sulcer to get her to consent to the Tribal Court's jurisdiction and divorce decree. Barrett entered his special appearance and moved for dismissal of the divorce petition on the grounds that the marriage was dissolved by the prior divorce. In her response, Sulcer attached an affidavit setting forth details of the alleged fraud, coercion and duress. Barrett made no response denying the allegations.
Two days after filing her response to Barrett's motion in the District Court, Sulcer filed motions in the Tribal Court urging vacation of the divorce decree and/or the granting of a new trial. These motions were also based upon her allegations of fraud and coercion. Before the Tribal Court could rule on these motions, the District Court dismissed Sulcer's divorce petition specifically finding the Tribal Court divorce decree binding unless subject to attack on grounds of fraud, coercion or duress. In its order, the District Court noted that the determination of fraud, coercion or duress should be made by the court which granted the divorce, i.e. the Tribal Court. Sulcer then appealed the District Court's decision.
Sometime after the District Court's pronouncement, the Tribal Court heard evidence on Sulcer's allegations of fraud, coercion and duress and determined it had subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Barrett was a tribal member and it had personal jurisdiction over Sulcer because she had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Sulcer appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of the Tribe which affirmed. Neither of those decisions has any impact upon our review of this case.
This Court has long recognized the validity of marriages and divorces between tribal Indians contracted according to the customs of their tribe even where those marriages or divorces would not normally be recognized under the laws of this State. Cyr v. Walker, 29 Okla. 281, 116 P. 931 (1911); Buck v. Branson, 34 Okla. 807, 127 P. 436 (1912); James v. Adams, 56 Okla. 450, 155 P. 1121 (1915); Unussee v. McKinney, 133 Okla. 40, 270 P. 1096 (1928); Thomas v. Healey, 152 Okla. 93, 3 P.2d 1047 (1931). These cases involved divorces granted according to the tribal customs and not as a result of a tribal court decree of divorce. In order to determine whether the District Court erred in dismissing the divorce petition we must consider the effect that a divorce decree of the Tribal Court has in the courts of this State.
Thus, the question before us is whether the District Court must recognize the divorce decree of the Tribal Court and give such judgment full faith and credit. The effect of the "Full Faith and Credit" clause of Article IV, § 1, of the U.S. Constitution 1 upon state courts confronted with the enforcement of tribal court decrees has been at issue before courts for many years. In the past, the application of Article IV, § 1, has been questioned due to the respective Indian Tribes being considered sovereign nations rather than as "States". See, for example, In the Matter of the Marriage of Red Fox, 23 Or.App. 393, 542 P.2d 918 (1975) and Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (App.1977). Other courts, however, have accorded full faith and credit to tribal court judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 2 by treating an Indian Tribe as a "Territory" of the United States. Jim v. CIT Financial Serv. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 655 P.2d 895 (1982). However, this Court has never before considered the issue.
In 1992, the Oklahoma State Legislature enacted a statute which affirms this Court's authority to establish standards for recognizing the judgments and decrees of tribal courts. Okla.Sess.Laws 1992, c. 384, § 1. The statute, codified at 12 O.S.Supp.1992, § 728, reads:
In accordance with the authority granted by this statute, this Court adopted Rule 30 to the Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, 12 O.S.Supp.1994, Ch. 2, App. on May 26, 1994. Rule 30(B) provides:
"The district courts of the State of Oklahoma shall grant full faith and credit and cause to be enforced any tribal judgment where the tribal court that issued the judgment grants reciprocity to judgments of the courts of the State of Oklahoma, provided, a tribal court judgment shall receive no greater effect or full faith and credit under this rule than would a similar or comparable judgment of a sister state."
Consequently, if the Tribal Courts of the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma grant reciprocity to the judgments of the State of Oklahoma, full faith and credit should be accorded to the Tribal Court decree from this point forward. Although we do not give retroactive application of this rule to the case before us, the Legislature has clearly spoken on its desire for the courts of this State to give full faith and credit to the judgments of the courts of the Indian Tribes and this Court has enunciated the applicable standards under which such judgments are to be recognized. With this in mind, we look to general principles of law as to the recognition of foreign judgments. In Britton v. Gannon, 285 P.2d 407, 409 (Okla.1955), we held the courts of Oklahoma are:
"not required to recognize the judgment of a court of another state, territory, or country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, where the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction or the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud."
Consequently, it need only be determined whether the Tribal Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Sulcer and whether the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.
It is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties nor can the requirement therefore be waived by the parties. Brasier v. Brasier, 200 Okla. 689, 200 P.2d 427 (1948); Beach...
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