Barrett v. Lee Brass Co.

• Decision Date: 12 December 2003
• Citation: 883 So.2d 227
• Parties: Samantha BARRETT v. LEE BRASS COMPANY.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

883 So.2d 227

Samantha BARRETT
v.
LEE BRASS COMPANY

2020081.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

December 12, 2003.

883 So.2d 228

Terrell Wynn and Bruce J. McKee of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, LLP, Birmingham, for appellant

Brandy Murphy Lee of Campbell, Waller & Poer, LLC, Birmingham, for appellee.

MURDOCK, Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in a workers' compensation case holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to death benefits in connection with her husband's death. The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in holding that the employee's death did not occur in the course of his employment. We disagree, and we therefore affirm the summary judgment.

"We review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as was applied in the trial court. A motion for a summary judgment is to be granted when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. A party moving for a summary judgment must make a prima facie showing `that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. The court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412 (Ala.1990). If the movant meets this burden, `the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to rebut the movant's prima facie showing by "substantial evidence."' Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala. 1992)."

Bailey v. R.E. Garrison Trucking Co., 834 So.2d 122, 123 (Ala.Civ.App.2002)

The facts before the trial court, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are as follows. Douglas Harold Barrett was killed in an automobile accident on April 14, 2000. Barrett was returning home to Cedartown, Georgia, from Anniston, where he had worked for Lee Brass Company ("LBC") for 11 years. Barrett had traveled to Anniston to pick up his paycheck from LBC.

Barrett's employment with LBC had been terminated effective March 10, 2000. LBC had informed Barrett of the termination in a letter that explained that Barrett's job was being eliminated as part of a force reduction. This letter further explained

883 So.2d 229

that LBC would continue to pay Barrett his usual wages and provide him health insurance and other benefits for several months as part of a severance package. The letter also advised Barrett that the wages paid as part of the severance package "will be paid bi-monthly through the normal payroll process and mailed to you at your most current address of record."

Although Barrett was accustomed to having LBC directly deposit the checks into his Anniston bank account, after March 10 LBC was no longer willing to deposit the paychecks for Barrett. Reiber Heath, LBC's representative in the litigation, stated that it was LBC's practice "to mail the checks in case of severance." Samantha Barrett testified by deposition, however, that after March 10 her husband had traveled to LBC's place of business to pick up each of his paychecks in order to be able to deposit them himself. She also testified by affidavit that, at the time of the accident, her husband had been returning from Anniston along the same route he had customarily followed to and from LBC each workday.

The plaintiff relies heavily upon the decisions of this court in Oliver v. Faulkner Wood Co., 531 So.2d 675 (Ala.Civ.App. 1988), and Process Equipment, Inc. v. Quinn, 701 So.2d 29 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), in arguing that her husband's death occurred in the course of his employment. For the reasons explained below, we find Oliver and Quinn to be distinguishable from the present case.

To be compensable under our Workers' Compensation Act, § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, an employee's injury or death must result from an accident "arising out of and in the course of his employment." Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-31. No all-embracing definition of this standard has yet been found. "Every case involving these words should be decided upon its own particular facts and circumstances, and not by reference to some formula." Moesch v. Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp., 479 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Ala.Civ.App.1985).

The phrase "arising out of" employment denotes employment as the source and cause of the accident. In order to satisfy this requirement, "the rational mind must be able to trace the resulting injury to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not by some other agency." Id. As was true in Oliver, we are not presented in the present case with the question whether the employee's injury was one "arising out of" his employment; the issue presented is whether the employee's injury occurred "in the course of" his employment.

As opposed to the causal element addressed by the "arising out of" requirement, the phrase "in the course of ... employment" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which an injury occurs.

"`An injury to an employee arises in the course of his employment when it occurs within the period of his employment, at a place where he may reasonably be and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incident to it.'"

Moesch v. Baldwin County Elec. Membership Corp., 479 So.2d at 1272 (quoting Massey v. United States Steel Corp., 264 Ala. 227, 230, 86 So.2d 375, 378 (1956)) (emphasis added).

The present case does not...