Massey v. U.S. Steel Corp., 6 Div. 786

• Citation: 264 Ala. 227,86 So.2d 375
• Decision Date: 18 August 1955
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 786
• Parties: Lena Mae MASSEY v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, T. C. I. Division.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 375

86 So.2d 375

264 Ala. 227

Lena Mae MASSEY v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, T. C. I. Division.

6 Div. 786.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Aug. 18, 1955.

Rehearing Denied April 12, 1956.

Lipscomb, Brobston, Jones & Brobston, Bessemer, for appellant.

Burr, McKamy, Moore & Tate, Wm. Henry Beatty, Birmingham, for appellee.

LAWSON, Justice.

This is a workman's compensation case instituted in the circuit court of Jefferson County, Bessemer Divison, by Lena Mae Massey against United States Steel Corporation, T. C. I. Division, to recover compensation for the death of her husband, Felix Monroe Massey.

We granted certiorari on application of the plaintiff below to review the trial court's judgment denying compensation.

Plaintiff's husband, to whom we will sometimes hereafter refer as the employee, died in a hospital in Fairfield on August 13, 1952. Death was 'due to a dissecting aortic aneurysm.' The words just quoted are from the trial court's finding of facts, which goes into a rather detailed discussion of the medical testimony as it relates to the meaning of the words 'dissecting aortic aneurysm.' We think it will suffice for present purposes to say that the trial court found that death was caused by the rupturing of a soft pulsating tumor containing blood, which tumor resulted from preternatural dilation of the diseased coating of a large blood vessel.

The rupture occurred on the afternoon on August 11, 1952, just as the employee was completing a shower bath in a bathhouse which the defendant company owned and maintained on its premises and which its employees were not required to use, but were permitted to use if they so desired, without any charge.

At the time of his death Massey was employed as a hoisting engineer, that is, he operated a machine which pulled the workmen from the 'ore slope to the limestone slope.' His duties did not require strenuous physical labor nor were his working conditions abnormal.

The last shift on which the employee worked was from 7:00 A. M. to 3:00 P. M. on August 11, 1952. At about 3:00 P. M. he went to the 'check-house' located near the mouth of the mine, where he checked out for the day. He was entitled to no compensation after he checked out and he was then free to go about his own affairs, having completed his duties for the day.

After checking out Massey 'Walked at a fast pace or moved at a slow trot' to the bathhouse located approximately two city blocks from the check-out house. Upon arriving at the bathhouse, the employee proceeded to take a shower bath with unheated water, although heated water was available. As heretofore shown, Massey was in the act of coming out from under the shower when he was stricken and fell to the floor. The use of the unheated water after a rapid walk on a warm day increased the employee's blood pressure and caused the diseased or weakened blood vessel wall to break.

The foregoing is a summary of the finding of facts as made by the trial court.

Having found those facts to exist, the court was confronted with the question as to whether they were sufficient to support the conclusion that the death of plaintiff's husband was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. § 253, Title 26, Code 1940.

The court concluded from those facts that the employee's death was caused by an accident which occurred in the course of his employment, but further determined that the accident did not arise out of the employment and proceeded to render judgment in favor of the defendant below.

The appellant, plaintiff below, does not question the finding of facts made by the trial court. She admits that such finding is correct and has not brought to this court the evidence taken on the trial below.

It is the appellee's insistence that the sole question presented for our consideration is whether or not the trial court correctly concluded from these facts that the accident which it found caused the death of plaintiff's husband did not arise out of his employment. We cannot agree that our review is so limited. Our review is of the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, not of the reasons given by the trial court for rendering that judgment. In other words, we are not limited to a consideration of the conclusion reached by the trial court upon which it denied recovery to plaintiff. Before we would be justified in reversing the judgment, we must be satisfied from the facts as found by the trial court that it correctly concluded that the death of plaintiff's husband was caused by an accident which was in the course of his employment and be satisfied further that the trial court incorrectly concluded from the facts as found that the accident did not arise out of the employment.

We will consider first the question as to whether the facts as found by the trial court as to the cause of death are sufficient to support the conclusion that death of the employee was caused 'by an accident' within the meaning of our compensation law. § 253, Title 26, Code 1940.

The trial court's conclusion that death was caused 'by an accident' was not based on a finding that the rupture was caused by a fall, slip or blow, but was grounded on the finding 'that the unheated shower after a rapid walk on a warm day increased his blood pressure and caused the dissecting [rupture] aortic aneurysm.'

In § 262, Title 26 Code 1940, it is said:

'The word 'accident' as used in the phrases 'personal injuries due to accident' or 'injuries or death caused by accident' in articles 1 and 2 of this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time injury to the physical structure of the body by accidental means.'

In Pow v. Southern Const. Co., 235 Ala. 580, 180 So. 288, it was pointed out that an injury to be compensable need not be an external traumatic injury. And in Gadsden Iron Works v. Beasley, 249 Ala. 115, 30 So.2d 10, we upheld an award where the cause of death was a heart attack. In De Arman v. Ingalls Iron Works Co., 258 Ala. 205, 61 So.2d 764, 767, we said: 'The test as to whether injury is unexpected and unforeseen so if received on a single occasion occurs 'by accident' is that the sufferer did not intend or expect that injury would on that particular occasion result from what he was doing.'

And in the cases of Davis Lumber Co. v. Self, Ala., 82 So.2d 291, and Alabama Textile Products Corp. v. Grantham, Ala., 82 So.2d 204, this day decided, we upheld awards where the injuries were not caused by a fall, slip or blow.

Other courts have held that death was caused 'by an accident' when it was shown to have resulted from the rupturing of an arterial aneurysm due to exertion and strain. Evans v. Cavanagh, 58 Idaho 324, 73 P.2d 83; Southern Shipping Co. v. Lawson, D.C., 5 F.Supp. 321; Larson v. Blackwell Lumber Co., 48 Idaho 136, 279 P. 1087; Kayser v. Eric County Highway Dept., 276 App.Div. 789, 92 N.Y.S.2d 612; Jones v. Town of Hamden, 129 Conn. 532, 29 A.2d 772; Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Brown, 67 Ind.App. 178, 117 N.E. 555. See E. Baggot Co. v. Industrial Commission, 290 Ill. 530, 125 N.E. 254, 7 A.L.R. 1611; Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Griggs, 190 Ga. 277, 9 S.E.2d 84; Bussey v. Globe Indemnity Co., 81 Ga.App. 401, 59 S.E.2d 34; Fealka v. Federal Mining & Smeltering Co., 53 Idaho 362, 24 P.2d 325.

We hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the death of the employee was caused 'by an accident' within the meaning of our compensation law, having found that death was caused by the rupturing of an aortic aneurysm and that the immediate cause of the rupture was the exertion and strain incident to walking rapidly and the cold shower. Of course, the fact that the aorta was in a diseased condition does not preclude compensation. Gadsden Iron Works v. Beasley, supra.

We have often found it necessary to construe the words 'arising out of and in the course of his employment', § 253, Title 26, Code 1940, but it has been said no all-embracing definition has yet been found. Carraway Methodist Hospital v. Pitts, 256 Ala. 665, 57 So.2d 96. Every case involving these words should be decided upon its own particular facts and circumstances and not by reference to some formula. But it is usually said that the phrase 'arise out of' employment refers to employment as the cause and source of the accident. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, 249 Ala. 675, 32 So.2d 666. The rational mind must be able to trace the resulting injury to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not by some other agency. Dean v. Stockham Pipe & Fittings Co., 220 Ala. 25, 123 So. 225. We have said that the phrase 'in the course of his employment' refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident took place. An injury to an employee arises in the course of his employment when it occurs within the period of his employment, at a place where he may reasonably be and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incident to it. Mobile Liners v. McConnell, 220 Ala. 562, 126 So. 626; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, supra; Carraway Methodist Hospital, Inc., v. Pitts, supra.

The question before us also involves proper application of subdivision (j) of § 262, Title 26, Code 1940, as amended, which defines the circumstances in general terms when an accident arises out of and in the course of one's employment. See Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Thomas, 220 Ala. 686, 127 So. 165. That subdivision purports to exclude from compensation all injuries and death except while employees are 'engaged in, on, or about the premises where their services are being performed, or where their service requires their presence as a part of such service at the time of the accident, and during the hours of service as such worker.' This clause...