Barron v. Trans Union Corp., Civ.A. 98-D-704-N.

• Decision Date: 03 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 98-D-704-N.,Civ.A. 98-D-704-N.
• Citation: 82 F.Supp.2d 1288
• Parties: Cleveland BARRON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRANS UNION CORP., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

82 F.Supp.2d 1288

Cleveland BARRON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TRANS UNION CORP., Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 98-D-704-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

January 3, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jeffery C. Duffey, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiffs.

Joseph A. Fawal, Birmingham, AL, Thomas J. Spina, Birmingham, AL, Bruce S. Luckman, Mark E. Kogan, Timothy P. Creech, Philadelphia, PA, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendant Trans Union Corp.'s ("Defendant") Motion For Summary Judgment ("Mot."), together with a Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment ("Mem."), filed June 3, 1999. On June 21, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a Response To Motion For Summary Judgment ("Resp."). Defendant filed a Reply on July 2, 1999. On December 14, 1999, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Response To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment ("Suppl.Resp."). Defendant filed a Reply To Plaintiffs' Supplemental Response ("Suppl.Reply") on December 30, 1999. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (The Fair Credit Reporting Act). The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the court construes the evidence and factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (detailing the nature of the parties' responsibilities when preparing or defending against a motion for summary judgment).

Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Cleveland Barron and Susan Barron ("Mr. Barron" and "Mrs. Barron," respectively, or, collectively "Plaintiffs") are husband and wife. (Compl.¶ 1.) Defendant is a "consumer reporting agency" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).¹ (Resp., Ex. 4.) Defendant prepares, sells and distributes "consumer reports" as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).² (Compl.¶ 7.)

Between approximately January 1994 and June 1998, Defendant prepared and provided consumer reports on Mr. Barron to eleven businesses where Mr. Barron was applying for credit either individually or jointly with Mrs. Barron. (Resp., Ex. 3; Mem., Ex. A.) Plaintiffs contend that the following two entries in each of Mr. Barron's consumer reports are inaccurate: (1) a state civil judgment allegedly entered in April 1994 against Mr. Barron and in favor of QHC of Alabama, Inc., in the amount of $34,184.00 ("Civil Judgment"); and (2) a Sears credit card account, indicating that Sears "charged off as bad debt" $822.00 allegedly owed by Mr. Barron ("Sears Account"). (Resp. at 5, Ex. 3). Plaintiffs have submitted court documents, which indicate that the individual against whom the Civil Judgment was entered is not Mr. Barron, but rather is another individual with the same last name. (Suppl.Resp., Ex. 1; Mem., Ex. A.) Plaintiffs also have submitted a photocopy of Mr. Barron's Sears' credit card, which bears an account number different from the one listed on Mr. Barron's consumer reports. Plaintiffs further contend that Mr. Barron has never applied for or received the Sears Account listed in his consumer reports. (Mem., Ex. A.) As a result of the alleged inaccurate Civil Judgment and Sears Account on Mr. Barron's consumer reports, Plaintiffs were denied credit. (Resp., Ex. 3.)

Plaintiffs, through their attorney, wrote letters to Defendant disputing the accuracy of the Civil Judgment and Sears Account on Mr. Barron's consumer reports. The letters were dated February 1, 1994, April 19, 1994, June 1, 1994, September 12, 1994 and November 7, 1994. (Mem., Ex. A.) In his Affidavit, Mr. Barron further asserts that

[s]ubsequent to my attorney writing letters to [Defendant] trying to straighten out my [consumer] report[,] I contacted [Defendant] by telephone numerous times and was connected to the automated telephone system to make my complaints. The last time I recall contacting [Defendant] by telephone complaining about the erroneous [Civil Judgment] and [Sears Account] on my [consumer report] was in the fall of 1997. I was trying to get [Defendant] to correct the [consumer] report. I was only able to talk to a "live" person one time. I was told [Defendant] would let me know in 6 weeks and I never heard anything back from [Defendant].

(Resp., Ex. 1.)³

Defendant responded to Plaintiffs' communications, most recently in a letter dated November 25, 1994. Therein, Defendant stated that it "investigated the information [Mr. Barron] has disputed regarding his/her credit profile" and that "[t]he disputed creditor(s) have confirmed that the information is being reported accurately. ..." (Mem., Ex. B.) In obtaining consumer credit information from which Defendant prepares consumer reports, Defendant "encourage[s]" creditors to "adopt" the "Metro Consumer Reporting Format." (Suppl.Reply, Ex. A.) Defendant further "encourage[s]" creditors to "supply full identifying information when requesting consumer reports ... and when reporting ... data to [Defendant]." (Id.) Defendant defines "full identifying information" as "[f]irst name, last name, and middle initial," "[f]ull street address," "[z]ip code," "[y]ear of birth," "[a]ny general designator, such as Jr., Sr., or III," and "[s]ocial security number." (Id.)

Plaintiffs filed a one-count Complaint on June 24, 1998, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq. Plaintiffs categorize their claims against Defendant as follows: "(1) that [][D]efendant failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of information concerning [P]laintiffs about whom a credit report related," in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); and "(2) that [][D]efendant failed to reinvestigate and to delete inaccurate information once [][P]laintiffs complained about such," in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681i. (Suppl.Resp. at 1; Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs demand a jury trial and request compensatory damages, punitive damages, an injunction prohibiting Defendant "from any violation of the [FCRA]," attorney's fees and costs. (Compl. at 2.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts the following four grounds in support of its Motion For Summary Judgment: (1) that the FCRA's two-year statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs' claims arising on or before June 23, 1996 (Mem. at 1-2, 4-5); (2) that Plaintiffs' claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) fail as a matter of law...