Barrows v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-3304,85-3304
• Citation: 106 Ill.Dec. 391,505 N.E.2d 1182,153 Ill.App.3d 83
• Parties: , 106 Ill.Dec. 391, 1987-1 Trade Cases P 67,557 William BARROWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHWESTERN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, an Illinois corporation, John J. Boehm, James R. Hines, and James A. Stockman III, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1182

505 N.E.2d 1182

153 Ill.App.3d 83, 106 Ill.Dec. 391,

1987-1 Trade Cases P 67,557

William BARROWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHWESTERN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, an Illinois corporation John J. Boehm, James R. Hines, and James A Stockman III, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-3304.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fourth Division.

March 5, 1987.

Wayne B. Giampietro, James B. Dykehouse, Chicago (DeJong, Poltrock & Giampietro, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael J. Koenigsknecht, Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, Chicago (Gardner, Carton & Douglas, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, William Barrows, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing his complaint against defendants, Northwestern Memorial Hospital, John J. Boehm, chairman of the hospital's pediatrics service, James R. Hines, chief of staff at the hospital, and James A. Stockman III, chairman of the hospital's department of pediatrics. The court dismissed the complaint as being substantially insufficient at law, in violation of section 2-615(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 2-615(a).

We reverse and remand.

In determining whether to allow a motion to dismiss, a court must take allegations of fact contained in the complaint as true, and construe all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor. (Cook v. Askew (1975), 34 Ill.App.3d 1055, 1057, 341 N.E.2d 13, 15.) Plaintiff, a physician, alleged that defendants denied his application for staff privileges at the hospital although he had met all of the qualifications for admission to the staff.

Plaintiff alleged that he and a medical associate are pediatricians. They had a working relationship with a group of obstetrical-gynecological (ob-gyn) physicians; they would treat babies born to the patients of the ob-gyn physicians immediately after birth. In January 1984, defendants granted the ob-gyn physicians admission to the staff of Prentice Hospital, a facility which defendants operate; the ob-gyn physicians transferred their affiliation to Northwestern Memorial Hospital.

Plaintiff and his associate subsequently applied for admission to the staff of Northwestern Memorial. Plaintiff alleged that Boehm stated to Hines in a letter that the hospital's pediatrics department did not need another pediatrician of plaintiff's particular background and expertise. Defendants thereafter notified plaintiff that they denied his application for admission to the hospital staff. Plaintiff then complained to defendants that their bylaws allowed him to appear and to be heard. Defendants then granted plaintiff a meeting, after which they again denied his application.

Plaintiff further alleged that defendants based their denial of staff privileges on their unwritten rule: that a physician receives staff privileges only if he or she has a business relationship with a doctor already on defendants' staff. As a result of this unwritten rule, defendants admitted two other physicians to the hospital staff with no better qualifications than those of plaintiff, at the same time that defendants denied plaintiff such privileges.

Plaintiff alleged in count I of the complaint that defendants were aware of the relationship between him and the ob-gyn physicians. He further alleged that defendants denied him admission to their staff in order to interfere with this relationship and to deprive him of his source of patients. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants conspired to deprive him of patients who would choose him to treat their children and that this conspiracy deprived him of his legitimate expectation of business relationships with those patients.

Count II of the complaint alleged that defendants' conduct limited the supply of pediatric services in Chicago and unreasonably restrained trade and commerce in the State, violating section 3 of the Illinois Antitrust Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 60-3). Plaintiff alleged in count III that defendants' unwritten rule controlling the granting of staff privileges violates the hospital's rules, regulations and bylaws. Defendants' unwritten rule, thus, constituted fraud on plaintiff. Count IV alleged that defendants' conduct also violated the public policy of Illinois, evidenced by section 3-4 of the Health Finance Reform Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 111 1/2, par. 6503-4) and Rule 3-1.1 of the Illinois Department of Public Health.

Plaintiff sought an injunction preventing defendants from enforcing their unwritten rule and, based on the rule, refusing to admit him to their staff. Plaintiff further sought $15,000 in actual damages and an amount of punitive damages for the trial court to determine. Plaintiff also sought a finding of willful conduct and treble damages under counts II, III, and IV, pursuant to section 7 of the Antitrust Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 60-7.

Plaintiff filed the complaint on March 5, 1985. On November 6, 1985, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The court ruled that the complaint did not state a cause of action. Plaintiff appeals.

Pleadings present, define, and narrow the issues, and limit the proof needed at trial. Pleadings are not intended to erect barriers to a trial on the merits but instead to remove them and facilitate trial. The object of pleadings is to produce an issue that one side asserts and the other side denies, so that a trial may determine the actual truth. (People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc. (1981), 88 Ill.2d 300, 307-08, 58 Ill.Dec. 754, 430 N.E.2d 1005, 1008.) Attacking defects in pleadings points out the defects so that the complainant will have an opportunity to cure them before trial. The granting of a motion to strike and dismiss is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Harvey v. Mackay (1982), 109 Ill.App.3d 582, 586, 65 Ill.Dec. 167, 440 N.E.2d 1022, 1025.

I

Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in finding that his complaint was substantially insufficient at law. Explaining this pleading requirement, our supreme court stated:

"To pass muster a complaint must state a cause of action in two ways. First, it must be legally sufficient; it must set forth a legally recognized claim as its avenue of recovery. When it fails to do this, there is no recourse at law for the injury alleged, and the complaint must be dismissed. [Citations.] Second and unlike Federal practice, the complaint must be factually sufficient; it must plead facts which bring the claim within the legally recognized cause of action alleged. If it does not, the complaint must be dismissed. [Citation]." People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc. (1981), 88 Ill.2d 300, 308, 58 Ill.Dec. 754, 430 N.E.2d 1005, 1009.

Plaintiff contends that he set forth legally recognized claims against defendants. Defendants, however, invoke the rule of non-review, upon which the trial court based its dismissal. The rule is that a private hospital's refusal to appoint a physician to its medical staff is not subject to judicial review. (Mauer v. Highland Park Hospital Foundation (1967), 90 Ill.App.2d 409, 412-13, 232 N.E.2d 776, 778.) The rationale behind the rule is the court's unwillingness to substitute its judgment for that of private hospital authorities. 90 Ill.App.2d 409, 415, 232 N.E.2d 776, 779.

Two exceptions to the rule of non-review have developed in Illinois. First, our courts can review the application procedures of a private association when membership in the organization is an economic necessity. (Treister v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (1979), 78 Ill.App.3d 746, 755, 33 Ill.Dec. 501, 507, 396 N.E.2d 1225, 1231.) Second, where a private hospital revokes or reduces a physician's existing staff privileges, the hospital must follow its own bylaws in so doing or be subject to limited judicial review. Jain v. Northwest Community Hospital (1978), 67 Ill.App.3d 420, 425, 24 Ill.Dec. 341, 385 N.E.2d 108, 112.

Plaintiff presents two alternate arguments. He first contends that his action falls within the economic necessity exception to the rule of non-review. Plaintiff secondly asks us to reevaluate the efficacy of the rule itself. We address the second contention first.

II

We must address a preliminary issue before we can reevaluate the efficacy of the rule of non-review of a private hospital's denial of a physician's application for staff membership. We must first determine whether the Illinois Supreme Court has addressed this exact issue, because where our supreme court has declared Illinois law on any point, that court alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion; such a decision binds all other judicial tribunals in this State, and it is the duty of those tribunals to follow such a decision in similar cases. Agricultural Transportation Association v. Carpentier (1953), 2 Ill.2d 19, 27, 116 N.E.2d 863, 867; Stopka v. Lesser (1980), 82 Ill.App.3d 323, 326, 37 Ill.Dec. 779, 781, 402 N.E.2d 781, 783.

The appellate court first recognized the rule of non-review in Mauer v. Highland Park Hospital Foundation (1967), 90 Ill.App.2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776. This court has acknowledged the rule in several subsequent cases (e.g., Rao v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis (1986), 140 Ill.App.3d 442, 456, 94 Ill.Dec. 686, 696, 488 N.E.2d 685, 695; Knapp v. Palos Community Hospital (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 244, 256, 80 Ill.Dec. 442, 451, 465 N.E.2d 554, 563; Spencer v. Community Hospital of Evanston (1980), 87 Ill.App.3d 214, 216, 42 Ill.Dec. 272, 275, 408 N.E.2d 981, 984). Our supreme court has not addressed the issue. Since the appellate court adopted the rule of non-review of a private hospital's denial of a physician's application for staff membership, it is free to modify and interpret the doctrine to correspond with prevalent considerations of public policy and social needs. Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7...