People ex rel. Fahner v. Carriage Way West, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 54118,54118
• Citation: 58 Ill.Dec. 754,430 N.E.2d 1005,88 Ill.2d 300
• Parties: , 58 Ill.Dec. 754, 1981-2 Trade Cases P 64,408 The PEOPLE ex rel. Tyrone FAHNER, Attorney General, Appellant, v. CARRIAGE WAY WEST, INC., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1005

430 N.E.2d 1005

88 Ill.2d 300, 58 Ill.Dec. 754,

1981-2 Trade Cases P 64,408

The PEOPLE ex rel. Tyrone FAHNER, Attorney General, Appellant, v. CARRIAGE WAY WEST, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 54118.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 13, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1982.

Tyrone C. Fahner, Atty. Gen., Chicago (Thomas M. Genovese, Chief, and Stephen P. Juech, Asst. Attys. Gen., Antitrust Div., Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Malato & Stein, P. C., Chicago (Robert S. Minetz and Stephen H. Malato, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Sportsman's Country Club, Inc.

Sidley & Austin, Chicago (Frederic F. Brace, Jr., and William J. Nissen, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Carson Pirie Scott & Co.

SIMON, Justice:

The Attorney General filed a two-count civil complaint in the circuit court of Cook County on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois under the Illinois Antitrust Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 60-7(4)). The complaint alleged that the defendants had entered into a conspiracy to fix the greens fees and golf-cart-rental prices at various golf courses the defendants operated, in violation of section 3(1)(a) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 60-3(1)(a)). While some defendants answered the complaint, denying its allegations, others moved to dismiss the complaints for failure to state a cause of action. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with leave to amend within 60 days pursuant to sections 45 and 48 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, pars. 45, 48). The Attorney General, instead of amending the complaint, asked this court for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus or for a supervisory order. When that motion was denied, the Attorney General returned to the circuit court and sought leave to file an amended complaint instanter, but leave was denied. The cause was later dismissed. The appellate court affirmed (88 Ill.App.3d 297, 43 Ill.Dec. 384, 410 N.E.2d 384), and this court granted leave to appeal under Rule 315 (73 Ill.2d R. 315).

The complaint at issue, after reciting the jurisdiction of the court and the proper venue, defined its terms and named the defendants, who are operators of golf courses in the Chicago area open to the public upon the payment of a fee, known in the trade as a "greens fee." The complaint charged that, except for the illegal activity, all the defendants would have been competitors for the over five million people who had paid greens fees to them in the time covered by the complaint. Also named as a defendant was the Chicagoland Golf Association, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation which claimed all the defendants as members. The association was charged with holding periodic meetings and circulating the minutes of those meetings to all members of the association.

The substance of count I of the complaint was that from November 1970 to and through 1975 the defendants conspired to fix prices. It alleged:

"19. Defendants and co-conspirators have entered into an agreement, understanding, and concert of action the substantial terms of which were to fix, control and maintain the rate of greens fees charged to the general public.

20. That in furtherance of the aforesaid unlawful combination and conspiracy, the defendants and co-conspirators employed the following means and methods, among others:

A. Beginning at least as early as October 1970, and from time to time thereafter, (the exact times being unknown to the plaintiff) the defendants and co-conspirators met at various locations in Cook County and discussed and agreed upon the rate of greens fees to be charged to the general public;

B. On or before March 26, 1974, the exact date being unknown to plaintiff, defendants and co-conspirators agreed to fix a date when reduced winter rates would be discontinued and summer rates would be imposed;

C. Defendants and co-conspirators not in attendance at the aforementioned meetings were informed of the discussions and agreements reached at these meetings by receiving printed minutes prepared by the Secretary of the Association."

A similarly worded count II charged the fixing of golf-cart-rental prices. The claimed effect of each agreement was the suppression of competition. The complaint sought injunctive relief and the maximum penalty of $50,000 against each of the defendants.

The purpose of pleadings is to present, define and narrow the issues and limit the proof needed at trial. Pleadings are not intended to erect barriers to a trial on the merits but instead to remove them and facilitate trial. The object of pleadings is to produce an issue asserted by one side and denied by the other so that a trial may determine the actual truth. (Fleshner v. Copeland (1958), 13 Ill.2d 72, 77, 147 N.E.2d 329; Warnes v. Champaign County Seed Co. (1955), 5 Ill.App.2d 151, 156, 124 N.E.2d 695; McKinney v. Nathan (1954), 1 Ill.App.2d 536, 545, 117 N.E.2d 886.) Perhaps the best measure of a complaint's sufficiency, then, is whether the defendant is able to answer the essential allegations. Most of the defendants were able to do so here, but because some moved instead to dismiss the complaint, further analysis is necessary.

Illinois is a fact-pleading State. This means that although pleadings are to be liberally construed and formal or technical allegations are not necessary, a complaint must, nevertheless, contain facts to state a cause of action. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 31.) Which facts? The complaint is deficient when it fails to allege the facts necessary for the plaintiff to recover. (Fanning v. LeMay (1967), 38 Ill.2d 209, 212, 230 N.E.2d 182.) "But it is a rule of pleading long established, that a pleader is not required to set out his evidence. To the contrary, only the ultimate facts to be proved should be alleged and not the evidentiary facts tending to prove such ultimate facts." Board of Education v. Kankakee Federation of Teachers Local No. 886 (1970), 46 Ill.2d 439, 446-47, 264 N.E.2d 18.

To pass muster a complaint must state a cause of action in two ways. First, it must be legally sufficient; it must set forth a legally recognized claim as its avenue of recovery. When it fails to do this, there is no recourse at law for the injury alleged, and the complaint must be dismissed. (See, e.g., Ritchey v. Maksin (1978), 71 Ill.2d 470, 475, 17 Ill.Dec. 662, 376 N.E.2d 991; Pierce v. Carpentier (1960), 20 Ill.2d 526, 530-31, 169 N.E.2d 747.) Second and unlike Federal practice, the complaint must be factually sufficient; it must plead facts which bring the claim within the legally recognized cause of action alleged. If it does not, the complaint must be dismissed. See, e.g., Van Dekerkhov v. City of Herrin (1972), 51 Ill.2d 374, 376-77, 282 N.E.2d 723.

The complaint here charged a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of section 3(1)(a) of the Illinois Antitrust Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 60-3(1) (a)). There can be no question of its legal sufficiency. Price fixing is a per se violation of our antitrust statute, and by stating the business of the defendants to be golf course operators, the complaint took them out of the statutory exemption provided by section 5(12) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 60-5(12)).

As for factual sufficiency, the ultimate facts needed to prove a violation of section 3(1)(a) are agreements among those who would otherwise be competitors for the purpose or with the effect of fixing the price charged for any goods or service received. These ultimate facts were alleged in paragraph 19 of the complaint with respect to charges for greens fees and in paragraph 23 for golf-cart rentals. In addition, paragraph 20(B) alleged an agreement, entered into prior to March 26, 1974, upon a date on which higher summer rates would be placed in effect.

The complaint, in paragraph 20, also pleaded overt acts by co-conspirators in furtherance of the agreement to fix prices: meetings of co-conspirators to discuss specific prices and then minutes of those meetings circulated to the participants in the conspiracy who had agreed to adhere to the price fixing, but who were not present at the meetings. Under Federal antitrust law, which the Illinois Antitrust Act adopts (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 60-11), no overt act is required to prove a price-fixing conspiracy. (United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940), 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59, 60 S.Ct. 811, 845-46 n.59, 84 L.Ed. 1129, 1168 n.59; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. (1927), 273 U.S. 392, 402, 47 S.Ct. 377, 381, 71 L.Ed. 700, 707; Nash v. United States (1913), 229 U.S. 373, 378, 33 S.Ct. 780, 782, 57 L.Ed. 1232, 1236.) The portion of the complaint alleging overt acts was therefore technically unnecessary. Its presence, however, alleging the manner in which the price-fixing conspiracy was carried out, bolsters the conclusion that the complaint satisfactorily pleaded facts sufficient to show that the plaintiff was not simply paraphrasing the Illinois Antitrust Act. The complaint, on its face, shows that there is a valid issue which, if denied, calls for a trial.

The defendants claim that the complaint does not describe any specific act which evidenced the entry of any particular defendant into the conspiracy. But evidence need not be laid out in the complaint, only the ultimate fact that the defendants agreed to fix prices. The trial, not the pleadings, is the proper place to look for evidence of how and when the illegal agreement was made. As for the details of the agreement, the only terms that had to be pleaded were the object-the fixing of greens fees and golf-cart rentals-and the effect-the suppression of competition. These were alleged as well as the date on which higher summer rates would be instituted. Such specifics as when, where, or through what agent defendants came to agree were not required in the complaint.

The defendants also claim that the complaint's terms are conclusional. The line...