Bartlett v. City of Chi. Sch. Dist. #299
| Decision Date | 17 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 13–cv–2862 |
| Citation | 40 F.Supp.3d 959 |
| Parties | Douglas Bartlett, Plaintiff, v. City of Chicago School District #299, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Dmitry N. Feofanov, Chicagolemonlaw.com, P.C., Lyndon, IL, for Plaintiff.
Kathleen Marie Gibbons, Sunil Kumar, Susan Margaret O'Keefe, Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings [26] filed by Defendants Board of Education of the City of Chicago.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motion [26].
Plaintiff Douglas Bartlett teaches second grade at Washington Irving Elementary School and has worked for the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, School District # 299, for over seventeen years. On August 8, 2011, in connection with a required math lesson about counting money and mathematical toolkits,2 Bartlett displayed several tools to his students. These tools included a box cutter, a 2.25‘ pocketknife, wrenches, screwdrivers, and pliers. As part of his demonstration, Bartlett also described the uses of the tools. Rochelle Bryant, an instructional specialist from the Board, was present in Plaintiff's classroom that morning and observed Plaintiff's demonstration.
On August 19, 2011, Defendant Valeria Bryant,3 the principal at Washington Irving, notified Bartlett that a pre-discipline hearing had been scheduled at school for August 24, 2011, regarding the “tools” incident. Bartlett was charged with negligently supervising children; inattention to duty; violating school rules; repeated or flagrant acts; and possessing, carrying, storing or using a weapon on the job when not authorized to do so. During the hearing, Bartlett was represented by counsel and denied the charges. Principal Bryant served as the hearing officer. After the hearing, Bartlett supplemented the record with a written statement. On September 27, 2011, a Notice of Disciplinary Action was issued by Defendant Bryant. Bryant recommended that Bartlett receive a four-day suspension without pay, finding not credible Plaintiff's claim that the boxer-cutter and knife demonstration was a required component of the math lesson; that he failed to obtain permission to demonstrate use of the box-cutter and knife to his second grade students; and that he failed to maintain his box-cutter in a secure location that was inaccessible to his students.
Plaintiff appealed his suspension to the Board's Office of Employee Relations. The Office of Employee Relations convened a hearing on January 18, 2012, during which Plaintiff was represented by the Chicago Teachers Union. The administrative hearing officer upheld the four-day suspension, finding that (1) Bartlett admitted he showed the box cutter, knife, screwdriver, and other tools to students; (2) he kept the box cutter in the classroom; (3) he placed the box cutter on his desk, which was accessible to students; (4) a pocket knife, box cutter, and screwdriver are explicitly articulated as weapons in the student code of conduct, of which Bartlett, as a teacher, was aware; (5) Bartlett did not receive permission to have these items in his classroom; and (6) Bartlett's tool demonstration was beyond the scope of the lesson that he was to be teaching.
Bartlett's complaint asserts two claims against Defendants. Count I alleges that Bartlett was deprived of his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count II asserts that the disciplinary action against him also violated the due process guarantee of Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution.
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings permits a party to move for judgment after both the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's answer have been filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) ; Moss v. Martin, 473 F.3d 694, 698 (7th Cir.2007). The Court takes all well-pleaded allegations as true, and after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, determines whether the complaint sets forth facts sufficient to support a cognizable legal theory. Scherr v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1073 (7th Cir.2013). As a general rule, “[a] complaint that invokes a recognized legal theory and contains plausible allegations on the material issues cannot be dismissed under Rule 12.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir.2012) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ). But “a complaint that alleges an impenetrable defense to what would otherwise be a good claim should be dismissed (on proper motion) under Rule 12(c).” Id. at 637. That is, “[w]hen the complaint itself contains everything needed to show that the defendant must prevail on tan affirmative defense, then the court can resolve the suit on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).”
If “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,” the Rule 12(c) motion “must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Court may, however, take judicial notice of documents that are part of the public record without triggering the operation of Rule 12(d), including pleadings, orders, and transcripts from prior proceedings in the case. Scherr, 703 F.3d at 1073 (citing Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Res. Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1081–82 (7th Cir.1997).
In Count I, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim for violation of his due process rights,4 claiming that Defendants violated his due process rights by failing to provide advance notice that his actions could result in disciplinary action and by unfairly suspending him for four days without pay. Specifically, Bartlett maintains that he was not aware that he would be subject to a provision of the school's student handbook dealing with, and defining, a “weapon” because he is instructor at Washington Irving Elementary School, not a student.
The Fourteenth Amendment imposes constraints on government actions which deprive an individual of “liberty” or “property” interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). To assert a violation of the Due Process Clause, Plaintiff must be able to show that he had a “property interest” and that he was deprived of this interest without due process of law. See Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) ). Property interests are not created by the United States Constitution; “[r]ather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”Moore v. Muncie Police and Fire Merit Com'n, 312 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir.2002) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) ). For example, in the context of fired public employee bringing a procedural due process claim against his employers, the Seventh Circuit has stated that “[a] property interest in continued employment ‘can be created in one of two ways, (1) by an independent source such as state law securing certain benefits; or (2) by a clearly implied promise of continued employment.’ ” Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir.2010) (citing Phelan, 347 F.3d at 681 ); see also Lee v. County of Cook, 862 F.2d 139, 141 (7th Cir.1988) ; Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 519–20 (7th Cir.2007). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he had a property interest in his employment as a public school teacher. See Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir.2007) ().
Here, Bartlett is a tenured teacher and under Illinois law he may not “be removed except for cause.” 105 ILCS 5/34–85 ; see also Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 673 (7th Cir.2001). Consequently, Bartlett had a protected property interest from, at a minimum, not being fired from his teaching position. Id. ; see also Gleason v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 792 F.2d 76, 79 (7th Cir.1986) ; Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 542 (7th Cir.1982) (). Even though Bartlett was not fired—rather, he was suspended for four days without pay and his record now reflects that he was disciplined for his conduct in August 2011—Seventh Circuit precedent instructs that a plaintiff has a protectable property interest “if he had been suspended for however short time without full pay.” Swick v. City of Chicago, 11 F.3d 85, 87 (7th Cir.1993). Thus, on these facts, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged a protectable property interest with respect to his suspension.
Plaintiff claims in his response brief that his “due process claim is not based on a violation of fundamental rights or actions that ‘shock the conscience.” See Pl.'s Resp. at 6. He also did not label his claim as one for procedural due process nor did he respond directly to Defendant's argument regarding procedural due process. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his due process rights were violated because he did not have notice that his conduct could subject him to potential discipline and that he had no notice that a knife and box cutter were included in the Board's definition of “weapon” because that term was not defined in the Board's Employee Discipline and Due Process Code (rather only in the Board's Student...
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