Bartlett v. Raidart

• Decision Date: 14 June 1928
• Citation: 142 A. 398,107 Conn. 691
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BARTLETT v. RAIDART.

142 A. 398

107 Conn. 691

BARTLETT v. RAIDART.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 14, 1928

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Litchfield County; Elbert B Hamlin, Judge.

Action by Henrietta Bartlett against George H. Raidart, executor, to recover for services alleged to have been rendered defendant's intestate, brought to the court of common pleas for Litchfield county and tried to the court. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Error, and judgment directed for plaintiff, with a new trial only for assessment of damages.

Ordinarily rendering and acceptance of valuable services affords strong basis for inference that services were to be paid for.

Hadleigh H. Howd, of Winsted, for appellant.

Wilbur G. Manchester, of Winsted, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The action is for services which the plaintiff claims she rendered the defendant executor's intestate, Mrs. Anna Smith, between September 6 and December 4, 1926. The plaintiff, a qualified trained nurse, resided in Winsted near the residence of Mrs. Smith, and was employed by the Winsted Visiting Nurse Association daily from 9 a. m. until 5 p. m., except on Saturday afternoons and Sundays. Mrs. Smith was a widow in her ninety-first year and lived with her son. On the night of September 4, 1926, Mrs. Smith's son became ill, and she called the plaintiff, then a stranger to her, to come to her home and care for him. He was removed to the hospital the third day thereafter; on that night Mrs. Smith telephoned the plaintiff to come to her home and remain with her that night, as she was afraid to remain alone. The plaintiff spent between these dates 89 nights at the residence of Mrs. Smith; she slept with her much of the time, rendered her all the care deemed necessary, prepared and gave her such stimulants and water as she desired, gave her a bath each Saturday night, and rendered her assistance when she had soiled her clothes. The services could have been rendered by a person not a trained nurse, but not so efficiently. Mrs. Smith's meals were prepared at the adjacent residence of Mrs. Bond, where the plaintiff lodged and boarded. The plaintiff took meals to Mrs. Smith, and on Saturday afternoons and Sundays took her own meals to Mrs. Smith's, in order to keep her company, but paid for her own meals and lodgings at Mrs. Bond's. On some of these Saturday afternoons and Sundays during this period the plaintiff took Mrs. Smith to ride in the automobile of the nursing association which she was accustomed to use. Mrs. Smith did not employ a doctor during this period. She did not require the care of a trained nurse. She did need companionship at night when alone in her home.

When the plaintiff at one time suggested to Mrs. Smith that she discontinue her attendance, Mrs. Smith requested her to remain. The plaintiff had an impression that Mrs. Smith would leave her something in her will. Mrs. Smith never said specifically that she would, but did say that the plaintiff would be taken care of. The plaintiff never asked any payment of, or rendered any bill to, Mrs. Smith, nor kept any account of services rendered to Mrs. Smith, or discussed the subject of payment with her. On December 4, 1926, Mrs. Smith moved to the residence of Mrs. Bond, and thereafter the plaintiff rendered no services to Mrs. Smith. The plaintiff made out against the estate of Mrs. Smith a bill at the rate of $5 a night, and later another bill at the rate of $3 a night. The plaintiff first valued her services for the Sundays at $5 a day, and later at $3.

The facts found by the trial court do not establish an express contract, either written or oral. Neither do they establish a quasi contract, which is not a contract at all, but an obligation which the law creates out of the circumstances present, although the contractor did not assume the obligation, and may not have intended it, but in fact actually dissented from it. Unjust enrichment is said to be the most important source of quasi contractual obligations. We described in Sibley v. State, 89 Conn. 682, 686, 96 A. 161, 162 (L. R. A. 1916C, 1087), the quasi contract in these terms:

" The term ‘ quasi contract’ describes a situation where there is an obligation or duty arising by law upon which the same remedy is given as would be given if the obligation or duty arose out of contract. The term itself implies that the obligation or duty is not a contractual one."

The civilians termed these " obligations quasi ex contractu." These classes of contracts were very commonly denominated " implied contracts," a...