Sibley v. State

• Decision Date: 17 December 1915
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SIBLEY v. STATE.

96 A. 161

89 Conn. 682

SIBLEY

v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 17, 1915.

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Windham County; James H. Webb, Judge.

On claim of Kate B. Sibley against the State under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there was a finding and award by the Compensation Commissioner for the Second District, from which the State appealed to the superior court, which reserves the case for the advice of the Supreme Court. Judgment setting aside award advised.

George E. Hinman, Atty. Gen., and William A. King, of Willimantic, for the State. Charles E. Searls, of Putnam, and Harry E. Back, of Danielson, for appellee.

THAYER, J. Preston B. Sibley, the duly elected and qualified sheriff of Windham county, in undertaking to board a trolley car to go from his home to Putnam in connection with the duties of his office was thrown to the ground and received injuries which resulted in his death a short time afterwards. The Constitution of the state (article 28 of the amendments) directs that a sheriff shall be elected in the several counties and the statutes of the state provide the manner of his election by the electors of the county and fix the duties and salary attached to the office in each county, and provide that the salary shall be paid by the state. The claimant was his wife and dependent and seeks compensation from the state for his injury and death under the provisions of part B of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913 (Public Acts 1913, chapter 138). The commissioner of the second district awarded her compensation, and from that award the state appealed to the superior court, which reserved the case upon the facts found by the commissioner for the advice of this court.

That the injury which caused Sheriff Sibley's death arose out of and in the course of his employment so as to entitle him to compensation, provided he was an employé of the state within the meaning of the act, has not been questioned before us. The state's claim is that according to the definition of the word employé given in part B, section 43, of the act, he was not its employé.

Part B, section 43, gives the following def inition of employé and employer:

"'Employee' shall mean any person who has entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer. 'Employer' shall mean any natural person, corporation, firm, partnership, or joint stock association, the state, and any public corporation within the state using the services of another for pay; it includes also the legal representative of any such employer."

The commissioner held that the sheriff, when in the performance of his duties as such, was an employé of the state within the meaning of the statute. As the statute by defining employé leaves no question as to its meaning, the commissioner must have held, and his memorandum of decision shows that he did hold, that the sheriff was working under a contract with the state while performing the duties of his office. In this he was in error. The office of sheriff antedates the Constitution of the state, and that instrument as already noticed directs that a person shall be appointed to fill that office. Among the duties imposed by statute upon the incumbent of the office is the conservation of the public peace within his county, and he is authorized to suppress all tumults riots, unlawful assemblies, and breaches of the peace with strong hand, and may raise the power of the county and command any person to assist him in the execution of his office. General Statutes, § 1759. The rights, authority, and duty thus conferred upon the sheriff by law clearly invests him with a portion of the sovereign power of the government to be exercised by him for the public good. The office of sheriff is thus a public office as defined by us in State ex rel. Stage v. Mackie, 82 Conn. 398, 401, 74 Atl. 759, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 660, and numerous other cases and by, so far as we know, all courts and text-writers. The incumbent of such an office holds it as a trust from the state not resting upon contract. State v. Pinkerman, 63 Conn. 176, 182, 28 Atl. 110, 22 L. R. A. 653. He is a preserver of the public peace; he is not the hired servant of a master; no contract relation exists between him and the community or state. Farrell v. Bridgeport, 45 Conn. 191, 195. In Seymour v. Over-River School District, 53 Conn. 502, 509, 3 Atl. 552, as showing that a teacher in a school district is not a public officer, it was said:

"He is not usually elected or appointed, but is employed—contracted with."

Mechem, Public Officers, §§ 855, 856 says:

"The relation between the officer and the public is not the creature of contract nor is the office itself a contract. So his right to compensation is not the creature of contract. It exists if it exist at all as the creation of the law, and when it so exists it belongs to him not by force of any contract, but because the law attaches it to the office. Unless compensation is by law attached to the office none can be recovered."

Compensation to a public officer is a matter of statute and not of contract, and it does not depend upon the amount or value of the services performed, but is incidental to the office. State v. Gordon, 245 Mo. 12, 149 S. W. 638, 641; Leonard v. City of Terre Haute, 48 Ind. App. 104, 93 N. E. 872. A salary is attached to the office to enable the incumbent the better to perform the duties of his office. State v. Hawkins, 44 Ohio St. 98, 110, 5 N. E. 228. It is the substantially universal rule that a person who is elected or appointed to a public office to which no salary or compensation is attached by law, can recover no compensation for his services, although he qualifies and performs its duties, and for the reason that no contractual relation exists between him and the governmental agency by whom he is elected or appointed.

But it...