Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 March 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 65297,65297 |
| Citation | 303 S.E.2d 129,166 Ga.App. 1 |
| Parties | BARTLEY v. AUGUSTA COUNTRY CLUB, INC. et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
W. Barry Williams, Augusta, for appellant.
Wyck A. Knox, Jr., W.M. Fulcher, Augusta, for appellees.
This appeal arises from the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of appellees in this action brought by the aggrieved wife of a former member of appellee Augusta Country Club, Inc. ("Club"), a non-profit corporation. In addition to the Club, appellant sued the manager (Kendall) and an employee (Anderson) of the Club. Appellant's complaint arises from her six-month suspension from the use of club facilities for conduct "endangering the good order, welfare or character of the club." The conduct giving rise to the suspension involved a confrontation between appellant and Anderson, during which appellant allegedly made derogatory comments about Anderson. Subsequent to the filing of this action, appellant's husband was expelled from the Club, which expulsion is the subject of another suit.
Appellant seeks special, general, and punitive damages totalling $1,000,000, arising from the alleged impairment of "vested property" and constitutional rights as a result of her suspension and her husband's subsequent expulsion. She also alleges that the action taken by the Club was contrary to its by-laws.
1. Appellant has no "vested property rights" in the Club. It is clear from the record that she was not a member of the Club but merely had the privilege to use club facilities as the spouse of a "senior resident member." The action taken by the Club in suspending appellant was an action taken against her husband's membership to the extent that it reduced the benefits and privileges normally incident thereto. Irrespective of any property rights her husband may have or may have had in the Club (see Code Ann. § 22-2501(b)) (OCGA § 14-3-80(b) ), appellant has never been a member of the Club, as defined by its by-laws (see Code Ann. § 22-2102(f) (OCGA § 14-3-2(8) ), and could not have obtained any property rights in its assets.
2. The bulk of appellant's claims appear to be based on numerous alleged ways in which the Club's action in suspending her violated her constitutional rights. However, disciplinary actions taken by a private, social club against its members are not matters of constitutional law. Appellant's rights, if any, are governed by the by-laws, which constitute the agreement between the corporation and its members. Hornady v. Goodman, 167 Ga. 555, 572, 146 S.E. 173; Tuttle v. Walton, 1 Ga. 43, 48-49.
3. The trial court erred, however, in awarding the Club summary judgment. The record in its present state does not eliminate every genuine issue of material fact (Code Ann. § 81A-156) (OCGA § 9-11-56) concerning the propriety of the Club's action in suspending appellant in view of the provisions of the by-laws dealing with expulsion. Article IX, Section 1, of the by-laws permits the Board of Governors of the Club to suspend "a member " of the Club "[i]n the event of an infraction of any By-Law or Rule of the Club, or of any conduct on the part of a member which may tend to endanger the good order, welfare or character of the Club ..." However, as noted above, appellant was not a member of the Club, nor is the term "member" defined in the by-laws so as to be inclusive of appellant. Consequently, the suspension and expulsion provisions contained in the by-laws do not authorize the action taken against appellant, although Article IX was the express basis for the Board's action against her.
This is not to say that the Board's action was not authorized by the by-laws. Article II, Section 4, provides that "[t]he Board shall have the power ... to make and amend rules; receive and adjust complaints ... [and] shall have the power to fix penalties for the violation of by-laws, rules and regulations and shall also have the power to remit penalties for such violations." Although the penalty imposed was a matter within the Board's discretion and the record to date contains no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Board, it is not clear which by-law, rule, or regulation, if any, appellant violated so as to justify her suspension. Thus, we cannot hold that the Board's action was authorized as a matter of law.
4. We agree with appellees' position that judicial...
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...Savoca Masonry Co. Inc. v. Homes & Son Const. Co. Inc., 112 Ariz. 392, 542 P.2d 817 (1975); see also Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, Inc., 166 Ga.App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 129 (1983); Orchard Ridge Country Club, Inc. v. Schrey, 470 N.E.2d 780 (Ind.App.1984); Kendrick v. Watermill Beach Club, Inc.......
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Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, Inc.
...was taken from the grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the background facts of this case see Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, 166 Ga.App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 129 wherein this court affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court judgment awarding summary judgment to the In......
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Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, Inc.
...assisting his wife to sue the club, thereby putting its reputation and financial resources in jeopardy (see Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, 166 Ga.App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 129 (1983)); assisting his wife in preparing and distributing a letter derogatory of the club's actions; causing disruption ......