Bartley v. City of High Point

• Decision Date: 07 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. COA19-1127,COA19-1127
• Citation: 846 S.E.2d 750
• Parties: Bruce Allen BARTLEY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HIGH POINT and Matt Blackman in his Official Capacity as a Police Officer with the City of High Point, and Individually, Defendants.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

846 S.E.2d 750

Bruce Allen BARTLEY, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF HIGH POINT and Matt Blackman in his Official Capacity as a Police Officer with the City of High Point, and Individually, Defendants.

No. COA19-1127

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: July 7, 2020

The Deuterman Law Group, by Seth R. Cohen, Greensboro, for plaintiff.

Poyner Spruill LLP, Raleigh, by David L. Woodard and Brett A. Carpenter, for defendant-Matt Blackman.

ARROWOOD, Judge.

Officer Matt Blackman ("Officer Blackman" or "defendant") appeals from order partially denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment/arrest, and assault and battery filed against Officer Blackman in his individual capacity. Officer Blackman contends the trial court erred in denying summary judgment based on the defense of public official immunity. He further requests that this Court address the merits of the claims against him. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon the public official immunity defense and decline to reach the merits of the underlying claims.

I. Background

On 23 August 2017, Officer Blackman, a police officer with defendant-City of High Point, was driving in an unmarked car when he observed plaintiff pass a slow-moving truck over a double yellow line in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-146(a). Officer Blackman believed the truck was not moving so slow as to impede the flow of traffic, and decided to initiate a traffic stop of plaintiff's vehicle. Though Officer Blackman's official job duty is as a detective in the Violent Crimes Unit, he occasionally engages in traffic enforcement as well. As he began to follow after plaintiff's vehicle, Officer Blackman testified that he activated his blue strobe lights and siren. Officer Blackman believed he was soon able to draw near enough to plaintiff such that plaintiff should have reasonably been able to see his blue lights and hear his sirens. However, he was unable to get close enough to plaintiff's vehicle to initiate a traffic stop. He observed plaintiff make a left turn onto a street leading to a residence at a speed which made him become concerned that plaintiff was aware he was behind him and was attempting to make it to the residence. Officer Blackman further testified that, based on his training and experience, it is not uncommon for people to try to get to a driveway and park their vehicle.

Plaintiff pulled into the driveway of a residence and Officer Blackman pulled in behind him. Officer Blackman had deactivated his siren shortly before pulling into the driveway, but left his blue strobe lights on. Plaintiff, who was 60-years old at the time, testified he exited his vehicle and was headed towards the back of it when he first noticed Officer Blackman. Officer Blackman got out of his vehicle and twice ordered plaintiff to get back into his car. Officer Blackman did not identify himself as a police officer or state the reason for his traffic stop, and though his blue strobe lights were reportedly on, he was driving an unmarked car and dressed in plainclothes. In addition, plaintiff testified that Officer Blackman was initially standing behind the front door of his vehicle, which blocked the police badge at his waist from plaintiff's view. Plaintiff, who testified he was unaware Officer Blackman was a police officer and also did not notice the blue strobe lights on Officer Blackman's vehicle, told Officer Blackman that he was on private property and refused to get back into his car. He then proceeded to move towards the back of his car to retrieve his sick cat from the back seat, closer to Officer Blackman.

Following plaintiff's refusal to follow his orders, Officer Blackman used his radio to request that a backup unit be sent to his location because he believed there might be an officer safety issue. Plaintiff testified that as his back was turned, Officer Blackman "body slammed" him against the trunk of his car, handcuffed him, and informed him that he was being detained. Officer Blackman testified that, due to plaintiff ignoring his commands and the manner in which he approached him, he believed that the safest course of action was to handcuff plaintiff. After plaintiff was handcuffed, he turned and noticed the badge and service weapon on Officer Blackman's belt. Officer Blackman charged plaintiff with resisting, delaying, or obstructing an officer in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-233 for ignoring his commands and tensing his arm while being handcuffed. He also charged plaintiff for passing the double yellow line in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-146(a). Plaintiff was patted down and detained for 20-25 minutes at his residence. At one point, he asked Officer Blackman to loosen the handcuffs because they were too tight, but Officer Blackman refused. Officer Blackman released plaintiff after he finished conducting the traffic stop and wrote him a citation.

Plaintiff completed driving school and community service and the two charges against him were dropped. On 20 December 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of High Point and Officer Blackman in both his official and individual capacity, alleging assault and battery, false imprisonment/ false arrest, and malicious prosecution. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was forcibly thrown against the trunk of his car, handcuffed, and charged with resisting an officer. In response, defendants asserted the defenses of governmental and public official immunity. On 19 September 2019, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On 21 October 2019, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the City of High Point and Officer Blackman in his official capacity on the grounds that sovereign immunity barred those claims. The trial court denied the motion with respect to the claims against Officer Blackman in his individual capacity. On 23 October 2019, Officer Blackman filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's order partially denying his motion.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Officer Blackman contends the trial court erred in partially denying his motion for summary judgment on the defense of public official immunity and on the claims against him in his individual capacity. Defendant further requests that this Court address the merits of the claims against him.

Defendant appeals from an interlocutory order, from which "a party [generally] has no right to immediate appellate review[.]" Tise v. Yates Const. Co., Inc. , 122 N.C. App. 582, 584, 471 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1996) (citation omitted). However, "this Court has previously held that a public official ... may immediately appeal from an interlocutory order denying a summary judgment motion based on public official immunity." Wilcox v. City of Asheville , 222 N.C. App. 285, 288, 730 S.E.2d 226, 230 (2012) (citing Free Spirit Aviation, Inc. v. Rutherford Airport Auth. , 191 N.C. App. 581, 583, 664 S.E.2d 8, 10 (2008) ). "Immediate appeal of such interlocutory orders is allowed because ‘the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action.’ " Thompson v. Town of Dallas , 142 N.C. App. 651, 653, 543 S.E.2d 901, 903 (2001) (quoting Epps v. Duke University, Inc. , 122 N.C. App. 198, 201, 468 S.E.2d 846, 849 (1996) ).

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2019). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Thompson , 142 N.C. App. at 654, 543 S.E.2d at 904.

"We review a trial court order granting or denying a summary judgment motion on a de novo basis, with our examination of the trial court's order focused on determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Beeson v. Palombo , 220 N.C. App. 274, 277, 727 S.E.2d 343, 346-47 (2012) (quoting Cox v. Roach , 218 N.C. App. 311, 321, 723 S.E.2d 340, 347 (2012) ). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences of fact against the movant and in favor of the nonmovant. Showalter v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety , 183 N.C. App. 132, 137, 643 S.E.2d 649, 652 (2007) (citations omitted).

A. Public Official Immunity

Officer Blackman contends that, because he was a public official conducting his duty, he is entitled to the protection of public official immunity. "Public official immunity is ‘a derivative form’ of governmental immunity, which precludes suits against public officials in their individual capacities[.]" Wilcox , 222 N.C. App. at 288, 730 S.E.2d at 230 (internal citation omitted). "Police officers engaged in performing their duties are public officials for the purposes of public official immunity [and] ... ‘enjoy[ ] absolute immunity from personal liability for discretionary acts done without corruption or malice.’ " Lopp v. Anderson , 251 N.C. App. 161, 168, 795 S.E.2d 770, 776 (2016) (quoting Campbell v. Anderson , 156 N.C. App. 371, 376, 576 S.E.2d 726, 730 (2003) ). Thus, a police officer is generally "immune from suit unless the challenged action was (1) outside the scope of official authority, (2) done with malice, or (3) corrupt." Wilcox , 222 N.C. App. at 288, 730 S.E.2d at 230 (citing Smith v. State , 289 N.C. 303, 331, 222 S.E.2d 412, 430 (1976) ).

Here, plaintiff alleges Officer Blackman acted with malice by body slamming him into the trunk of his car and charging and arresting him for resisting an officer without probable cause, and is therefore not entitled to public official immunity. " ‘A defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does...