Showalter v. Dept. of Crime Control

• Decision Date: 01 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. COA06-757.,COA06-757.
• Citation: 643 S.E.2d 649
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Gary Winton SHOWALTER, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL AND PUBLIC SAFETY, State Highway Patrol Division, and Willie E. Emmons, in his official and individual capacity, Defendants.

643 S.E.2d 649

Gary Winton SHOWALTER, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL AND PUBLIC SAFETY, State Highway Patrol Division, and Willie E. Emmons, in his official and individual capacity, Defendants.

No. COA06-757.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

May 1, 2007.

Appeal by defendants from order entered 6 March 2006 by Judge Michael E. Beale in Cabarrus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 March 2007.

David Q. Burgess, Charlotte, for plaintiff-appellee.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Michael R. Epperly, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants-appellants.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff brought this action alleging claims against defendant Emmons, a member of the North Carolina State Highway Patrol, and the North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety. The claims arose from an incident which occurred on 25 January 2004 on Interstate Highway 85 in Mecklenburg County when Trooper Emmons stopped plaintiff and attempted to issue him a citation for traveling at a speed greater than reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions. When plaintiff protested, a scuffle ensued and Trooper Emmons subdued plaintiff with the use of pepper spray and handcuffs. Plaintiff was subsequently arrested and charged with resisting, delaying or obstructing a law enforcement officer. Both charges were later dismissed by the trial court after Trooper Emmons was twice absent from court when plaintiff's trial was scheduled.

In his suit, plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages alleging state tort claims against Trooper Emmons, in his individual and official capacities, for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and assault and battery, as well as a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also asserted claims against Trooper Emmons and the Department alleging violation of his rights under §§ 19-21 and 35-36 of the North Carolina Constitution.

Defendants answered, denying the material allegations of the complaint and asserting, inter alia, the affirmative defenses of sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and public official immunity. After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's North Carolina constitutional claims against Trooper Emmons and the Department, but denied defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's state tort and 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims, concluding there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. Defendants appeal.

The order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order which, as a general rule, is not immediately appealable unless a substantial right of one of the parties would be adversely affected if the appeal is delayed until a final judgment. See N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 1-277, 7A-27(d) (2005); Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C.App. 162, 164, 265 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1980). However, this Court has repeatedly held that the denial of a motion for summary judgment grounded on the defense of governmental immunity affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable. See Derwort v. Polk County, 129 N.C.App. 789, 792, 501 S.E.2d 379, 381 (1998); Hedrick v. Rains, 121 N.C.App. 466, 466 S.E.2d 281, aff'd, 344 N.C. 729, 477 S.E.2d 171 (1996). "We allow interlocutory appeals in these situations because the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action." Epps v. Duke University, Inc., 122 N.C.App. 198, 201, 468 S.E.2d 846, 849 (1996) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, to the extent defendants appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment grounded on the affirmative defense of immunity, their appeal is properly before us. Price v. Davis, 132 N.C.App. 556, 558-59, 512 S.E.2d 783, 785-86 (1999). With respect to the balance of their arguments, however, defendants have shown no substantial right which would be lost or irreparably prejudiced if the order is not reviewed before final judgment and those arguments are premature. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978).

A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewable de novo to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003). The burden is upon the party moving for summary judgment to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2006); Lowe v. Bradford, 305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1982).

Defendants argue the trial court erred in concluding that Trooper Emmons was not entitled to qualified immunity because the right which plaintiff alleges to have been violated was not clearly established at the time and because a reasonable officer would not have known that Trooper Emmons' actions violated that right. The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials from personal liability "`insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Andrews v. Crump, 144 N.C.App. 68, 75-76, 547 S.E.2d 117, 122, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 215, 553 S.E.2d 907 (2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410 (1982)).

Turning first to the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Court has held that ruling on a defense of qualified immunity requires (1) identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether the right was clearly established at the time it was allegedly violated; and (3) if so, then determining whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have known that his actions violated that right. Lee v. Greene, 114 N.C.App. 580, 585, 442 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1994). While the first two requirements entail purely legal conclusions, the third may require factual determinations respecting disputed aspects of the officer's conduct. . . . Thus, "[i]f there are genuine issues of historical fact respecting the officer's conduct or its reasonableness under the circumstances, summary judgment is not appropriate, and the issue must be reserved for trial." Id. (quoting Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir.1992)) (internal citations omitted).

In this case, the plaintiff's § 1983 claim alleged that his right to be free from false arrest, and his right to be free from the use of excessive force had been violated by the defendants. Defendants argue that Trooper Emmons had probable cause to arrest and use force against plaintiff, and therefore these claims must fail as a matter of law. However, in analogous cases, we have held that when, as in the case at bar, the nature and course of events are disputed, "[t]he trier of fact must determine exactly what transpired and, based on those facts, determine if probable cause existed." Glenn-Robinson v. Acker, 140 N.C.App. 606, 621, 538 S.E.2d 601, 612 (2000).

We further note that we have held that the right to be free from false arrest is a firmly established right for § 1983 purposes. Id. We have held the same with respect to the right to be free from the use of excessive force. Barnett v. Karpinos, 119 N.C.App. 719, 724, 460 S.E.2d 208, 211-12 (1995). These decisions predate the events that gave rise to this case. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court erred in determining that such rights existed, and were known to...