Barton v. Beck Estate

• Citation: 195 A.2d 63,159 Me. 446
• Parties: Mary Griffin BARTON v. Winifred M. BECK'S ESTATE.
• Decision Date: 20 November 1963
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

Page 63

195 A.2d 63

159 Me. 446

Mary Griffin BARTON v. Winifred M. BECK'S ESTATE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 20, 1963.

Richard B. Sanborn, Augusta, for plaintiff.

Arthur A. Peabody, Portland, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN, SIDDALL and MARDEN, JJ.

WILLIAMSON, Chief Justice.

This case is before us on appeal from the disallowance of the will of Winifred M. Beck in the Supreme Court of Probate. The will was allowed in the Probate Court without a contest. On appeal to the Court below the contestant, an heir of the deceased, raised issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

First: At the outset before reaching the merits the proponent of the will contends that the presiding Justice in the Supreme Court of Probate found (a) lack of testamentary capacity, and (b) undue influence; that such findings are irreconcilable and inconsistent; and that without more the judgment should be vacated.

From our review of the opinion of the Justice, we are satisfied that he did not base his decision on a finding of lack of testamentary capacity. On the contrary, we conclude the undue influence was the ground for disallowance of the will.

Under the heading 'testamentary capacity' the Justice said:

'The testimony [of the contestant's witnesses] imposed upon the proponent the burden of satisfying the Court that the will was the free, untrammeled and intelligent expression of the wishes and intention of the testatrix. To the contrary, the explanation given in the testimony of the principal beneficiary and his attorney satisfies the Court that the will was not the untrammeled expression of the testatrix, but was the product of a weakened mind imposed upon by those in whom she had placed her trust.'

Under the heading 'undue influence' the Justice repeated the quoted statement with insignificant differences.

This is the language of undue influence not of testamentary capacity. 'Was there proof of facts from which the presiding justice could properly infer and conclude that the mind of Christos Dilios at the time he executed the instrument now before us for interpretation was not free and untrammelled?' Casco Bk. & Tr. Co. and Tomuschat, Applits., 156 Me. 508, 537, 167 A.2d 571, 586.

'Fraud and undue influence in this connection mean whatever destroys free agency and constrains the person whose act is under review to do that which is contrary to his own untrammelled desire.' Neill v. Brackett, 234 Mass. 367, 126 N.E. 93, 94.

Testamentary capacity is concerned with the 'sound and disposing mind' and not with undue influences operating upon such a mind. Waning, Applt., 151 Me. 239, 250, 117 A.2d 347; Royal et al., Appellants, 152 Me. 242, 245, 127 A.2d 484. This of course does not deny the bearing of susceptibility to influence in determining the strength of the mind under consideration.

The principle stated by the Justice was not applicable to testamentary capacity but to undue influence. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider questions of irreconcilability or inconsistency raised by the proponent. The factual premise on which the issue rests does not here exist.

Second: With the elimination of the issue of testamentary capacity, the decisive issue is whether there was evidence warranting the finding of undue influence and the disallowance of the will in its entirety.

The governing principles of law are well established. The findings of fact of the Justice in the Supreme Court of Probate stand unless clearly erroneous.

'Unless the decrees of the presiding justice of the Supreme Court of Probate are clearly erroneous, there is no other course for us to follow except to overrule the exceptions and affirm the decrees.

'This is the admonition given us by Rule 52(a), M.R.C.P. which reads in part as follows:

"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroncous, (emphasis supplied) and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.'

'As pointed out in the very recent decision of Harriman v. Spaulding, 156 Me. 440, 165 A.2d 47, this rule now spells out in definite and positive language the applicable standard previously set forth in a long line of decisions of this court, and applies to findings of a single justice sitting in the Supreme Court of Probate.' Casco Bk. & Tr. Co. and Tomuschat, Applts., supra, 156 Me. at 537, 167 A.2d at 586.

'Undue influence' has been defined in language repeatedly approved by our Court, as follows:

'By undue influence in this class of cases is meant influence, in connection with the execution of the will and operating at the time the will is made, amounting to moral coercion, destroying free agency, or importunity which could not be resisted, so that the testator, unable to withstand the influence, or too weak to resist it, was constrained to do that which was not his actual will but against it.' Rogers, Appellant, 123 Me. 459, 461, 123 A. 634, 636; Casco Bank & Trust Co. and Tomuschat, Appellants, supra, 156 Me. at 513, 167 A.2d at 574; Thibault, Applt. v. Est. Fortin, 152 Me. 59, 61, 122 A.2d 545; Royal et al., Appellants, 152 Me. 242, 250, 127 A.2d 484.

The burden of proof of establishing undue influence is upon the contestant. Casco, supra.

When there exists a confidential or trust relationship on the part of a beneficiary with the alleged testator, the law requires 'the closest scrutiny and most careful examination of all of the surrounding circumstances * * *. Such a condition might, as a matter of fact, cast upon the proponent the burden of explanation, and the absence of satisfactory explanation would be an additional fact of more or less weight.' O'Brien, Appellant, 100 Me. 156, 169, 60 A. 880, 885.

The risk of persuasion, that is to say the burden of proof, is not thereby changed. At most, the confidential or trust relationship on the facts as they develop in the given case may permit, but may not require, a finding of undue influence. As the Court said in O'Brien, supra, 100 Me. at 169, 60 A. 880, 886; 'The issue is one of fact, to be determined by the tribunal to which it is submitted, and we do not approve of a statement to the effect that any particular evidence is sufficient to change the issue from one of fact to one of law.' See also Mooney v. McKenzie, 324 Mass. 685, 88 N.E.2d 546; Reilly v. McAuliffe, 331 Mass. 144, 117 N.E.2d 811; 57 Am.Jur., Wills § 389. 'Extent of evidence to rebut presumption. Inferences of undue influence which arise from the fact that testator and beneficiary were in relations of trust and confidence, are inferences of fact, and may be rebutted by any competent evidence. If the evidence makes out a strong case of undue influence, the proponent must meet such evidence with a high degree of proof.' 3 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills § 29.82.

See In Re Hess's Will, 48 Minn. 504, 51 N.W. 614, 31 Am.St.Rep., 665, with annotation at p. 670.

The Justice could properly have found as follows:

Miss Winifred M. Beck, eighty years of age, executed the purported will at Freeport on March 24, 1960. For many years prior to 1959 she lived in Boston where she had been employed as a secretary until retirement. Occasionally she had made visits to Freeport where she was born.

In 1959 on the death of two cousins she returned to Freeport. Russell G. Jeannotte (the proponent), an undertaker in Freeport, and Miss Bertha E. Rideout, his attorney, brought her from Boston. She occupied a house formerly belonging to a deceased cousin and then owned by Mr. Jeannotte at a rental of $150 a month, an amount fixed by the rental she had been paying in Boston. Mr. Jeannotte arranged that Mrs. Langley who had served as housekeeper for the deceased cousins should continue in a like capacity with Miss Beck. Within a few days he became Miss Beck's confidential advisor. He took over the management of her affairs. For example, he did her banking, kept financial records, and prepared checks for her signature. There was ample evidence to satisfy the Court that Mr. Jeannotte acted in a fiduciary capacity with relation to Miss Beck and her affairs.

From 1959 Miss Beck's mind was deteriorating. She was forgetful, easily confused, and did not see well. Her mind was seriously weakened.

In March 1960 Mr. Jeannotte informed his attorney, Miss Rideout, that Miss Beck wanted to see her. The attorney met...