Reilly v. McAuliffe

Citation117 N.E.2d 811,331 Mass. 144
PartiesREILLY v. McAULIFFE et al.
Decision Date26 February 1954
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Edward O. Proctor, Boston, for petitioner.

Edward H. Stevens, Brockton, Eben G. Townes, Brockton, for respondents.

Before QUA, C. J., and WILKINS, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

This case comes here on the petitioner's appeal from a decree disallowing an instrument purporting to be a codicil to the will of Mary A. Donovan, late of Brockton. The judge made findings of material facts and the evidence is reported.

The facts are in substance these: On August 4, 1948, Mary A. Donovan, hereinafter called the testatrix, executed her will. There was no contest with respect to this instrument and it was admitted to probate. After making pecuniary bequests amounting to $3,650 and bequests of certain personal effects, the testatrix under the twelfth clause of her will gave the residue of her estate to James, Marion, and Charles Pyne, children of her niece by the half blood, Elizabeth Pyne; to Mary Creeden, John and James McAuliffe, children of her sister Hannah McAuliffe; and to Margaret, Mary Ellen and George Twomey, children of her sister Ellen Twomey, share and share alike. Madeleine L. Reilly, hereinafter called the petitioner, was named executrix.

An instrument purporting to be a codicil to this will was executed by the testatrix on May 26, 1951, ten days before her death. By its terms clauses 6, 7, and 12 of the will were revoked and new provisions were substituted. A legacy of $200 to her nephew George Twomey under the sixth clause was increased to $1,000, and a legacy of $25 to Annie Reilly (the petitioner's mother) under the seventh clause was increased to $50. Under the substituted twelfth (residuary) clause the petitioner was made the sole legatee. If the codicil is allowed the petitioner would receive the major portion of the estate, the value of which is approximately $20,000.

The testatrix, a maiden lady, was eighty-one years of age when she died. For many years she had been employed as a domestic servant in various households. When not employed she lived in the home of her sister Ellen Twomey in Brockton and for a while she stayed with her sister Hannah McAuliffe who also lived in Brockton. In 1946 she rented a room in the home of the petitioner's mother, Mrs. Annie Reilly, of Brockton, and lived there until April 3, 1951. Throughout this period 'the relation of * * * [the testatrix] to her sisters and brother and their families was always pleasant.'

On April 3, 1951, the testatrix was admitted to the Brockton Hospital. Her condition was diagnosed as cancer of the bladder. As a result of an operation performed on her on April 9 it was discovered that the cancer was inoperable. On April 25 she was removed to the Braemoor Rest Home. While at the hospital she was constantly under the influence of opiates and drugs administered for the purpose of deadening pain. During the period that she was at the rest home she 'was suffering severely from cancer' and was given opiates, sedatives, and drugs to alleviate pain. 1 At times both at the hospital and at the rest home she 'was confused and had some hallucinations but was generally rational'.

On April 26, 1951, the day following the removal of the testatrix to the rest home, the petitioner and Mr. Ovide V. Fortier were appointed conservators of her estate on the grounds of advanced age and physical incapacity.

The petitioner has been a member of the bar since 1927. She first became acquainted with the testatrix in 1946 when the latter went to live in the home of the petitioner's mother. At times when the petitioner would take her mother for an automobile ride the testatrix would be invited to accompany them. The petitioner attended to the legal affairs of the testatrix. During the summer of 1948 the testatrix lived with the petitioner at a farm which the latter owned in Pembroke. It was during this period that the will, drawn by the petitioner, was executed by the testatrix. In 1949 the testatrix discussed proposed changes in her will with the petitioner but nothing further was done about it.

While the testatrix was at the rest home the petitioner visited her every day. During one of these visits the testatrix asked the petitioner to bring to her the 1948 will, which then was in the petitioner's possession. The petitioner complied with this request and they discussed the will and the changes which the testatrix had in mind. The petitioner made notes of the proposed changes. Since by these changes the petitioner was to be the residuary legatee, she suggested that it be drawn by another attorney. She asked Mr. Fortier, an attorney, if he would prepare a codicil but he declined on the ground that inasmuch as he was one of the conservators of the testatrix he could not properly do so. She then asked Mr. Mantalos, a Brockton attorney, to draft the codicil, and it was prepared by him in Mr. Fortier's office on the basis of information furnished by the petitioner.

After the codicil was prepared, Mr. Mantalos and the petitioner went to the rest home to have it executed. Mr. Mantalos, who had never seen the testatrix before, was introduced to her by the petitioner who then left the room. Mr. Mantalos made no inquiries as to who the testatrix's physician was, nor did he read the will of 1948 to her. In fact he did not have it with him. At the time of the execution of the codicil the testatrix was 'very weak' and her condition was 'very critical.'. On the evening prior to its execution the testatrix was given a strong dosage of demerol, a drug for the relief of pain. 2

The judge concluded that 'the alleged codicil was procured by the undue influence of Madeleine L. Reilly exercised upon Mary A. Donovan, and that at the time of * * * [its] execution * * * Miss Donovan was not capable of understanding the nature and extent of her property or the natural objects of her bounty.'

The various factors to be considered in cases of fraud and undue influence have been fully set forth in Neill v. Brackett, 234 Mass. 367, 369-370, 126 N.E. 93. It was there said, among other things, that 'When the donor is enfeebled by age or disease, although not reaching to unsoundness of mind, and the relation between the parties is fiduciary or intimate, the transaction ordinarily is subject to careful scrutiny.' 234 Mass. at page 369, 126 N.E. at page 94. Here it is plain that the testatrix was enfeebled by both age...

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12 cases
  • In re The Bible Speaks
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. First Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of Massachusetts
    • May 19, 1987
    ...Mass.App.Ct. 120, 430 N.E.2d 869 (1982); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 192 Mass. 416, 78 N.E. 492 (1906), codicils to wills, Reilly v. McAuliffe, 331 Mass. 144, 117 N.E. 811 (1954), and intervivos gifts. McDonald v. McNeil, 300 Mass. 350, 15 N.E.2d 460 (1938). Massachusetts courts have indicated that......
  • Markell v. Sidney B. Pfeifer Foundation, Inc.
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • May 29, 1980
    ...v. Vivian, 272 Mass. 150, 153, 172 N.E. 257 (1930); Slater v. Munroe, 316 Mass. 129, 132, 55 N.E.2d 15 (1944); Reilly v. McAuliffe, 331 Mass. 144, 147-149, 117 N.E.2d 811 (1954). The reason for the distinction is that in the case of an exclusively fiduciary relationship, it can reasonably b......
  • Bruno v. Bruno
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • July 7, 1981
    ...362 Mass. 107, 113, 284 N.E.2d 231 (1972), with Popko v. Janik, 341 Mass. 212, 215, 167 N.E.2d 853 (1960), Reilly v. McAuliffe, 331 Mass. 144, 148-149, 117 N.E.2d 811 (1954), McDonald v. MacNeil, 300 Mass. 350, 352-353, 15 N.E.2d 460 (1938), and Eddy v. Eddy, 281 Mass. 156, 163-164, 183 N.E......
  • Cleary v. Cleary
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • April 14, 1998
    ...cases state that there is no presumption of fraud or undue influence, but fail to discuss burden of proof. See Reilly v. McAuliffe, 331 Mass. 144, 148, 117 N.E.2d 811 (1954) ("although there is no presumption of undue influence on an attorney's part, the law views the transaction with consi......
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