Baruffaldi v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1958
• Citation: 337 Mass. 495,150 N.E.2d 269
• Parties: Dorothy BARUFFALDI v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 269

150 N.E.2d 269

337 Mass. 495

Dorothy BARUFFALDI v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued March 5, 1958.

Decided May 7, 1958.

Robert J. Muldoon, Somerville (Philibert L. Pellegrini, Somerville, with him), for petitioner.

Fred W. Fisher, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, COUNIHAN and WHITTEMORE, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

This is a petition under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 (the State administrative procedure act), inserted by St.1954, c. 681, § 1, to review a decision of the contributory retirement appeal board established under G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), as appearing in St.1945, c. 658, § 1.

The pertinent facts are these. From January, 1950, until his death on January 1, 1954, Lawrence Baruffaldi was employed by the city of Somerville as city engineer, and was a member of the contributory retirement system of that city. He had a history of heart disease, the disease 'becoming progressively more serious in recent years.' On March 13, 1953, he was admitted to a hospital from which he was discharged on March 28, 1953. The admission diagnosis was 'Coronary artery insufficiency due to arteriosclerosis, old myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, secondary to the coronary arteriosclerosis.' He was again a patient at the same hospital from July 31, 1953, to August 2, 1953, during which period the following 'final diagnosis' was made: 'Arteriosclerotic heart disease with cardiac enlargement. Normal sinus rhythm, decompensated with coronary insufficiency. Angina pectoris.' For about a year prior to his death Baruffaldi had been under the care of a physician who advised him to avoid 'emotional upsets.' His last visit to his physician was on December 8, 1953. During the latter part of 1953 his use of medicine far exceeded the amount used in former years.

As city engineer, Baruffaldi had the duty of supervising the construction of a municipal garage with a view to ensuring that the contractor was meeting the specifications of the contract with respect to time, materials, and workmanship. 'There were many, almost constant, disagreements, heated disputes, between * * * [Baruffaldi] and the contractor regarding the work which caused * * * [Baruffaldi] to become emotionally upset on repeated occasions.' These incidents became 'more frequent and intense as the time for a change of administration as a result of the municipal election of November, 1953, drew close.' Baruffaldi's term as engineer was to expire on January 4, 1954.

On the morning of December 31, 1953, Baruffaldi became involved in his 'final and bitterest argument' with the contractor. The argument related to the heating of the building, Baruffaldi contending that the contract required the contractor to heat the building and the contractor contending the contrary. This dispute was 'broken off at the instance of an associate who led * * * [Baruffaldi] by the arm from the scene.' Baruffaldi stayed on the job until 4:30 P.M., when he left for home. It appears that he was ill that evening but it does not appear that he sought medical aid at that time.

The next day (New Year's Day) Baruffaldi visited the job and returned to his home in the afternoon. He died that evening about 9 P.M. The cause of death set forth in the death certificate was 'Coronary thrombosis (1 day) Coronary insufficiency (3 years).'

The petitioner (Baruffaldi's widow) applied to the Somerville retirement board (hereinafter called the local board) for death benefits under the provisions of G.L. c. 32, § 9. The local board denied her application and she appealed to the contributory retirement appeal board (hereinafter called the appeal board) under G.L. c. 32, § 16(4). Following a hearing, the appeal board reached a decision in which after reciting the facts set forth above, it concluded as follows: 'We find that Mr. Baruffaldi's death undoubtedly resulted from the impact upon his already diseased heart, of the argument which took place on the morning of December 31, 1953. We rule, therefore, that under the circumstances of this case his death was not the result of a personal injury sustained within the provisions of § 9(1) of c. 32 of the General Laws. The decision of the * * * [local board] is affirmed [and the] appeal [is] dismissed.'

The petitioner then filed this petition for review in the Superior Court under G.L. c. 30A, § 14. The judge ordered a decree to be entered affirming the decision of the appeal board. From a decree entered accordingly, the petitioner appealed. G.L. c. 30A, § 15.

The rights of the petitioner to death benefits are found in G.L. c. 32, § 9(1), the material portions of which are: 'If the board, upon receipt of proper proof, finds that any member [of the contributory retirement system] in service died as the natural and proximate result of a personal injury sustained or a hazard undergone as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties at some definite place and at some definite time * * * without serious and wilful misconduct on his part, the payments and allowances hereinafter referred to * * * shall be granted to his beneficiary or beneficiaries, in the sum or sums, and upon the terms and conditions, specified in this section * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

As stated above, the appeal board found that Baruffaldi died as a result of 'the impact upon his already diseased heart, of the argument' which took place on the preceding day and that this argument arose out of the construction of a building which Baruffaldi was supervising as city engineer. Yet, notwithstanding these findings, the appeal board ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to death benefits under § 9(1). This ruling can be supported only by holding that Baruffaldi's death was not 'the natural and proximate result of a personal injury sustained * * * as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties * * *.' On the findings of the appeal board there is no basis for concluding that what happened to Baruffaldi did not result from the performance of his duties. And we think that such result can be said to be 'natural and proximate.' The petitioner does not contend that Baruffaldi's condition resulted from a hazard of his employment. See Hough v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, 309 Mass. 534, 539, 36 N.E.2d 415. Thus the question narrows down to whether the incident causing his death was a 'personal injury' within the intendment of the statute.

Clearly under the predecessor of § 9(1) the petitioner would not be entitled to death benefits in a situation like the present. By G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 32, § 31B, as appearing in St.1936, c. 318, § 1, death benefits were payable only in cases where the appropriate board, upon receipt of proper proofs, 'shall decide that * * * death was the natural and proximate result of an accident or of undergoing a hazard peculiar to his employment, at some definite time and place while the member was in actual performance and within the scope of his duty * * *'. (Emphasis supplied.) In Hough v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, 309 Mass. 534, 36 N.E.2d 415, a town clerk sought retirement under G.L. c. 32, § 31, as appearing in St.1936, c. 318, § 1, by reason of total and permanent incapacity. It appeared that his incapacity resulted from long hours of clerical work over a period of years, culminating in his collapse after attending a lengthy meeting of a town board. In refusing to quash the decision of the appeal board denying retirement, this court construing language in § 31 which is identical with § 31B quoted above, said 309 Mass. at pages...