Bascle v. Parish
| Decision Date | 14 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-1926 |
| Parties | JONAH BASCLE, ET AL Plaintiffs v. JEFFERSON PARISH, ET AL Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
The matters before the Court are: a Motion to Dismiss filed by Regional Planning Commission ("RPC") (Doc. 27); a Motion to Dismiss filed by Jefferson Parish ("Jefferson") (Doc. 34); a Motion to Dismiss filed by St. Tammany Parish ("St. Tammany") (Doc. 48); a Motion to Dismiss filed by Orleans Parish ("Orleans")1 (Doc. 49); and a Motion to Dismiss filed by St. Bernard Parish Government ("St. Bernard") (Doc. 58) (collectively "Defendants"). For the following reasonsDefendants' Motions are GRANTED.
Plaintiffs, Jonah Bascle, Jesse Bascille, and Lucille Ogden are mobility-disabled residents of Orleans Parish. Plaintiffs claim that they are unable to utilize the services of taxicabs because, to this date, there are no vehicles accessible to disabled persons operating in Jefferson Parish, St. Tammany Parish, the City of New Orleans, and St. Bernard Parish (collectively "The Parishes"). Plaintiffs allege that RPC and The Parishes have failed to provide Accessible Taxicabs ("AT") and transportation throughout the Greater New Orleans Area ("GNO") or coordinated an effort for this result. Based on this alleged failure, Plaintiffs complain that Defendants have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA"), Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 12 and Louisiana Revised Statute § 49:146, et seq., and the Louisiana White Cane Law.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is "plausible on its face" when the pleaded facts allow the court to "[d]raw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liablefor the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. A court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and must "draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). The Court need not, however, accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.
To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a "sheer possibility" that the plaintiff's claims are true. Id. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'" will not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 S. Ct. at 1955). Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the plaintiffs' claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255-57. The Court's review "is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint." Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)).
The Court finds that the ADA only precludes the Defendants from discriminating in their licensing function and does not require them to plan for the provision of accessible taxicabs to disabled individuals. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims under the ADA fail. Because the ADA and RAare judged under the same legal standards, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims similarly fail under the RA. Further, the Court finds that even if taxicabs are considered an accommodation under Louisiana law, Plaintiffs fail to show that Defendants have effected a policy of discrimination denying them access to taxicabs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Louisiana law also fail. Defendants' Motions are granted and Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.
Defendants aver that Plaintiffs cannot state a claim under either the ADA or RA. This Court agrees. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' ADA and RA claims against Defendants are dismissed.
"The ADA is a broad mandate of comprehensive character and sweeping purpose intended to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them into the economic and social mainstream American life." Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotations omitted). "Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by recipients of federal finding." Id. "Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, like § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, provides that individuals with disabilities shall not be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by such entity." Id. at 220-21 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)).
Title II of the ADA is divided into two parts. Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 2004). Part A covers public services generally and part B applies specifically andonly to public transportation provided by public entities. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141, et. seq.) To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under either Part of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he is qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability. Melton, 391 F.3d at 671-72 (citing Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, Tex., 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1997)).
A prima facie case under the RA is operationally identical to the test under the ADA. Id. at 676 n.8. Moreover, "the ADA and Rehabilitation Act generally are interpreted in pari materia." Frame, 667 F.3d at 220-21 Indeed, the language in both the ADA and the RA is similar, and the remedies, procedures and rights available under the RA are also available under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133. As a result, jurisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both." Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000).
The RPC argues that it has no statutory or other authority to regulate taxi services or to require The Parishes or taxicab companies to provide AT. Moreover, even if the RPC had authority to regulate taxicabs, federal law exempts taxicab companies and owners from both the ADA andRA and, therefore, cannot be compelled to provide AT. The Parishes argue that there is no applicable mandate under the RA or ADA that requires the Parishes to provide ATs or to compel private taxicab service providers through its regulations to do the same. The Parishes aver that because they operate a certification and/or licensing program for the private taxicab companies, and not a transportation program, then the provisions of the ADA and RA cannot apply to them.
Plaintiffs argue that RPC's responsibilities are to prepare and plan for the development of the Greater New Orleans area which includes the responsibility to plan for the transportation needs of the disabled. Plaintiffs further contend that just because RPC does not have the authority to compel a private industry to purchase accessible automobiles does not mean that it does not have the authority to create programs encouraging taxi companies to purchase accessible vehicles.
Plaintiffs further maintain that in order to establish a case under the Rehabilitation Act, they must only allege that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual is denied access to a program to which he or she is entitled. Plaintiffs further claim that a regulating and licensing authority can be held liable for discrimination under the ADA in the industry in which the Parishes admit to operating. Plaintiffs further allege that a taxicab is privately owned property to which the general public has access as invitees and thus, Plaintiffs have properly alleged a violation of Louisiana Revised Statute Section 49:146 and similarly, that the Parishes have violated the Louisiana White Cane Law by refusing access to taxicabs.
"Title II of the ADA prohibits 'public entities' from discriminating against disabled individuals." Reeves v. Queen City Transp., 10 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1183 (D.Col. 1998). A public entity is defined, in pertinent part, as any state or local government or any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a state or states or local government. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). For the purposes of the Motions all Defendants are considered "public entities."
"Subtitle B of Title II specifically governs the provision of public transportation services by public entities." Noel v. N.Y.C. Taxi and Limousine Comm'n, 837 F.Supp.2d 268, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165). "[T]he Secretary of Transportation [] is directed to promulgate regulations to implement part B under 42 U.S.C. § 12149." Melton, 391 F.3d at 671. Plaintiffs aver that accessible taxis are considered a demand responsive system. A "demand responsive system means any system of providing designated public transportation which is not a fixed route system." 42 U.S.C. § 12141(1). Title B dictates that if a public entity operates a demand responsive system it is considered discriminatory for the public entity to purchase or lease a new vehicle that is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities unless the system otherwise provides an equivalent...
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