Bastow v. General Motors Corp.
| Decision Date | 08 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | 87-1386 and 87-1387,Nos. 87-1338,s. 87-1338 |
| Citation | 844 F.2d 506 |
| Parties | 25 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 361, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 11,742 Kimberly A. BASTOW, Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; and Johnson Chevrolet, Buick, Pontiac, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, Appellees. Kimberly A. BASTOW, Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Appellant, and Johnson Chevrolet, Buick, Pontiac, Inc., an Iowa Corporation. Kimberly A. BASTOW, Appellee, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, and Johnson Chevrolet, Buick, Pontiac, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Mark H. Goodrich, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellant.
Robert L. Fanter, Des Moines, Iowa, for appellees.
Before ARNOLD and FAGG, Circuit Judges, and LARSON, * Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Kimberly Bastow appeals from the district court's judgment in favor of defendants General Motors Corporation and Johnson Chevrolet, Buick, Pontiac, Incorporated. Plaintiff brought this diversity action, alleging the parking brake system in her new 1982 model Chevrolet Citation X-Car was defective and unreasonably dangerous because (1) the brake light went "on" even when the brake was not effectively applied and there was no warning to this effect; (2) the vehicle rolled more easily backward than forward with the parking brake applied and again there was no warning about this; and (3) the brake was not adjusted to the specifications contained in the General Motors shop manual. Defendants contended at trial that Bastow's failure to use the brake--not the defects she alleged--caused the injuries she suffered when her vehicle rolled backward over her.
The case was submitted to a jury on theories of strict liability and express warranty. The jury found for defendants on plaintiff's express warranty claim but could not agree on strict liability. The district court entered judgment against plaintiff on her express warranty claim and neither party has appealed from this aspect of the court's judgment.
The court declared a mistrial on plaintiff's strict liability claim, subsequently granting defendants' renewed motion for a directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff had failed to "meet her burden of proving that her theory of what caused the accident resulting in her injuries was more probable than any other theory based on the evidence presented at trial." Plaintiff has appealed, alleging she submitted sufficient evidence of causation to have her strict liability claim decided by a jury. Defendants have cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in excluding certain expert testimony relating to plaintiff's character for truthfulness. We affirm the exclusion of expert testimony but reverse the district court's decision granting defendants' renewed directed verdict motion.
According to the trial court's instructions, plaintiff had the burden of proving the following essential elements of a strict liability claim under Iowa law: (1) the defendants sold or distributed the subject vehicle; (2) the defendants were engaged in the business of selling or distributing the subject vehicle; (3) the parking brake system in the subject vehicle was in a defective condition; (4) the defective condition was unreasonably dangerous; (5) plaintiff used the vehicle in the intended manner or in a reasonably foreseeable manner; (6) the vehicle had undergone no substantial change since leaving defendants' possession; and (7) the defect was a proximate cause of the personal injuries and damages suffered by the plaintiff. See Osborn v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 893, 901 (Iowa 1980). There was no dispute as to elements (1), (2), and (6); the contested issues at trial involved whether the parking brake system was defective and whether any alleged defect was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The issue on appeal is whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause to overcome defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
In ruling plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence of causation, the district court applied a test derived from Iowa law concerning the quantum of circumstantial evidence necessary to establish an issue of fact. The court ruled plaintiff must prove her theory was "more probable than any other theory based on the evidence presented at trial," and defendants emphasize this standard on appeal.
This Court has often stated the proper standard for reviewing motions for directed verdicts. In Grogg v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 841 F.2d 210, 211-12, (8th Cir.1988), we summarized this standard as follows:
Our standard of review of the grant of a directed verdict is the same as the standard applied by the district court in the first instance. Smith v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 770 F.2d 719, 722 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1050 [106 S.Ct. 1273, 89 L.Ed.2d 581] (1986). Under this standard, we assume the evidence supporting [plaintiff's] position is true, and we give her the benefit of all inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence. See id. Viewed in this way, the district court correctly took the issue from the jury only if " 'all the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining [plaintiff's] position.' " Dale v. Janklow, 828 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir.1987) (quoting Bell v. Gas Serv. Co., 778 F.2d 512, 514 (8th Cir.1985)). Unlike other rulings by the district court, the "grant of a directed verdict is not accorded the usual presumption in favor of correctness." Id.
In analyzing the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict in a diversity case, this Court has generally applied the appropriate state sufficiency standard where the issue has not been raised by the parties and the state and federal standards are similar. Carper v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 758 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir.1985) ().
We have previously held that the Iowa and federal standards for reviewing motions for directed verdict and for determining the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence are substantially the same. Id.; McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir.1981); Ford Motor Co. v. Mondragon, 271 F.2d 342, 345 (8th Cir.1959). Neither party in this case argues to the contrary, and both defendants and the district court appear to rely primarily on Iowa's rule concerning the evaluation of circumstantial evidence in determining the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with an examination of Iowa law.
Under Iowa law, "[i]n considering the propriety of a motion for a directed verdict the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made." Carper, 758 F.2d at 340, citing Osborn v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 893, 901 (Iowa 1980). "Even when the facts are not in dispute or contradicted, if reasonable minds might draw different inferences from them a jury question is engendered." Carper, 758 F.2d at 340; Osborn, 290 N.W.2d at 901. See Schermer v. Muller, 380 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Iowa 1986).
Questions of proximate cause generally are for the jury; "it is only in exceptional cases that they can be decided as a matter of law." Bandstra v. International Harvester Co., 367 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Iowa App.1985). See Schermer, 380 N.W.2d at 687; Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(10). Issues of proximate cause may be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Kleve v. General Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Iowa 1973), modified on other grounds, Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980).
Plaintiff's evidence in this case is circumstantial. Prior to 1980, Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure applicable in civil cases provided that if a party sought to prove his or her theory of the case by circumstantial evidence, such evidence "must be such as to make the theory reasonably probable, not merely possible, and more probable than any other theory based on such evidence." Osborn, 290 N.W.2d at 901, citing Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(16). Nonetheless, it was "[g]enerally ... for the jury or other trier of fact to say whether circumstantial evidence [met] this test." Id.; Oak Leaf Country Club, Inc. v. Wilson, 257 N.W.2d 739, 746 (Iowa 1977); Kleve, 210 N.W.2d at 572.
In 1980, Rule 14(f)(16) was amended to state simply that "[d]irect and circumstantial evidence are equally probative." Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(16) (). 1 The Iowa Supreme Court has subsequently recognized and applied this rule in several more recent cases. Schermer v. Muller, 380 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Iowa 1986) (); Beck v. Fleener, 376 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa 1985) (); Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Iowa 1984) ().
Defendants' reliance on the "more probable than any other theory" standard thus may be misplaced. Even assuming such a standard applied, 2 however, we do not believe the evidence in this case presents the "exceptional" situation in which proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law.
Our review of the evidence presented at trial convinces us the district court erred in granting defendants' renewed directed verdict motion on plaintiff's strict liability claim. Plaintiff unequivocally testified she applied the parking brake and then assured herself it was on by verifying the car...
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