Batchelder & Snyder Co. v. Union Freight R. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1927
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: BATCHELDER & SNYDER CO. v. UNION FREIGHT R. CO.

259 Mass. 368

156 N.E. 698

BATCHELDER & SNYDER CO.

v.UNION FREIGHT R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 20, 1927.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Alonzo R. Weed, Judge.

Action by the Batchelder & Snyder Company against the Union Freight Railroad Company. On report after finding and decision for plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff.A. T. Johnson, of Boston, for palintiff.

A. W. Blackman, of Boston, for defendant.

WAIT, J.

The defendant is a switching carrier operating a line through Atlantic avenue in Boston between the freight terminals of the Boston & Albany, the New York, New Haven & Hartford, and the Boston & Maine railroads, and delivering cars at various private sidings which serve wharves and warehouses along the avenue. It has no freight station, but in 1922, had a public siding near its office at 87 Atlantic avenue. It stores cars which it cannot ‘set,’ that is, place at the consignee's siding, on such private sidings as are available at the moment. It has no facilities for icing cars, and it is not its custom to re-ice cars containing perishable goods during the period between their arrival on its line and their ‘setting’ at the point of unloading. In the absence of special instructions it sets cars received for the same consignee in the order of their arrival and, ordinarily, makes but one delivery a day at a siding. With consignees like the plaintiff, it often ‘sets' cars during the day's switching without first requiring delivery of the bill of lading, on the understanding that the bill shall be surrenderedforthwith and, in any event, not later than nine o'clock a. m., of the following day. It makes a demurrage charge to the consignee when delivery of a car consigned or ordered to any except a public siding cannot be made because of any condition attributable to the consignee, and the car, consequently, is not unloaded or released within forty-eight hours thereafter. As a basis for such charge it sends to the consignee by mail a ‘constructive placement’ notice. The plaintiff was familiar with these practices.

A carload of pickled hams was shipped by Hately Brothers Company from Chicago on a uniform order bill of lading, consigned to ‘Hately Brothers Company, Boston, notify Batchelder & Snyder Company, Boston,’ routed by New York Central and Boston & Albany railroads. It left Chicago on May 9, 1922, and in usual course was due in Boston on the fourth morning following. A draft, with bill of lading attached, reached Boston on May 11, and was presented for acceptance to Batchelder & Snyder Company, the plaintiff, on that day. Order was given on May 12 to the Boston & Albany Railroad to place the car on plaintiff's siding at Constitution Wharf. The car arrived at the Boston & Albany yards early on May 13, was inspected, and was delivered to the defendant at 1:45 A. M., for placement on plaintiff's siding at Constitution Wharf. It was then sufficiently iced to preserve its contents, which were then in good condition, for forty-eight hours. The defendant paid the freight due to the Boston & Albany Railroad. The defendant had in its control at the time, another car of meat, an earlier arrival, which it ‘set’ for the plaintiff on May 13. It was unable to ‘set’ the second car because the siding was thus occupied and, accordingly, it placed it on a private siding on Commercial Wharf. There it could be reached either for unloading or re-icing. The defendant knew it contained meat, but made no inspection and did no re-icing. On May 13, the defendant put in the mail a ‘constructive placement’ notice to the plaintiff, as a basis for a demurrage charge, but gave no information where the car could be found. The plaintiff made inquiries of the defendant but was not informed of the whereabouts of the car. It paid the draft on May 15, and, presumably, then took up the bill of lading. The defendant, on the evening of May 16, pulled out the car which it had ‘set’ on May 13; gave postcard notice to the plaintiff of the arrival of the car here in question ‘bill of lading required here’; and at 3:30 p. m., on May 17, ‘set’ this car. At Constitution Wharf the plaintiff signed a ‘delivery check’ dated May 16, acknowledging receipt ‘in apparent good order,’ and, on opening the car, called the Boston & Albany Railroad to inspect it. Inspection disclosed that only traces of ice remained in the car and that its contents were damaged. On May 18, bill of lading was surrendered to the defendant and the defendant presented its bill for the freight paid the Boston & Albany Railroad and its own charges. Payment was refused on the ground that the car could have been set on May 13. No claim for loss or damage was ever made on the Boston & Albany Railroad. Claim on the defendant was first made on September 23; this was also the first time that the defendant's attention was called to the condition of the car and its contents. The claim, in form, corresponded with a claim under the bill of lading.

In substance, the trial judge found and ruled that interstate transit ended with the acceptance of the car by the defendant on May 13; that no contract between these parties existed upon the bill of lading, and no claim under the bill of lading was involved; that transit continued until the car was ‘set’ on May 17; that no delivery took place until that time; that an implied contract of carriage arose between the defendant and the plaintiff in accord with which the defendant, as a common carrier, was liable for failure properly to safeguard perishable goods; that although delivery was delayed because of conditions for which the consignee, and not the carrier, was responsible, the carrier's failure to inform the consignee of the disposition which it had made of the car between its acceptance from the interstate carrier and its delivery to the consignee defeated any claim that it was not...