Bates v. State

Docket NumberS21A1188
Decision Date14 December 2021
PartiesBATES v. THE STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

LaGrua, Justice.

Appellant Larry Bates was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of his neighbor, Paul Wilson, and Wilson's dog. On appeal, Appellant raises four enumerations of error alleging ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) trial counsel pursued meritless defenses; (2) trial counsel failed to file the necessary pre-trial notice to pursue a mental illness defense; (3)trial counsel failed to properly subpoena an expert witness; and (4) trial counsel failed to object to and rebut the State's expert witness.[1] Seeing no reversible error, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed that Appellant moved into his girlfriend's home in 2016. A year later, Appellant began accusing his across-the-street neighbors, Paul and Beth Wilson, of allowing their dogs, Scooter and Maggie, to urinate and defecate on his lawn. In May 2017, Appellant made numerous calls to 911 and code enforcement authorities regarding the Wilsons' dogs and also to report "harassment" from the Wilsons in the form of staring and gesturing at Appellant. Officers responding to the 911 and code enforcement calls found no evidence of defecation by the dogs, and the Wilsons denied harassing Appellant and allowing their dogs to urinate or defecate on Appellant's lawn. On May 29, in the presence of a responding officer and another neighbor, Appellant and Wilson shook hands and agreed to let "bygones be bygones."

A month later, Wilson arrived home from work and took the dogs out for their nightly walk. Appellant saw Wilson and his dogs outside Appellant's home. Shortly thereafter, Appellant called 911 and requested an officer to respond to his address because he was "fixing to shoot this son of a b**ch" for "letting his dog piss in [unintelligible] yard." While on the phone with the 911 operator, Appellant fired numerous shots at Wilson, killing both him and Scooter.

Appellant remained on the phone with the 911 operator until officers responded to his home. As seen on the responding officer's bodycam video, the officer handcuffed Appellant in his driveway, and while the officer called EMS, Appellant said, "you're gonna get EMS, and if he dies, he dies, he f**king - he let his dog pee out here and he told me 'haha whatever.'" Appellant further stated "I shot him, I shot him, I shot him."

EMS determined Wilson was deceased, and the medical examiner determined that Wilson's cause of death was internal injuries from gunshot wounds to the head and torso. The medical examiner also determined that Scooter's cause of death was internal injuries from a gunshot wound to the torso.[2]

Following Appellant's arrest, he agreed to waive his Miranda[3]rights and gave a statement to the police. During his interview, Appellant stated he was standing outside his home looking at the stars, and Wilson walked by with his dogs. When the dogs reached Appellant's yard they began urinating. Appellant verbally confronted Wilson. Words were exchanged, and Appellant turned around to go back into his home. Wilson then said, "that's what I thought, that's what I thought, motherf**ker." Appellant then went inside his home, grabbed his gun, and "went down there and confronted [Wilson]," but Wilson had "walked down the road . . . in front of the neighbor's house." When Appellant reached him, Wilson "bowed his chest" and "start[ed] coming at him," and then Appellant shot Wilson.

Prior to trial, Appellant was evaluated by three psychologists to determine whether he was insane at the time of the shooting, whether his "will was overwhelmed by delusions associated with [post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD")] to the extent he suffered with delusional compulsion at the time of the alleged offense, "[4] and whether he was presently competent to stand trial. The psychologists determined that Appellant was not insane at the time of the shooting, that he was not suffering from delusional compulsion at the time of the shooting, and that he was presently competent to stand trial.

At trial, Appellant was represented by two attorneys, Jeffrey Sliz and Robert Greenwald. On the morning of trial, trial counsel and the State entered into a stipulation regarding evidence of Appellant's PTSD diagnosis. The first stipulation was that, pursuant to Collins v. State, 306 Ga. 464, 466 (2) (831 S.E.2d 765) (2019), and Virger v. State, 305 Ga. 281, 297 (9) (824 S.E.2d 346) (2019), Appellant's PTSD diagnosis and all related testimony were inadmissible to negate intent or diminish mens rea. The second stipulation was that some testimony regarding Appellant's PTSD diagnosis was admissible. Specifically, the parties agreed that Dr. Iana Dzagnidze could testify regarding Appellant's PTSD treatment at the United States Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") medical center and that Appellant's VA medical records were admissible as business records, so long as they were relevant. Additionally, the parties stipulated that the three psychologists who evaluated Appellant prior to trial could testify regarding their assessments of Appellant, their interpretations and observations of his mental status, and their reports.

During the State's case-in-chief, Appellant's counsel cross-examined several witnesses regarding their knowledge of Appellant's PTSD diagnosis. Specifically, counsel elicited testimony from the following people: (1) Appellant's girlfriend, who testified that Appellant suffered from PTSD, that he was receiving treatment for it, that she occasionally drove him to his appointments at the VA, and that he was prescribed medication for his symptoms; (2) Wilson's wife, who testified that she "could have" made the statement to an officer investigating the shooting that Appellant "had PTSD and was crazy"; and (3) a neighbor of Appellant, who testified that he and Appellant had discussed Appellant's PTSD. On direct examination, the prosecutor questioned two officers about whether they had a conversation with Wilson's wife regarding Appellant's PTSD at the Wilsons' house after the shooting. One officer did not remember any such conversation. The other officer testified that a conversation did occur, and he told Wilson's wife that he "ha[d] known some people with PTSD and this wasn't indicative of how they would act." Appellant's counsel cross-examined this officer regarding this testimony and elicited an admission from the officer that his opinion was based on knowing just one person with PTSD.

After the State rested, the defense presented the testimony of Louis Rosen. Rosen and Appellant served in the United States Army together and were twice deployed to Iraq. Rosen explained there are no shifts during deployment - "[i]t's always go, go, go business in Iraq. So you may be out on a mission for 36 hours, get back, and then 36 minutes later have to go back out." He described this as extremely stressful. Rosen also testified that Appellant was injured during his second deployment and that afterwards, Appellant's "ability to be the one of reason on a constant basis was not the same." Rosen testified that Appellant "used to take it upon himself to calm us down. To be like our common grace. And he just was not able to really take that role as much anymore because of the stress that he was enduring." After Appellant's and Rosen's military discharge in 2008, they remained in contact, and Rosen testified that Appellant had received counseling from the VA, but not often enough.

After Rosen's testimony, Appellant's counsel read stipulated portions of Appellant's VA medical records to the jury. These portions included the following: Appellant was first diagnosed with PTSD in 2008 prior to his discharge from the Army. After discharge, Appellant scheduled an appointment for a mental health consultation, but canceled it. A year later, Appellant was referred to a neuropsychologist. Two years later, in 2011, Appellant had a psychiatric consultation with Dr. Dzagnidze during which he was identified as suffering from "psychosocial stress."[5] Appellant met the criteria for intensive outpatient treatment, but declined weekly appointments, preferring to focus on medication management. In 2014, Appellant met with Dr. Dzagnidze and described symptoms of depression and anxiety. A year later, in 2015, Appellant began seeing Dr. Dzagnidze on a more regular basis. During one appointment, Dr. Dzagnidze discontinued one of Appellant's prescribed medications due to self-described adverse side effects. A few months later, Dr. Dzagnidze changed Appellant's diagnosis from PTSD to chronic PTSD. Approximately six months later, in mid-2016, Dr. Dzagnidze noted Appellant's "difficult[ies] getting along with people." A couple months later, Dr. Dzagnidze noted Appellant had nightmares about combat and deployment.

In late 2016, Appellant requested a transfer to the VA clinic in Lawrenceville, and the internal transfer notes requested a 60-minute appointment with a therapist, with a note that Appellant "needs [a] treatment plan." A month later, a mental health progress note listed: (1) Appellant's relevant medical conditions as depressive disorder and chronic PTSD; (2) Appellant's "treatment plan problems/needs" as symptoms of PTSD and depression, including his self-report of stress, isolation, withdrawal, nightmares, irritability, agitation, intrusive thoughts, hypervigilance, and anxiety; and (3) Appellant's goal: "I want my symptoms to decrease." Approximately a month before the shooting, Appellant spoke with Dr. Robert Gerardi at the VA about the issues he was having with Wilson and noted that some of the tension may have been his own fault. Appellant also reported ongoing nightmares about combat and...

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