Batts v. Faggart, 378

• Decision Date: 11 December 1963
• Docket Number: No. 378,378
• Citation: 133 S.E.2d 504,260 N.C. 641
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Paul A. BATTS v. Jack Lewis FAGGART, Edward Lee Futrell, Morgan Trucking Company, and Equipment Leasing Company.

Page 504

133 S.E.2d 504

260 N.C. 641

Paul A. BATTS v. Jack Lewis FAGGART, Edward Lee Futrell, Morgan Trucking

Company, and Equipment Leasing Company.

No. 378

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 11, 1963

W. H. Steed and Charles F. Lambeth, Jr., Thomasville, for plaintiff appellee.

Walser & Brinkley, Lexington, for defendant appellant Faggart.

BOBBITT, Justice.

Faggart asserts, as his first ground of demurrer, that the complaint does not allege a cause of action against him. If this be true, there is no misjoinder of parties and causes of action. Shaw v. Barnard, 229 N.C. 713, 51 S.E.2d 295; Jordan v. Maynard, 231 N.C. 101, 56 S.E.2d 26; Wetherington v. Whitford Motor Co., 240 N.C. 90, 81 S.E.2d 267.

The complaint contains no allegation of injury or damage proximately caused by the first collision, to wit, when plaintiff's car was struck by the car operated by Faggart. Plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries caused by the second collision, to wit, when plaintiff's car was struck by the tractor-trailer operated by Futrell.

The complaint alleges the second collision and plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of Futrell while acting as agent for the corporate defendants. The crucial question is whether, upon the facts alleged, the alleged negligence of Faggart, conceding his negligence proximately caused the first collision, may be considered a (concurring) proximate cause of the second collision. If not, plaintiff has alleged no cause of action against Faggart and his demurrer should be sustained on that ground, not for misjoinder of parties and causes of action.

'There may be two or more proximate causes of an injury. These may originate from separate and distinct sources or agencies operating independently of each other, yet if they join and concur in producing the result complained of, the author of each cause would be liable for the damages inflicted, and action may be brought against any one or all as joint tort-feasors. ' Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 109, 66 S.E.2d 690; Riddle v. Artis, 243 N.C. 668, 670, 91 S.E.2d 894. 'This principle is applicable when the facts are such as to justify the view that the several acts of negligence on the part of two different persons concur in contributing proximately to the injury complained of. ' Tillman v. Bellamy, 242 N.C. 201, 204, 87 S.E.2d 253.

Plaintiff contends the facts alleged in the complaint support his allegations that the second collision was proximately caused by the joint and concurring negligence of all defendants. Faggart contends it appears from the facts alleged by plaintiff that the negligence of Futrell was the sole proximate cause of the second collision and that his (Faggart's) negligence was not a concurring proximate cause.

'The doctrine of intervening negligence is well established in our law. Its essential elements and governing principles are well defined and elaborately explained in former decisions of this Court. Further elaboration here is unnecessary. ' Riddle v. Artis, supra, and cases cited; Smith v. Grubb, 238 N.C. 665, 78 S.E.2d 598, and cases cited.

This Court, in Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 87, 6 S.E.2d 808, and prior cases, has quoted with approval this statement from the opinion of Mr. Justice Strong in Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475, 24 L.Ed. 256: 'The question always is: was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous operation? Did the facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury? It is admitted that the rule is difficult of application. But it is generally held, that in order to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act not amounting to wanton wrong, is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances.'

The facts alleged disclose: As a result of the first collision, the plaintiff 'was momentarily stunned and shocked.' When he 'regained his senses,' his car 'was stopped crossways in the middle of said northbound lanes of traffic. ' Upon regaining his senses, plaintiff proceeded to drive his car forward, to turn to his left and to proceed into and along 'the eastern or outside lane' for northbound traffic. The tractor-trailer operated by Futrell, traveling north, 'approached plaintiff's automobile on the eastern or outside lane of said highway, and he ran into the rear end of plaintiff's automobile with such terrific force * * *' Futrell had 'an unobstructed view of plaintiff and the scene of his peril' for a distance of 900 feet. Notwithstanding, he did not apply his brakes or slow down but continued at a speed of more than 60 miles per hour and crashed into the rear of plaintiff's car.

Under the facts alleged, the second collision did not occur when plaintiff's car 'was stopped crossways...