Bauer By and Through Bauer v. Minidoka School Dist. No. 331

Decision Date02 August 1989
Docket NumberNo. 17634,17634
Citation778 P.2d 336,116 Idaho 586
Parties, 55 Ed. Law Rep. 748 Tregg BAUER, a minor, By and Through his parents and legal guardians, Mark BAUER and Mary Bauer, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MINIDOKA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 331 and Minidoka Board of Education, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Jenkins Law Office, Chartered, Idaho Falls, for plaintiffs-appellants. Mr. P. Bruce Palmer argued.

Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Twin Falls, for defendants-respondents. Mr. Brian K. Julian of Boise, Idaho, argued.

JOHNSON, Justice.

This is a personal injury case in which summary judgment was granted dismissing the complaint. The first issue presented is whether I.C. § 36-1604 (Supp.1988), Idaho's recreational use statute (the recreational use statute), precludes a claim for damages by a public school student who was injured on school property shortly before school commenced. The second issue presented is whether there were genuine issues of material fact concerning a claim that the injury occurred because of negligent supervision by the school district. We reverse the summary judgment as to each of these issues and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.

Tregg Bauer (Tregg) suffered a broken leg when he tripped over sprinkler pipes while he was playing football on the grounds of the junior high school he attended. The injury occurred one morning a few minutes before classes commenced. Tregg's parents brought this action on his behalf and for themselves, seeking damages for Tregg's injury. The complaint alleged that Tregg was under the supervision of Minidoka School District No. 331 and the Minidoka Board of Education (the district) and that the district owed him a duty of due care for his safety. The complaint also alleged that the district had breached this duty by (1) storing the sprinkler pipes in the manner it did, (2) failing to warn Tregg of the dangers of the sprinkler pipes, and (3) failing reasonably to maintain the school grounds and to make them safe for Tregg.

The district moved for summary judgment. The motion was supported by an affidavit of the principal of Tregg's school. The affidavit stated that the football game took place before official school hours, that it was not organized or officiated by employees of the district and that the participants provided their own equipment, as well as maintenance, supervision and control of the game. The principal also stated that the school grounds were open for public use and that the students participating in the football game were not charged a fee for the use of the grounds.

Tregg and his mother submitted affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In his affidavit Tregg stated that he arrived at school about 8:00 a.m., having walked to school early to play football with classmates prior to the first school bell. He stated that many of his classmates who regularly played football with the group before school rode school buses, which brought them to school by 8:00 a.m. or earlier. He said that the principal and many of the teachers arrived at school early in the morning, knew the students were playing football before the first bell rang and watched them play nearly every day. Tregg also stated that the principal made it clear to him and his classmates that they were to play on the football field rather than at any other place on the school grounds.

Tregg's mother, who was also a teacher at the junior high school, stated in her affidavit that at least one teacher was always on duty by no later than 8:00 a.m. in front of the school to supervise the arrival of students and their conduct on the school grounds prior to the first school bell. She said that the principal was at school prior to 8:00 a.m. virtually every day and that he personally supervised activities and conduct of students in and around the school prior to the beginning of school. She also stated that the principal had personally observed the football games being played on the football field before school. She said that prior to the date of Tregg's accident the principal had announced to students and faculty over the public address system and through written memos that football was to be played on the football field only and not at any other location on the school grounds.

In granting summary judgment, the trial court concluded that under the recreational use statute the district owed no duty of care to Tregg to store the sprinkler pipes, to warn of the danger caused by the presence of the pipes, to keep the field in a reasonably safe condition or to supervise the pre-school football game. The trial court denied a motion for reconsideration, and this appeal followed.

II.

THE RECREATIONAL USE STATUTE DOES NOT APPLY.

Tregg's parents assert that the recreational use statute is not applicable here. We agree.

The pertinent portions of the recreational use statute state:

(a) Statement of Purpose. The purpose of this section is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public without charge for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes.

(b) Definitions. As used in this section:

1. "Land" means private or public land, roads, trails, water, watercourses, irrigation dams, water control structures, headgates, private or public ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to or used on the realty.

2. "Owner" means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises.

3. "Recreational Purposes" includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or any combination thereof: Hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, rafting, tubing, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, animal riding, motorcycling, snowmobiling, recreational vehicles, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites, when done without charge of the owner.

(c) Owner Exempt from Warning. An owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes. Neither the installation of a sign or other form of warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity, nor any modification made for the purpose of improving the safety of others, nor the failure to maintain or keep in place any sign, other form of warning, or modification made to improve safety, shall create liability on the part of an owner of land where there is no other basis for such liability.

(d) Owner Assumes No Liability. An owner of land or equipment who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use such property for recreational purposes does not thereby:

1. Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose.

2. Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed.

3. Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act or omission of such persons.

I.C. § 36-1604(a-d).

This Court has upheld the application of the recreational use statute to injuries occurring on public land. Corey v. State, 108 Idaho 921, 703 P.2d 685 (1985); McGhee v. City of Glenns Ferry, 111 Idaho 921, 729 P.2d 396 (1986); Jacobsen v. City of Rathdrum, 115 Idaho 266, 766 P.2d 736 (1988). However, in none of these cases was the injured party in the relationship to the landowner that Tregg is to the district here. In Corey a snowmobile operator was injured in a state park. In both McGhee and Jacobsen, a child was injured in a city park. Here, Tregg was a public school student participating in a game being played at school as the school day was getting underway. Tregg was...

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