Baumgartner v. Joughin
Decision Date | 26 April 1932 |
Parties | BAUMGARTNER v. JOUGHIN, Sheriff. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
En Banc.
Original habeas corpus proceedings by E. Baumgartner against R. T Joughin, Sheriff of Hillsborough County, Florida.
Petitioner remanded.
Dickenson & Lake, of Tampa, for petitioner.
Charles F. Blake, of Tampa, for respondent.
In this case a majority of the court are of the opinion that the petitioner should be remanded to custody under the commitment issued by Hon. L. L. Parks, judge of the circuit court holding the petitioner guilty of contempt of court for improperly approaching a prospective juror.
It appears from the record that certain jurors had been drawn and summoned for duty at a trial term of the circuit court for Hillsborough county; that one of the cases to be tried at such term was that of State of Florida v. Louis Leavine, for murder; that amongst those drawn and served for jury duty was a venireman, Frank McWayne, who thereafter appeared in court in response to the summons; that prior to the juror's appearance in court the petitioner approached the said Frank McWayne, knowing that he had been drawn to serve on the jury during the week commencing February 29, 1932, and knowing that the case of State of Florida v. Louis Leavine for murder would be called for trial during that time, said to him That just prior to this that petitioner had come up to the prospective juror's store in an automobile to buy cigars and, in connection with the conversation just quoted, had by way of beginning conversation, dropped the remark that he knew Louis Leavine, who was to be tried for murder, but that Louis was not a bad boy, but that it was his brother Wilbur who was the wild one.
The circuit judge, upon being apprised of the incident, cited petitioner for contempt. Subsequently after a hearing the judge committed him to the county jail for sixty days. The case is here upon habeas corpus seking petitioner's discharge from that commitment.
Section 5439, Comp. Gen. Laws section 3575, Rev. Gen. St., provides that in habeas corpus cases: 'When, on the return of the writ, the cause of detention shall appear to have been a contempt, plainly and specifically charge in the commitment by some court officer or body having authority to commit for the contempt so charged and for the time stated, it shall be the duty of the court or judge before whom the writ is returnable forthwith to remand the prisoner, if the time for detention for contempt has not expired.'
In the instant case the return exhibits the following order of the circuit judge as the cause of petitioner's detention:
Attached to the petition for writ of habeas corpus is a full transcript of the proceedings and testimony upon which the order of commitment was made, so that the whole record embracing all the proceedings, as well as the order of commitment, is now before the court.
The essential characteristic of an alleged act of contempt, such as that here charged, is its tendency to obstruct the administration of justice. Such a contempt does not depend so much upon the particular intent of the contemnor as upon his act. And while a mere intent to commit a contempt cannot make an act contempt, unless the act done actually tends to obstruct the administration of justice, whether or not an act constitutes a contempt of court is determined by the reasonable tendencies of the act to obstruct the administration of justice. Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 9 S.Ct. 699, 33 L.Ed. 150; Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U.S. 749, 49 S.Ct. 471, 73 L.Ed. 938, 63 A. L. R. 1258.
Due process of law in the prosecution of contempt, except that committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the charges against him and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation. This includes the right to assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant either to the issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense, and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed. Cooke v. U. S., 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767.
The rule just stated was strictly followed in the case at bar. Hence, the only point left to be decided by us is whether or not the whole record now before the court discloses an act of contempt, plainly and specifically charged in the commitment and supported by the proceedings upon which the contempt judgment is based. If it does, the petitioner must be remanded. Ex parte Turner, 73 Fla. 360, 74 So. 314, L. R. A. 1917D, 355; Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 95 So. 755, 31 A. L. R. 1226.
Trial by capable juries is the bulwark of the administration of the criminal law. Exercise of calm, unbiased, and informed judgment is essential to proper functioning of juries, and without it the administration of justice in cases requiring jury trials is grievously impaired if not wholly defeated.
From time immemorial the right to trial by jury has been regarded as one of the most sacred heritages of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. The fundamental law recognizes the jury as an appendage of the court, and that it is indispensable as an agency to pass upon guilt or innocence of the accused in criminal cases. Consequently the jury is of unusual importance as an administrative factor in the American judicial systems, whether state or federal.
Therefore, whatever tends to obstruct the due administration of justice in the courts, by bringing undue influences or temptations or corruption to bear upon those who are likely to be selected for duty on juries, is an act calculated to obstruct the fair and impartial trial of jury cases in the courts, and as such, is a direct obstruction to the proper administration of justice which is punishable as a contempt.
Tampering with a member of a general jury panel, or with members of a jury panel selected to try a case, or with prospective jurors before they are sworn, is universally...
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Walker v. Bentley
...inherent power to punish these same violations by indirect criminal contempt. We find support for this conclusion in Baumgartner v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 335, 341, 141 So. 185, rehearing denied, 107 Fla. 858, 143 So. 436 (1932), in which the facts clearly demonstrate that the defendant was foun......
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Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure., In re
...authorizing summary proceedings in direct criminal contempt cases (See Ballengee v. State, 144 So.2d 68 (Fla.App.1962); Baumgartner v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 335, 141 So. 185; also see State ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818, holding that the defendant is not entitled to not......
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State ex rel. Schwartz v. Lantz, 82-739
...constitute contempt, and an intent to offend is duly denied under oath, a discharge from custody follows. See also Baumgartner v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 335, 141 So. 185 (1932). Thus, if the stay order which was violated was clear as to its effect and operation, proof of intent is unnecessary. C......
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...ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818; Ex Parte Ed. Senior, Jr., 37 Fla. 1, 19 So. 652, 32 L.R.A. 133; Baumgartner v Joughin, 105 Fla. 335, 141 So. 185. It appears by the record that the petitioner here was never cited in the court below for contempt and given an opportunit......
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Enforcement of orders and judgments
...for the attendance of witnesses, and testify in his or her own defense.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.840(d); see also Baumgartner v. Joughin , 105 Fla. 335, 141 So. 185, 187 (1932) (explaining that the accused is entitled to the “assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses t......