Baumgartner v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 22 May 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 7:22-cv-00081-O-BP
• Parties: DAVID BAUMGARTNER, Plaintiff, v. MARSHALL THOMAS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

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DAVID BAUMGARTNER, Plaintiff, v. MARSHALL THOMAS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 7:22-cv-00081-O-BP

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Wichita Falls Division

May 22, 2023

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

HAL R RAY, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (ECF No. 8) filed December 13, 2022; Plaintiff's Response (ECF No. 11); Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9) filed January 3 2023; Defendants' Response (ECF No. 12) filed January 24 2023; and Plaintiff's Response (ECF No. 15) filed February 14, 2023. After considering the pleadings and the applicable legal authorities, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that United States District Judge Reed O'Connor GRANT Defendants' Motion (ECF No. 8) and DISMISS Plaintiff's claims under federal law with prejudice and DISMISS without prejudice his claims asserting violations of Texas law. Further, the Court should DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9) because Baumgartner has pleaded his best case and further amendment would be futile.

I. BACKGROUND

In his amended complaint, David Baumgartner (“Baumgartner”) alleges that Marshall Thomas, Sheriff of Montague County, Texas; Brandon Fischer, Montague County Deputy Sheriff; Casey Polhemus, District Attorney for Montague County; and Kasey Hamilton, Administrative Assistant to the Sheriff of Montague County (“Defendants”) denied him his Fourth, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amendment rights by “compelling him to lifetime bondage and involuntary servitude to both the Montague County Sheriff's Office and the Texas Department of Public Safety.” ECF No. 5 at 6. Baumgartner is a convicted and registered sex offender and therefore must verify his sex offender registry information at least once every ninety days. ECF No. 8 at 2; Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Art. 62.058 (West 2023). The “bondage and involuntary servitude” claim in Baumgartner's amended complaint refers to this requirement. ECF No. 5 at 3-4, 6-8.

Baumgartner filed his complaint on August 16, 2022 (ECF No. 1) and his amended complaint on October 12, 2022 (ECF No. 5). He sues Defendants in their official and individual capacities. ECF No. 5 at 2. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. ECF No. 8. Besides responding to Defendant's Motion (ECF No. 11), Baumgartner also filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint (ECF No. 9) a second time. Both Motions are ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Rules require that a pleading stating a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A complaint must include sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must “take all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . and ask whether the pleadings contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Yumilicious Franchise, L.L.C. v. Barrie, 819 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

When dealing with a pro se party, courts are to liberally construe the pleadings, taking all well-pleaded allegations as true. Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). But “even a liberally-construed pro se . . . complaint must set forth facts giving rise to a claim on which relief may be granted.” Levitt v. Univ. of Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977)). Thus, a court inquires “whether within the universe of theoretically provable facts there exists a set which can support a cause of action under [the] complaint.” Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1976).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 does not provide any substantive rights, but instead “provides a method for vindicating already conferred rights.” Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.3d 398, 412 (5th Cir. 2015). “Section 1983 provides a claim against anyone who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State violates another's constitutional rights.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013). “To state a section 1983 claim, ‘a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'” James v. Tex. Collin Cty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotingMoore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000)).

C. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)). “[T]he immunity issue must be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation since it entails an entitlement to immunity from suit and not merely a defense to liability.” Id. (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 226 (1991)). Qualified immunity can be decided at the Motion to Dismiss stage as it is the earliest possible stage in litigation. Carswell v. Camp, 37 F.4th 1062, 1068 (5th Cir. 2022)

To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established' at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citations omitted). “[A] good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., 948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2020).

D. Municipal Liability

“A municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondent superior theory.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Municipalities may be held liable under § 1983, but only where a custom, policy or practice is the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur., LLC v. Tunica Cty., 543 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 2008). Establishing “[m]unicipal liability under Section 1983 requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force' is the policy or custom.” Fennell, 804 F.3d at 412 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Baumgartner has not pleaded sufficient facts to support his § 1983 claims.

Baumgartner alleges in his amended complaint that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by “unlawfully depriving Plaintiff the exercise and enjoyment of a right to be secure in his proper/correct person, papers, and effects.” ECF No. 5 at 7. Further, he states in conclusory fashion that his “unalienable constitutional rights secured him by the Constitution for the United States of America and Texas were deprived” in violation of the Fifth Amendment as a result of an arrest for an unspecified offense. Id. Specifically, he repeatedly states that

[Defendants are] tying Plaintiff to lifetime bondage and involuntary servitude to the extraneous entities MONTAGUE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE and TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETLY by operating outside the scope of their Oath of Office to conspire, oppress, threaten, intimidate, and defraud Plaintiff of the exercise and enjoyment of liberty and other rights secured him by the Constitution for the United States of America and Texas, compelling him to a tie of duty under a particular code of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

Id. at 6, 7.

Liberally construed, the amended complaint asserts that Defendants violated Baumgartner's rights because of the sex offender verification requirements applicable to him under Article 62.058 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 7-8. It also alleges that “the jury got it wrong when they convicted him for the underlying crimes” requiring the sex offender verification. Id. at 3-7. Finally, Baumgartner likens these reporting requirements to “bondage and involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 7. Defendants respond that Baumgartner has not alleged facts that would form the basis of any of the alleged violations. ECF No. 8 at 4-5.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief by including sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Baumgartner has not...