Ratliff v. Aransas County, Texas

• Decision Date: 15 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-40121,19-40121
• Citation: 948 F.3d 281
• Parties: Kenneth RATLIFF, Plaintiff - Appellant v. ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS ; Colby Scudder, Individually; Raymond Sheffield, Individually, Defendants - Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

948 F.3d 281

Kenneth RATLIFF, Plaintiff - Appellant

v.ARANSAS COUNTY, TEXAS ; Colby Scudder, Individually; Raymond Sheffield, Individually, Defendants - Appellees

No. 19-40121

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED January 15, 2020

Christopher John Gale, Amie Augenstein, Gale Law Group, Corpus Christi, TX, for Plaintiff - Appellant.

Casey Terrance Cullen, Cullen, Carsner, Seerden & Cullen, L.L.P., Victoria, TX, for Defendants - Appellees.

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Kenneth Ratliff was shot five times when he refused to drop his weapon during an armed confrontation with two sheriff's deputies in Aransas County, Texas. He survived and was later acquitted of criminal assault. He proceeded to sue both deputies, as well as the county, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the deputies used unreasonable and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed Ratliff's "official custom" and "failure to train" claims against Aransas County, finding that Ratliff's pleadings failed plausibly to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Later, the court awarded summary judgment to the deputies, holding that Ratliff had failed to rebut their qualified immunity defense. Ratliff appeals; we affirm.

I.

At approximately 3:00 a.m., on March 24, 2015, Aransas County sheriff's deputies were dispatched to a residence in Rockport, Texas, where Kenneth Ratliff was living with Tanya Vannatter, his fiancée. The deputies, Colby Scudder and Raymond Sheffield, had been requested by Vannatter, who reported in a 911 call that Ratliff had beaten her earlier in the evening.

When the deputies arrived, Vannatter explained that Ratliff had been drinking "all day and all night," and that, when she caught him sending text messages to another woman, he went "ballistic." More specifically, Vannatter said that Ratliff had thrown her to the ground, punched her "everywhere," and choked her with such force that she thought she would die. She was reluctant to press charges. But she did request that the deputies ask Ratliff to leave home voluntarily.

As Vannatter and the deputies walked toward Ratliff's front porch, Ratliff began shouting, "Get the f*** off my property." Ratliff was holding a loaded, semi-automatic pistol, but he had not chambered a round. The parties dispute whether the pistol was ever pointed at the deputies, but it is undisputed that the deputies issued five orders to disarm moments before the shooting. Ratliff responded, "shoot me ... shoot me" and "hey, you're on my property." Deputy Scudder fired nine shots, and Ratliff sustained five gunshot wounds

. The whole encounter lasted about twenty-five seconds. The deputies called an ambulance immediately, and paramedics arrived in time to tend to Ratliff, who survived.

II.

Texas authorities charged Ratliff with aggravated assault on a police officer, but he was later acquitted by a jury. Ratliff then sued Deputy Scudder, Deputy Sheffield, and Aransas County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Deputy Scudder violated clearly established law by using deadly force, that Deputy Sheffield violated clearly established law by failing to prevent deadly force, and that Aransas County should be held responsible because the deputies' actions reflect the county's "customary practice[,] ... policy or procedure."¹ The district court quickly dismissed Ratliff's claim against the county, however, holding that Ratliff had failed to plead sufficiently specific facts in support of his "official custom" and "failure to train" theories of Monell liability.

Then, on a motion for summary judgment, the district court also disposed of Ratliff's excessive force claims against the deputies. The district court found that Deputy's Scudder's use of deadly force was not objectively unreasonable under the circumstances and that Ratliff could not therefore meet his burden to rebut the defense of qualified immunity. That finding was also fatal to Ratliff's claim against Deputy Sheffield. Ratliff's entire suit was dismissed with prejudice. This appeal followed.

III.

Ratliff raises three issues on appeal. He argues that the district court erred: (1) by granting defendants' motion to dismiss the Monell claim against Aransas County, (2) by excluding testimony given by Ratliff in his earlier criminal trial from the summary judgment record in this civil action, and (3) by awarding summary judgment to the deputies on qualified immunity grounds. We will address each issue in turn.

A.

We first consider Ratliff's challenge to the dismissal of his Monell claim. Ratliff argues that his pleadings satisfy both the familiar pleading standard established by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and a lower-than-normal pleading standard that, according to Ratliff, applies in the Monell context under Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit , 507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). He can prevail on neither count.

Initially, we note that the ordinary Twombly pleading standard applies. It is, of course, true that Leatherman , a pre- Twombly case, held that courts must not apply a "heightened" pleading standard to Monell claims. See id. at 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160. Although Ratliff argues otherwise, however, Leatherman did not require courts to accept "generic or boilerplate" pleadings in this case or in any other context. Indeed, our precedents make clear that the Twombly standard applies to municipal liability claims. See Peña v. City of Rio Grande City , 879 F.3d 613, 621–22 (5th Cir. 2018) ; Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys , 675 F.3d 849, 866 n.10 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). "To survive a motion to dismiss," Ratliff's Monell pleadings "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quotation omitted).

Reviewing de novo , we find no error in the district court's conclusion that Ratliff has failed to produce sufficient pleadings. To state a Monell claim against Aransas County, Ratliff was required to plead facts that plausibly establish: "a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom." Piotrowski v. City of Houston , 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). The district court held that Ratliff's complaint fails to establish an official custom or policy of excessive force because "[t]he only facts [that Ratliff] allege[d] with any specificity ... relate to his shooting." This assessment is correct.

"[P]lausibly to plead a practice ‘so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law,’ [Ratliff] must do more than describe the incident that gave rise to his injury." Peña , 879 F.3d at 622. Ratliff's complaint states that "the assault, beating, and severe injury to citizens, with little or no justification, is a persistent, widespread practice of County employees—namely officers/deputies—that, although not authorized by officially adopted policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents official county policy." But this allegation does not contain any specific facts. Instead, the complaint's only specific facts appear in the section laying out the events that gave rise to this action. Thus, Ratliff's complaint clearly does not satisfy Twombly or Iqbal with respect to the allegation that excessive force is an Aransas County "custom."

In addition to this theory of widespread and customary police brutality, Ratliff also alleged that "Defendant County is liable for [the] inadequate training of police officers." To prevail on a failure-to-train theory, Ratliff must plead facts plausibly establishing "(1) that the municipality's training procedures were inadequate, (2) that the municipality was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy, and (3) that the inadequate training policy directly caused the violations in question." Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls , 614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010).

Ratliff has failed to carry this burden. Although the district court focused on the first two failure-to-train elements, "we may affirm a district court's [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) dismissal on any grounds raised below and supported by the record." Cuvillier v. Taylor , 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). Before the district court, the defendants argued that Ratliff's failure-to-train pleadings were insufficient with respect to the element of causation. It is clear that this argument is meritorious. Ratliff's complaint states in conclusory fashion that a "deficiency in training actually caused Defendants Scudder and Sheffield to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights." But, absent specific allegations supporting a plausible causation inference, this legal conclusion does not state a claim for relief and warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

In short, we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Ratliff's claim against Aransas County and, consequently, affirm its judgment dismissing the county from this case.

B.

We next examine Ratliff's argument that the district court erred by excluding testimony that Ratliff gave in his earlier criminal trial. He offered the testimony because of a failing memory and to rebut the deputies' qualified immunity defense in this § 1983 case. This previous testimony was attached, as part of a forty-page exhibit, to Ratliff's response to the defendants' summary judgment motion. The exhibit also included the testimony of other trial witnesses, including Vannatter and Deputy Scudder. The defendants objected only to Ratliff's testimony, arguing that such testimony was inadmissible hearsay to which no exception applied. The district court...