Baush Mach. Tool Co. v. Hill

• Decision Date: 16 July 1918
• Citation: 231 Mass. 30,120 N.E. 188
• Parties: BAUSH MACH. TOOL CO. v. HILL et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

231 Mass. 30

120 N.E. 188

BAUSH MACH. TOOL CO.

v.HILL et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

July 16, 1918.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hampden County; Christopher T. Callahan, Judge.

Suit by the Baush Machine Tool Company against Charles J. Hill and others. From an interlocutory and a final decree, both parties appeal. Interlocutory decree affirmed, and final decree reversed, and decree entered for plaintiff.

Jos. J. Feely, of Boston, for plaintiff.

F. W. Mansfield, of Boston, and J. F. Jennings, of Springfield, for defendants.

LORING, J.

[1] This is a bill in equity brought against the members (something over 250 in number) of two labor unions to enjoin them ‘from interfering with the business of the plaintiff * * * by maintaining, carrying on, aiding or abetting in any manner the strike in force against the plaintiff.’ The case was sent to a master. The master found that the members of the two unions had struck to get an increase of pay to unionize the plaintiff's shop and to limit the number of apprentices. The plaintiff and the defendants are at issue on the legality of a strike to limit the number of apprentices. But both plaintiff and defendants agree that a strike to unionize an employer's shop is an illegal strike and that a strike for an increase in wages is a legal strike. Without question a strike for both a legal and an illegal purpose is an illegal strike and no contention has been made to the contrary. It is not necessary therefore to consider the legality or illegality of a strike to limit the number of apprentices and we lay that purpose of the strike on one side as a matter of no consequence.

On the coming in of the master's report a temporary injunction was issued restraining the defendants from combining for the purpose of compelling the plaintiff to maintain a closed shop ‘unless and until the defendants shall formally renounce the purpose aforesaid and give notice to the plaintiff of such renunciation.’ The temporary injunction is set forth in full below. ¹ After this (with an exception of no importance) the master's report was confirmed. After confirmation of the master's report the ‘defendants' moved ‘to amend their answer’ by alleging that 28 of the defendants (named in the motion to amend) have renounced the purpose of compelling the plaintiff to unionize his shop and also the purpose of aiding the strike against the plaintiff for that purpose. The motion to amend is set forth in full in the margin.² The motion to amend was allowed against the objection of the plaintiff. Thereafter a judge of the superior court found that 28 defendants had ‘notified the plaintiff by mailing to it’ a letter dated November 22, 1917, and signed by them ‘of their renunciation of their combination or conspiracy to interfere with the plaintiff's business' for the purpose of unionizing the plaintiff's shop, and of their purpose of aiding or abetting the strike against the plaintiff for that purpose. The letter was made a part of the finding and was in these words:

‘Springfield, Mass., Nov. 22, 1917. We the undersigned members of Local No. 214 and Local No. 682 International Association of Machinists do hereby renounce and have renounced the closed shop principle, so-called, and any other unlawful object in connection with the Baush Machine Tool Co. strike and the maintenance thereof.’

Later on a final decree was entered permanently enjoining the 28 defendants who signed this letter from interfering with the plaintiff's business for the purpose of compelling it to maintain a closed shop or to limit the number of apprentices ‘or in any manner aiding or abetting the carrying on for those purposes of the strike declared against the plaintiff [and] restraining all other defendants * * * from carrying on, aiding or abetting in any manner whatsoever said strike for any purpose.’ The decree is set forth in full below. ³ From this decree appeals were taken both by the defendants and by the plaintiff.

By allowing the amendment to the answer the judge permitted 28 of the 250 defendants to sever and set up a defence different in part from that set up by the remaining 222. This aspect of the case was ignored by the defendants' counsel in the form of his motion to amend and in the appeal which was taken by him from the final decree.

The contention made in behalf of the 28 is that on the record it must be taken that the judge was satisfied that they had renounced any purpose of continuing parties to the strike so far as the strike was for the purpose of unionizing the plaintiff's shop and that being so that they should not have been enjoined from participating in the strike for that purpose. In other words the contention in behalf of these 28 defendants is in effect that they have ceased to be parties to any illegal strike and therefore ought not to have been enjoined as they were enjoined from doing the thing which they had renounced an intention of doing. We are of opinion that there would be no answer to the contention if the premises on which it is based had been true. But they are not true.

In the first place it is to be observed that the finding made in the superior court falls short of what the 28 defendants contend that it is. All that the judge found was that these 28 defendants had ‘notified the plaintiff’ (‘by mailing to it’ their letter dated November 22) that they ‘renounced the closed shop principle and any other unlawful object in connection’ with the pending strike. That is a guarded finding and does not go as far as the 28 defendants contend that the judge's finding went.

What the 28 defendants did was done pursuant to the scheme which first made its appearance in the temporary injunction. It was there provided that the temporary injunction should continue in force ‘until the defendants shall formally renounce the purpose’ ‘of compelling the plaintiff to maintain a so-called closed shop.’ By the terms of this provision it was not contemplated that the defendants who renounced the purpose of compelling the plaintiff to maintain a closed shop should renounce their membership in the union. There were two unions, but for convenience we speak of one union and of the defendants as members of the union. On the record it must be taken that the 28 defendants (who took advantage of this provision in the temporary injunction by giving notice of their renunciation of the illegal purpose of the strike) did not in fact leave the union. Furthermore it was not contemplated as part of the scheme put forward in the temporary injunction that the illegal strike which had been called and which was then being conducted and maintained by the union should come to an end. It was contemplated on the other hand that it should continue in force. Finally under the notice of renunciation which was given by the 28 it was contemplated that the illegal strike called and maintained by the union should continue in force and it did continue in force. What then was the situation which came into existence by reason of the notice of renunciation by these 28 members of the union who did not leave the union and who contemplated that in spite of their renunciation of the illegal purpose of the strike the illegal strike of the union would continue in force? In the first place so long as the union continued the illegal strike and these 28 defendants continued to be members of the union, the money of the union (which was their money as well as the money of the other 222 members of the union) could be used by the union in paying strike benefits, for example, or in any other way for the purpose of furthering the illegal strike. More than that since the 28 defendants were to continue members of the union they could be disciplined in any way in which a majority of the union could legally discipline its members in order to further the union's illegal strike which it was contemplated should continue in force. For example: The 28 defendants since they were still members of the union could be assessed to raise money to pay strike benefits to those out of work because engaged in this illegal strike in case and when the then present funds of the union should have been exhausted.

[3][4][5] What then is the result of the 28 having ‘renounced the closed shop principle and any other unlawful object’ of the illegal strike of the union of which they were and were to continue to be members? Suppose that at the time when the question of strike or no strike was before the union originally the 28 had voted to strike for an increase in wages only and the other 222 had voted to strike for that and the unionizing of the plaintiff's shop. And suppose that on this vote being announced the 28 had stated that they elected to remain members of the union and also stated that so far as they were concerned they should take part in the illegal strike (voted for by the 222) only for the purpose of securing an increase of pay. What would that have amounted to? It would have been nothing more than a statement of the motive which actuated the 28 in remaining members of the union and so of necessity parties to the illegal strike called and maintained by the union. The motive of the 28 in being parties to the illegal strike would have been of no consequence. Their liability is determined by the character of the strike not by their motive in electing to be parties to that strike; their liability is determined by the fact that they elected to remain...