Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 21 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2014–CA–01684–SCT.,2014–CA–01684–SCT.
• Citation: 201 So.3d 1046
• Parties: BAY POINT PROPERTIES, INC. f/k/a BP Properties, Inc. v. MISSISSIPPI TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION and Mississippi Department of Transportation.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

201 So.3d 1046

BAY POINT PROPERTIES, INC. f/k/a BP Properties, Inc.

v.MISSISSIPPI TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION and Mississippi Department of Transportation.

No. 2014–CA–01684–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

July 21, 2016.

William Alex Brady, II, Charles Sterling Lambert, Jr., attorneys for appellant.

Christopher M. Howdeshell, Jack Homer Pittman, Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellees.

EN BANC.

RANDOLPH

, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Bay Point Properties Inc. filed inverse condemnation proceedings against the Mississippi Transportation Commission,¹ claiming the easement MTC had across Bay Point's property had terminated and that MTC was required to pay Bay Point the unencumbered value of the property. The issue was put to the jury, which determined the easement—for which the Commission had paid $50,000—continued to encumber the property, but that the use by MTC was not a highway purpose. The jury awarded Bay Point the encumbered value of $500, as testified to by two witnesses.² Bay Point appealed. We affirm in part the judgment of the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Harrison County. However, the trial court failed to follow Section 43–37–9

's mandate to “determine and award or allow ... such sum as will, in the opinion of the court[,] ... reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees, actually incurred because of such proceeding.” Thus, we reverse the judgment of the Harrison County Circuit Court in part and remand the case with instructions to the trial court to hold a hearing in compliance with Section 43–37–9.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 1952, the Mississippi State Highway Commission, MTC's predecessor, acquired an easement over certain property of Wallace Walker for “all highway purposes” by an agreed judgment.³ The property was used to reconstruct a bridge spanning the Bay of St. Louis, between Pass Christian and Bay St. Louis, after the bridge had burned in 1948.⁴ After Hurricane Katrina destroyed the bridge in 2005, MTC constructed a newly designed bridge across the bay.⁵ MTC subsequently entered an agreement with Harrison County, which provided that (1) MTC would build a park, (2) Harrison County would maintain the park, (3) Harrison County would provide MTC any additional property required to build the park, and (4) MTC would maintain its property interest (its easement) in the park. MTC then built a park, with a parking lot, on the old road bed, with stairs connecting to the new bridge, which included a walking and biking path for the public.

¶ 3. Bay Point, Walker's successor in interest, filed inverse condemnation proceedings, claiming the easement terminated on the whole property when the new bridge was constructed following Katrina. Alternatively, Bay Point argued that the easement terminated on that portion of the easement used to build the park when the park was constructed. Bay Point asserted MTC's subsequent use constituted a taking for which it was entitled to just compensation of the unencumbered value of the property. MTC argued that it was using the property for highway purposes. Alternatively, MTC argued that, even if its use was not a highway purpose, the easement continued to burden the property because it had not been released on MTC's minutes as required by Section 65–1–123

. See Miss.Code Ann. § 65–1–123 (Rev.2012). Therefore, any compensation owed to Bay Point would be the value of the property, encumbered by the easement.

¶ 4. The jury viewed the property and heard five days of testimony before returning a verdict for Bay Point. The circuit court denied Bay Point's motion for attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses, as well as its post-trial motions for additur, new trial on the issue of damages, and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Bay Point appealed.

ISSUES

¶ 5. Bay Point raises the following issues, which we restate and reorder for clarity:

I. Whether the trial court erred in granting MTC's motion in limine regarding release of the easement.

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Bay Point's supplemental motion in limine regarding testimony of a nominal sum.

III. Whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony of an appraisal of the five-foot buffer.

IV. Whether the trial court erred in giving jury instructions D–2A, D–3A, and D–7A.

V. Whether the trial court erred in refusing jury instruction P–4.

VI. Whether the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that MTC must acquire property in fee to use as rest and recreation areas under Section 65–1–51.

VII. Whether the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence.

VIII. Whether the trial court erred in denying Bay Point's motion for attorneys' fees and costs.

IX. Whether the trial court erred in denying Bay Point's post-trial motions.

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the trial court erred in granting MTC's motion in limine regarding release of the easement.

¶ 6. Bay Point argues the trial court erred in granting MTC's motion in limine, limiting evidence of abandonment of the easement to the minutes of the Commission. We review evidentiary matters for an abuse of discretion. Ware v. Entergy Miss., Inc., 887 So.2d 763, 766 (Miss.2003)

. There is no abuse of discretion in granting a motion in limine “if the court determines that (1) the material or evidence in question will be inadmissible at trial under the rules of evidence; and (2) the mere offer, reference, or statements made during trial concerning the material will tend to prejudice the jury.” Id.

¶ 7. The Legislature has provided by statute the process by which an easement for highway purposes terminates: “All easements for highway purposes shall be released when they are determined on the minutes of the commission as no longer needed for such purposes[.]” Miss.Code Ann. § 65–1–123(5)

. The section further provides that “[i]n no instance shall any part of any property acquired by the commission, or any interest acquired in such property, including, but not limited to, easements, be construed as abandoned by nonuse [.]” Miss.Code Ann. § 65–1–123(6)

. Per the statute, the easement could not have been abandoned by nonuse. Release (i.e., termination or abandonment) requires a determination on the minutes.

¶ 8. Therefore, any evidence of abandonment other than minute entries is irrelevant and inadmissible. See M.R.E. 401

(“ ‘Relevant Evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”); M.R.E. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”). As the statute itself provides the sole process by which an easement for highway purposes terminates, the trial court did not err in limiting evidence of abandonment to what the statute requires—Commission minute entries.

¶ 9. The dissent's separation-of-powers argument is misplaced. See Dis. Op. at ¶¶ 42–43. The Legislature has decreed that it is the Transportation Department's prerogative whether to release a highway easement. MTC is the entity charged with transportation-related policy decisions, not this Court.⁶

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Bay Point's supplemental motion in limine regarding testimony of a nominal sum.

¶ 10. Bay Point argues on appeal that it filed a supplemental motion in limine to strike any testimony that its property was worth a nominal sum. However, Bay Point mischaracterizes its own motion. Bay Point's supplemental motion in limine requested only that the trial court “bar the expert testimony of John ‘Jeb’ Stewart[.]” The motion asserted that “Mr. Stewart should not be allowed to offer his opinion.... Mr. Stewart should not be allowed to offer any testimony.... Mr. Stewart should not be allowed to sit in front of the jury....” Finally, Bay Point requested the court “bar the expert testimony of John ‘Jeb’ Stewart.”

¶ 11. While the trial court denied the motion, Stewart did not testify. We fail to see how Bay Point was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to bar Stewart from testifying when Stewart in fact did not testify.⁷ See M.R.E. 103(a)

(“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]”).

III. Whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony of an appraisal of the five-foot buffer.

¶ 12. At some point, MTC appraised the value of the five-foot buffer around Bayou Boisdore reserved to Walker in the agreed judgment. Bay Point argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence of that appraisal. In Coleman v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 159 So.3d 546, 548 (Miss.2015)

, this Court held a trial court in error for excluding a second appraisal of the same property. As the appraisal was of the same property, it was “relevant and admissible” as to the value of that property. Id. at 551–52. However, the appraisals here are of two different parcels of property. The five-foot buffer was reserved to Walker, and thus he retained rights in that property that he did not retain in the property subject to MTC's easement. The trial court found the evidence would be irrelevant and would serve only to confuse the jury, as the value of the buffer was not related to the value of the property, whether encumbered or not. Moreover, neither the park nor the highway sits on the buffer. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.

IV. Whether the trial court erred in giving jury instructions D–2A, D–3A, and D–7A.

¶ 13. “The main query we make when reviewing jury instructions is whether (1) the jury instruction contains a correct statement of the law and (2) whether the instruction is warranted by the evidence.” N. Biloxi Dev. Co., LLC v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 912 So.2d 1118, 1123 (Miss.Ct.App.2005)

. In reviewing jury instructions, the instructions must be read as a whole. Id.

¶ 14. Instruction D–2A instructed the...