Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 18227.,18227.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Stephen BAYER v. SHOWMOTION, INC.

973 A.2d 1229

292 Conn. 381

Stephen BAYER v. SHOWMOTION, INC.

No. 18227.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 3, 2008.

Decided July 7, 2009.

Mark R. Carta, Darien, with whom were Kathryn A. Sherman and, on the brief,

Arthur K. Engle, Pittsburgh, PA, for the appellant (defendant).

Donna M. Lattarulo, Norwalk, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

ROGERS, C.J.

In this summary process action, the defendant, Showmotion, Inc., appeals¹ from the judgment of immediate possession of certain real property (property) in favor of the substitute plaintiff, 2 Meadow Street, LLC.² The threshold issue in this appeal concerns the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to a defect in the notice to quit.³ The defendant further claims that the present case should have been dismissed, or in the alternative stayed, because a prior pending action brought by the defendant against the named plaintiff, Stephen Bayer, barred this summary process action. Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court's factual findings with respect to its special defenses were clearly erroneous.⁴ We agree that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reflects the following relevant facts and procedural history. On March 11, 1996, the defendant and Bayer executed a written agreement for the lease of certain premises within a building owned by Bayer and located at 2 Meadow Street in Norwalk.⁵ According to the terms of the lease, the defendant agreed to pay monthly rent in exchange for possession of 30,700 square feet of space in the building. Pursuant to paragraph 32(C) of the lease, the defendant obtained a right of first refusal in the event that Bayer received from a bona fide third party an offer to purchase the property.⁶

On September 1, 2005, Bayer notified the defendant in writing that he had received an offer to purchase the property from a third party. The defendant timely responded by notifying Bayer, in writing, that it wished to purchase the property under the same terms and conditions set forth in the third party offer and by submitting a substantial deposit. On January 19, 2006, after failing to reach a final agreement with the defendant for the sale of the property, Bayer notified the defendant that he was withdrawing the property from the market. The defendant thereafter notified Bayer of its belief that Bayer was in default of the lease and filed a complaint against Bayer in the Superior Court claiming breach of contract and seeking specific performance of Bayer's promise to convey the property. See part II of this opinion.

On March 21, 2006, after the defendant had filed its breach of contract action, Bayer served the defendant with a notice to quit possession of the premises. Bayer thereafter initiated this summary process action alleging, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to pay timely rent for the month of March, 2006.

On April 27, 2006, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay, the present summary process action, arguing that the prior pending action doctrine barred Bayer from pursuing his claims. On June 1, 2006, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.

Bayer subsequently transferred ownership of the property to the plaintiff in January, 2007. On May 15 2007, the defendant filed a second motion to dismiss. In that motion, the defendant claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Bayer's complaint because: (1) Bayer no longer had standing to pursue his claim; and (2) a facial defect in the notice to quit precluded the court from assuming jurisdiction ab initio. Following oral argument on May 17, 2007, the trial court denied the defendant's second motion to dismiss. In addition, the court, sua sponte, ordered the plaintiff to be substituted in place of Bayer.

The plaintiff thereafter filed a substitute complaint identifying itself as the owner of the premises.⁷ After a trial on the merits of the substitute complaint, the court rendered judgment of immediate possession in favor of the plaintiff. This appeal followed.

I

We begin by addressing the defendant's claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 85, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bloomfield v. United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of America, Connecticut Independent Police Union, Local 14, 285 Conn. 278, 286, 939 A.2d 561 (2008).

The defendant first claims that a defect in the March 21, 2006 notice to quit deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's summary process action at its inception. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the notice to quit had failed to conform strictly to the timeline set forth in General Statutes § 47a-23(a). We disagree.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant's claim. Bayer served the defendant with the notice to quit on March 21, 2006. The notice, however, directed the defendant to quit possession of the premises "on or before March 25, 2005." (Emphasis added.) In other words, the defendant received the notice almost one full year after the quit date identified in the notice. In its May 15, 2007 motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that the notice failed to comply with the timeline set forth in § 47a-23(a) because Bayer had not served it at least three days prior to the date specified in the notice, and, therefore, the trial court could not assume jurisdiction over Bayer's complaint.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that the date discrepancy was a result of a scrivener's error and that the defendant "was clearly on notice that the plaintiff landlord was proceeding on the notice to quit as containing the date to quit as March 25, 2006 and not March 25, 2005," given the fact that "[a]ll of the [other] dates contained within the notice to quit were ... 2006" and that "all of the pleadings, and specifically paragraph five of the complaint, [state] that ... the notice to quit was served on March 21, 2006, to quit possession on or before March 25, 2006...." The court further noted that the defendant admitted in its answer that it had received the notice to quit and had procrastinated its challenge to the adequacy of the notice for more than one year until the eve of trial. Finally, the court concluded: "The defendant ... never had any doubt ... that the landlord was commencing this summary process action based on a proper notice to quit which required the tenant to remove himself on March 25, 2006...."

We previously have articulated our standard of reviewing challenges to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction in a summary process action on the basis of a defect in the notice to quit. "Before the [trial] court can entertain a summary process action and evict a tenant, the owner of the land must previously have served the tenant with notice to quit.... As a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit [pursuant to § 47a-23] is a jurisdictional necessity." (Citations omitted.) Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 728-29, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S.Ct. 3244, 106 L.Ed.2d 590 (1989); see also Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 5, 931 A.2d 837 (2007). This court's review of the trial court's determination as to whether the notice to quit served by the plaintiff effectively conferred subject matter jurisdiction is plenary. Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., supra, at 5, 931 A.2d 837.

We further observe that "[s]ummary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy.... It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms.... Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination.... Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 5-6, 931 A.2d 837.

Section 47a-23, which governs the form and delivery of notices to quit possession in summary process actions, provides in relevant part that, when an owner or lessor desires to obtain possession of its land or building and the lease pertaining to those premises has terminated for nonpayment of rent, the owner or lessor "(a) ... shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of such land [or] building ... at least three days ... before the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy...." The notice must be delivered in writing to the lessee or occupant. General Statutes § 47a-23(b) and (c).

The defendant argues that a strict construction of the three day timeline set forth in § 47a-23(a) compels us to conclude that the defect in the notice to quit deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The construction of § 47a-23(a), however, is not at issue in this case. Rather, we must decide whether the trial court properly construed the notice to quit to contain a mistake with regard to the March 25, 2005 date and found that the proper three day notice requirement had been intended and understood by the parties. That determination is governed by a more liberal standard as set forth in General Statutes § 52-123...