Bazoyah v. Herschitz

• Decision Date: 28 December 2010
• Citation: 79 A.D.3d 1081,913 N.Y.S.2d 769
• Parties: Alvard BAZOYAH, appellant, v. Izak HERSCHITZ, et al., respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

913 N.Y.S.2d 769

79 A.D.3d 1081

Alvard BAZOYAH, appellant,

v.Izak HERSCHITZ, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Dec. 28, 2010.

Harmon, Linder & Rogowsky, New York, N.Y. (Mitchell Dranow of counsel), for appellant.

Andrea G. Sawyers, Melville, N.Y. (Christopher T. Vetro of counsel), for respondents.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lally, J.), dated October 16, 2009, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and denied her cross motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate an order of the same court dated July 16, 2009, granting the defendants' unopposed motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to preclude her from offering evidence at trial.

ORDERED that the order dated October 16, 2009, is affirmed, with costs.

To vacate her default in opposing the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion ( see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Campbell-Jarvis v. Alves, 68 A.D.3d 701, 889 N.Y.S.2d 257; Nowell v. NYU Med. Ctr., 55 A.D.3d 573, 865 N.Y.S.2d 309; Raciti v. Sands Point Nursing Home, 54 A.D.3d 1014, 864 N.Y.S.2d 176; Simpson v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 48 A.D.3d 389, 392, 850 N.Y.S.2d 629). While "[t]he court has discretion to accept law-office failure as a reasonable excuse ... 'a pattern of willful default and neglect' should not be excused" ( Roussodimou v. Zafiriadis, 238 A.D.2d 568, 569, 657 N.Y.S.2d 66 [internal citations omitted], quoting Gannon v. Johnson Scale Co., 189 A.D.2d 1052, 1052, 592 N.Y.S.2d 881; see Pollock v. Meltzer, 78 A.D.3d 677, 909 N.Y.S.2d 914;Campbell-Jarvis v. Alves, 68 A.D.3d 701, 889 N.Y.S.2d 257). Here, the plaintiff's failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, her default in opposing the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to preclude her from offering evidence at trial, and her failure to appear for the duly-scheduled certification conference on July 8, 2009, constituted a pattern of willful default and neglect that cannot be excused ( see Grippi v. Balkan Sewer & Water Main Serv., 66 A.D.3d 837, 838, 886 N.Y.S.2d 614;Santiago v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 10 A.D.3d 393, 394, 780 N.Y.S.2d 764; Kolajo v. City of New York, 248 A.D.2d 512, 670 N.Y.S.2d 52). Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that she had a potentially meritorious opposition to the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 ( see Horne v. Swimquip, Inc., 36 A.D.3d 859, 861, 830 N.Y.S.2d 218; Sowerby v. Camarda, 20 A.D.3d 411, 798 N.Y.S.2d 125). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's cross motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the prior order of preclusion.

The Supreme Court also properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, since the preclusion order prevents the plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case ( see Panagiotou v. Samaritan Vil., Inc., 66 A.D.3d...