Bcl Enterprises, Inc., an Ohio Corp. and Taxpayer v. State of Ohio, Department of Liquor Control, and Steve O'bryan, D/b/a O'bryan's Deli
| Decision Date | 12 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | 95APE02-224,95-LW-1624 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | BCL Enterprises, Inc., an Ohio Corporation and Taxpayer, Plaintiff-Appellant v. State of Ohio, Department of Liquor Control, and Steve O'Bryan, d/b/a O'Bryan's Deli, Defendants-Appellees |
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Berry & Shoemaker, and Kevin L. Shoemaker, for appellant.
Betty Montgomery, Attorney General and James M. Guthrie, for appellee State of Ohio, Department of Liquor Control.
Brunner & Brunner, and Jennifer L. Brunner, for appellee Steve O'Bryan.
Plaintiff, BCL Enterprises, Inc., appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, Ohio Department of Liquor Control ("ODLC") and Steve O'Bryan. In support of its appeal, plaintiff raises two assignments of error as follows:
In November 1993, ODLC sought applications for a state liquor agency to be located in Butler County, Ohio (location No. 514). Plaintiff was the sole applicant; however, due to various construction delays, plaintiff could not commence operations as originally scheduled. ODLC eventually canceled plaintiff's application and advertised for new applications; both plaintiff and O'Bryan responded to the advertisement for new bids. Thereafter, ODLC selected O'Bryan to operate the agency store.
On October 25, 1994, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking, inter alia; (1) a declaration of the rights of the parties pursuant to the application and agency contract for location No. 514; (2) a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction prohibiting ODLC from executing a contract for location No. 514 with any entity other than plaintiff; and (3) a mandatory injunction requiring ODLC to evaluate plaintiff's original application.
On October 27, 1994, ODLC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the provisions of R.C. 4301.10(B)(1) authorize suits against ODLC only in cases involving leases of real estate or purchases and contracts necessary to the operation of state liquor stores; thus, any action against ODLC for declaratory and injunctive relief relative to an application for a state agency store is beyond the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. On the same day, O'Bryan also filed a motion to dismiss, raising issues beyond the jurisdictional issues raised by ODLC.
The trial court sustained ODLC's motion to dismiss on the basis that R.C. 4301.10(B)(1) deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court also sustained O'Bryan's motion to dismiss on the grounds that ODLC's absence from the caste created a jurisdictional defect relative to the declaratory judgment action against O'Bryan. Plaintiff has timely appealed the common plea court's judgment.
As both assignments of error raise jurisdictional issues, we will address them together. The sole basis for both ODLC's motion to dismiss and the trial court's subsequent dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is the language of R.C. 4301.10(B)(1), which states:
The trial court concluded that the language of R.C. 4301.01(B)(1) did not limit its effect to suits for money damages, but was intended to preclude suits against ODLC for any type of relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief, unless the suit related to real estate leases or state liquor store contracts. The trial court predicated this determination upon Hoffman Candy & Ice Cream Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control (1954), 96 Ohio App. 304. However, in Rickard v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control (1986), 29 Ohio App.3d 133, this court held that Hoffman was not controlling in a case involving declaratory and injunctive relief, as Hoffman involved an action for damages. As in Rickard, the case before us involves an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages. Thus, pursuant to Rickard, the trial court erred in concluding that Hoffman was controlling in the instant action.
Furthermore, plaintiff argues that the provisions of R.C. 4301.31 confer jurisdiction upon the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas with respect to actions involving declaratory and/or injunctive relief against ODLC. Such statute reads, in pertinent part:
"Except as provided in section 4301.28 of the Revised Code, no court, other than the court of common pleas of Franklin county, has jurisdiction of any action against the liquor control commission, the director of liquor control, or the department of liquor control, to restrain the exercise of any power or to compel the performance of any duty under Chapters 4301. and 4303. of the Revised Code. ***"
ODLC argues that R.C. 4301.31 should be read to include R.C. 4310.10(B)(1) within its language. Specifically, ODLC contends that, because the provisions of R.C. 4301.10(B)(1) authorize suits against ODLC only in cases involving leases of real estate or purchases and contracts necessary to the operation of state liquor stores, the language of R.C. 4301.31, conferring jurisdiction on the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, refers only to declaratory and injunctive relief actions relating to the execution of real estate leases and contracts and purchases for state liquor stores. However, we find such an interpretation to be contrary to the cases construing R.C. 4301.31.
In Rickard, supra, this court recognized a plaintiff's ability to sue ODLC for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in an action other than one involving a real estate lease or state liquor store contract. In that case, plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against ODLC in the Greene County Court of Common Pleas, seeking a declaration that R.C. 4301.32 through 4301.41 and R.C. 3501.38 were unconstitutional. Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief enjoining ODLC from taking adverse action against plaintiffs as a result of a local-option election. The Greene County Court of Common Pleas granted judgment in favor of plaintiffs. However, upon appeal, that judgment was reversed on jurisdictional grounds for the reason that R.C. 4301.31 required that the action be brought in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Rickard v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control (1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 101.
Upon remand, the Greene County Court of Common Pleas transferred the action to the franklin County Court of Common Pleas which dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, the trial court held that the Court of Claims was the only proper forum to hear a declaratory judgment action requesting a state statute to be found unconstitutional. On appeal this court held that R.C. 4301.31 requires that an action for declaratory and injunctive relief be bought in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.(fn1) As noted previously, though the 1986 Rickard case did not involve a real estate lease or a state liquor store contract or purchase, this court looked to the language of R.C. 4301.31 in determining the jurisdictional issue. Specifically, this court...
To continue reading
Request your trial