BCL Enterprises, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control

• Decision Date: 19 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-2189,95-2189
• Citation: 675 N.E.2d 1,77 Ohio St.3d 467
• Parties: BCL ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF LIQUOR CONTROL, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 467

77 Ohio St.3d 467

675 N.E.2d 1

BCL ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF LIQUOR CONTROL, Appellant.

No. 95-2189.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Oct. 16, 1996.

Decided Feb. 19, 1997.

BCL Enterprises, Inc. ("BCL"), appellee, initiated this action by filing a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Named as defendants were Steve O'Bryan, d.b.a. O'Bryan's Deli ("O'Bryan"), and the Ohio Department of Liquor Control ("department").

In its first cause of action, BCL alleged that the department "advertised for agency applications for a state agency store" in Butler County, Ohio, i.e., Location No. 514; that the applications were to be submitted to the department no later than November 5, 1993; that on November 3, 1993 the president of BCL filed an application with the department; and that no other applications were filed by the November 5 deadline. BCL further alleged that the department's application called for the liquor-store business to commence operations on or before December 15, 1993 or such other date as established by the department; that BCL informed the department that its business could not begin operating by December 5, 1993, but that BCL would attempt to commence operations in February 1994; and that the department agreed that BCL need not begin operations on December 15, 1993.

The complaint further alleged that BCL began working toward opening the business, and informed the department in May 1994 that it was ready to commence operations as a liquor, beer and wine store, but that the department then informed it that too much time had elapsed, and that the department intended to seek new applications for the location. BCL characterized the cancellation of its application as arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law.

In its second cause of action, BCL alleged that the department solicited a second time for applications for Location No. 514, and that, in this second round of advertising, the department stated an anticipated date of September 12, 1994 for commencement of operations at Location No. 514. BCL asserted that, in spite of BCL having timely filed a second application, the department nevertheless executed a written agency agreement with O'Bryan rather than BCL, even though O'Bryan did not intend to commence operations until November 2, 1994, and even though "BCL was ready, willing, and able to commence operations in accordance with [its] application." BCL characterized these department actions as arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and claimed that it would suffer irreparable harm if the department and O'Bryan were not enjoined from executing and performing an agency contract for Location No. 514.

As for relief, BCL sought (1) a declaration of "the rights of all parties pursuant to the application and the agency contract for Location # 514"; (2) a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction prohibiting the department from executing a contract for the location with any entity other than the plaintiff; and (3) a mandatory injunction requiring the department to evaluate the plaintiff's original application and award the contract to BCL if that application met department requirements.

Each defendant separately filed a Civ. R. 12(B) motion to dismiss. Both defendants asserted that dismissal was warranted in that, inter alia, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over BCL's claims.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that "R.C. 4301.10(B)(1) * * * deprives this court of jurisdiction." The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings, holding that the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County has subject-matter jurisdiction over the matters raised in the complaint.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal.

Berry, Shoemaker & Clark and Kevin L. Shoemaker, Columbus, for appellee.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and James M. Guthrie, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

The sole question we must answer in this appeal is whether the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County is vested with subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted by BCL.

"Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits * * *." Morrison v. Steiner (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 61 O.O.2d 335, 290 N.E.2d 841, paragraph one of the syllabus. Section 4(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, states that "[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law." It is well settled that " '[t]he court of common pleas is a court of general jurisdiction. It embraces all matters at law and in equity that are not denied to it.' " Schucker v. Metcalf (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 33, 34, 22 OBR 27, 28, 488 N.E.2d 210, 212 (quoting Saxton v. Seiberling [1891], 48 Ohio St. 554, 558-559, 29 N.E. 179, 180; Dumas v. Estate of Dumas [1994], 68 Ohio St.3d 405, 408, 627 N.E.2d 978, 980).

Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, courts of common pleas may "declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed," R.C. 2721.02. Am. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. of Kentucky v. Jones (1949), 152 Ohio St. 287, 40 O.O. 326, 89 N.E.2d 301; Herrick v. Kosydar (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 128, 130, 73 O.O.2d 442, 443, 339 N.E.2d 626, 628. See, also, Jones v. Chagrin Falls (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 456, 674 N.E.2d 1388, decided today. Pursuant to R.C. 2727.02 et seq., courts of common pleas have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief.

The appellant contends, however, that R.C. 4301.10(B)(1) and 4301.31 operate to divest the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County of subject-matter jurisdiction over BCL's complaint. The first of those statutes, R.C. 4301.10(B)(1), at the time this action was initiated provided: "The department [of liquor control] may * * * [s]ue, but may be sued only in connection with the execution of leases of real estate and such purchases and contracts necessary for the operation of the state liquor stores that are made under this chapter and Chapter 4303. of the Revised Code * * *." (Emphasis added.) The second statute, R.C. 4301.31, provided at the time the action was initiated: "Except as provided in section 4301.28 ¹ of the Revised Code, no court, other than the court of common pleas of Franklin county, has jurisdiction of any action against the * * * department of liquor control, to restrain the exercise of any power or to compel the performance of any duty under Chapters 4301. and 4303. of the Revised Code." (Emphasis and footnote added.)

The court of appeals held that, despite these statutory provisions, the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County is vested with jurisdiction to entertain actions against the department seeking declaratory or injunctive relief even where the case does not involve real estate leases or contracts and purchases necessary for the operation of state liquor stores. While expressing no opinion as to whether such relief should be granted, we affirm the holding of the court of appeals that the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas does have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider BCL's entitlement to such relief.

We reject the contention that R.C. 4301.31 establishes subject-matter jurisdiction in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County to restrain or compel departmental action. In providing that "no court, other than the court of common pleas of Franklin [C]ounty has jurisdiction" to restrain or compel the department's conduct, R.C. 4301.31 operates not to confer jurisdiction on the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, but rather to abrogate subject-matter jurisdiction of all other courts of...