State v. Mitchell

Decision Date29 November 2021
Docket Number20CA8
Citation181 N.E.3d 550
Parties STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sean B. MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Kathryn Cornelius-Blume, Dagger, Johnston, Miller, Ogilvie & Hampson, LLP, Lancaster, Ohio, for Appellant.

James K. Stanley, Meigs County Prosecuting Attorney, Pomeroy, Ohio, for Appellee.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} Sean B. Mitchell ("Appellant") appeals the June 24, 2020 judgment entry and final decision of the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas which found that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in Appellant's underlying criminal case when Appellant was sentenced in 2013. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss Appellant's matter with prejudice based upon violation of Appellant's constitutional rights under the Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution and also violation of constitutional speedy trial rights. Upon review, we find that the constitutional claims in Appellant's untimely Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgment should have been dismissed, as the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider them.

FACTS

{¶2} The underlying facts are fully recited in State v. Mitchell , 4th Dist. Meigs No. 13CA13, 2015-Ohio-1132, 2015 WL 1372604, (" Mitchell I "), at Paragraphs 2-5, 9 and 10. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to recite that in 2009, Appellant, after being apprehended by Mississippi law enforcement officials for bank robbery, confessed to robbing a bank in Meigs County, Ohio. On December 10, 2009, while Appellant was incarcerated in Mississippi, he was indicted by a Meigs County Grand Jury on four counts: aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A) ; robbery, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) ; theft, a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) ; and, kidnapping, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2).

{¶3} On July 10, 2012, Appellant was sentenced in Mississippi for his crimes committed there. Appellant was eventually brought to Ohio in 2013. On August 29, 2013, with the assistance of counsel, Appellant entered guilty pleas to the four counts contained in the indictment.

{¶4} On September 30, 2013, Appellant was sentenced in the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court imposed a sentence of five years in prison, to be served consecutively to his sentence in Mississippi. Appellant was then returned to the State of Mississippi to complete his prison sentence there.

{¶5} Appellant timely appealed his Ohio prison sentence in Mitchell I . In our March 19, 2015 decision in Mitchell I we found no merit to Appellant's arguments, however we remanded for correction of the sentencing entry.1 On April 16, 2015, the trial court entered a Nunc Pro Tunc corrective entry. Appellant did not appeal the Nunc Pro Tunc entry.

{¶6} On January 17, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se Motion for Jail Time Credit. On March 1, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se Motion to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment. In both pleadings, Appellant argued that Meigs County did not use reasonable diligence in bringing Appellant from Mississippi to Ohio to face the Ohio charges. Appellant further alleged that at Appellant's 2013 sentencing, the Meigs County Prosecutor was dishonest in her representation to the trial court regarding the delay.

{¶7} Hearing on Appellant's pro se motions was delayed for various reasons before and after the Covid 19 pandemic ensued. During that time, Appellant was appointed counsel. On March 20, 2020, defense counsel filed Defendant's Brief in Support of the previously filed pro se motions. The State's response to Appellant's motions was filed the same day. The matter finally came on for hearing on April 23, 2020.

{¶8} In its June 24, 2020 decision, subject of this appeal, the trial court found that the Meigs County Common Pleas Court had jurisdiction over Appellant and subject matter of his criminal case when Appellant pled guilty and was convicted in 2013. The trial court's entry specifically noted:

Mississippi was not a party to the IAD [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] and Ohio was without power to force Mississippi to turn over Defendant until all the coordinating parties and agencies agree for Defendant to be released from Mississippi and transported to Ohio. All the parties were not in coordination for that event until June 13, 2013. This Court specifically finds that the Defendant's speedy trial rights did not commence until June 13, 2013.

{¶9} This timely appeal followed. Additional facts and dates pertinent to resolution of this appeal are set forth below, where appropriate.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DISMISS APPELLANT'S MATTER, WITH PREJUDICE, AS APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFFORDED UNDER THE EXTRADITION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS UNDER OHIO LAW WERE VIOLATED.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶10} Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to hear and decide a particular case on its merits. See State v. Wycuff, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 19CA28, 2020-Ohio-5320, 2020 WL 6788189, at ¶ 9 ; BCL Enterprises, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control, 77 Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 1997-Ohio-254, 675 N.E.2d 1 ; Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 290 N.E.2d 841, paragraph one of the syllabus (1972). A judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void ab initio. Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941, paragraph three of the syllabus (1988). A sentence is also void when a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused. See State v. Harper , 160 Ohio St. 3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, at ¶ 42.

{¶11} When subject matter jurisdiction is lacking it can be raised at any time, it is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and it renders a judgment void as opposed to voidable. See State v. Helms , 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 14MA96, 2015-Ohio-1708, 2015 WL 1976359, at ¶ 15 ; State v. Lomax, 96 Ohio St.3d 318, 2002-Ohio-4453, 774 N.E.2d 249, ¶ 17 ; State v. Wilson , 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 45, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995), fn. 6. See also State v. Perry , 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraphs six and nine of the syllabus. " ‘The determination of whether a judgment is void is a question of law.’ " State v. Jayjohn, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 2021-Ohio-2286, 2021 WL 2792652, at ¶ 29, quoting State v. Cave , 4th Dist. Scioto No. 20CA3291, 2021-Ohio-874, 2021 WL 1056193, at ¶ 5. (Internal citations omitted.) A question of law necessitates a de novo review of the matter. See Wycuff, supra, at ¶ 7.

{¶12} Appellant has framed the issues presented in this appeal as involving the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) provides that an accused charged with a felony must proceed to trial within 270 days after the person's arrest. Appellant argues that the Meigs County Prosecutor failed to exercise reasonable diligence, as required by R.C. 2945.72 (A), to extradite him from Mississippi and to secure his presence in Meigs County, Ohio. Appellant asserts that speedy trial time attached as of July 13, 2011, when the Governor of Mississippi, Haley Barbour, issued a Mississippi Rendition Warrant directing the sheriff of Meigs County to take custody of Appellant. The Meigs County Sheriff did not take custody of Appellant and return Appellant to Ohio until just prior to his arraignment on June 28, 2013. Thus, Appellant contends that reasonable diligence was not exercised and the tolling provisions pertaining to extradition did not apply in Appellant's case. Appellant concludes that as a result, the trial court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction by January 2012, creating a void judgment entry.

{¶13} In State v. Helms, supra , the appellate court rejected the argument that a violation of Helms’ speedy trial rights deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and resulted in his conviction being void. Id. at ¶ 16.2 The 11th District rejected the same argument more recently in State v. Johnson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-064, 2017-Ohio-884, 2017 WL 981433. We also reject Appellant's characterization of his conviction as being void based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as presented in his appellate brief. Rather, we find his appeal to be limited to consideration of speedy trial issues relating to Appellant's involvement in extradition proceedings.

{¶14} Therefore, in determining the appropriate standard of review, we note that Appellant's appeal comes before us on the implicit denial of Appellant's pro se motions for jail time credit and for vacation of the allegedly void judgment in his case.3 Appellant's underlying motion challenging his sentence was captioned "Motion to Vacate or Set Aside Judgment." " "[C]ourts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged." " State v. Brown, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3770, 2017-Ohio-4063, 2017 WL 2375709, at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Burkes, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 13CA3582, 2014-Ohio-3311, 2014 WL 3744686, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12.

{¶15} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that " [w]here a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction relief as defined in R.C. 2953.21.’ " State v. Osborn, 4th Dist. Adams No. 18CA1064, 2018-Ohio-3866, 2018 WL 4600874, at ¶ 7, quoting State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997), syllabus. A "Motion to Correct or Vacate Sentence, despite its caption, meets the definition of a motion for postconviction relief set...

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