Bd. of Comm. of Roane Cnty. V. Parker et al.
| Decision Date | 13 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | E2001-00146-COA-R3-CV |
| Parties | BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF ROANE COUNTY v. JOE PARKER, ET AL.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Tennessee |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Roane County Nos. 13,252 & 13,223 Frank V. Williams, III, Chancellor
The Plaintiffs acquired a nine-acre tract of land zoned A-1, the General Agricultural District, which was the least restrictive zoning district in Roane County, and soon announced their intention to house a tiger thereon, a permissible use, which motivated the County to amend its Regional Zoning Ordinance by creating a new zoning district, A-2, with the permissible use declared to be the keeping thereon of exotic animals. Within three years the Plaintiffs had fifty or more exotic [Class I] animals on their nine-acre tract. They acquired three additional tracts which they requested be rezoned A-2 in order to expand their exotic animal sanctuary. Rezoning was refused and the Plaintiffs filed suit alleging the refusal was arbitrary and capricious; the County filed suit, seeking to enjoin the Plaintiffs from keeping more than one exotic animal - the tiger - on their nine-acre tract. The County prevailed in both actions. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.
Steven Douglas Drinnon, Dandridge, Tennessee, for the Appellants, Joe Parker, Mary Lynn Parker and Tiger Haven.
Jack H. McPherson, Jr., Kingston, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Board of Commissioners of Roane County, Tennessee.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded
OPINION
This is the second appeal of these consolidated cases. In the first appeal1 we vacated the judgment which (1) enjoined the Appellants from keeping exotic animals2 on Parcel 22.06, (about nine acres) and (2) upheld the refusal of the County to rezone adjacent tracts A-2, which would permit the keeping of exotic animals thereon.3 The dispositive issue on the first appeal was whether the trial court erred in refusing to alter or amend the judgment based on newly discovered evidence that other property had been rezoned A-2. The Chairman of the Roane County Planning Commission testified that no property in Roane County was zoned A-2; after the trial it was discovered that the Chairman mis-spoke, and that certain property, to wit, Parcels 38 and 39, Group B, Map 47, known as the Ladd property, had been rezoned A-2 several years previously.
We held that Information about the circumstances of that A-2 zoning may well be critical to the resolution of many of the issues raised at trial by the Appellants. . . . [W]hether the Board's refusal to grant them A-2 zoning was arbitrary and capricious, whether the A-2 zoning classification is unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad, and whether the Board's refusal to rezone their property to A-2 unreasonably discriminates. The existence of and circumstances surrounding the zoning of other property as A-2 in Roane County is material to the resolution of those issues.
We declined to address other issues raised by the Appellants, holding that "all parties will have an opportunity to appeal and raise any issue they believe appropriate . . . " Following remand and after extended colloquy concerning the relevancy of evidence proposed to be presented by the Appellants, the trial judge ruled:
Counsel, I am going to allow you to do this and only this, and that is if you can show that Mr. Parker and his land and his use was similarly situated to that of Jane Todd's (Ladd) and that they gave Jane Todd (Ladd) permission to do something that they did not give Mr. Parker and Tiger Haven permission to do then I will hold that to be arbitrary and capricious and strike the ordinance. That is all. And if you can show what Jane Todd and her property, what is going on out there, is the same or essentially the same or should be considered to be the same as what Mr. Parker wants to do with his land and they permitted one and did not permit the other that is arbitrary and capricious. And that is as far as I am going to go with it. . . . I think A-2 zone was created because they realized that Mr. Parker had a pet tiger out there and that if he could bring one then he might bring some others and that to avoid that situation they created the A-2 zone.
In accordance with these comments a pre-trial order was entered which "limited the introduction of evidence to the facts and circumstances related to the zoning of other A-2 property."
The Chancellor observed that "his task was to determine what effect 'these facts' have on the issues as outlined by the Court of Appeals."
The principal witness at the hearing on remand was Ms. Jane Ladd Petruzzi who testified that she made application, in 1992, to have property owned by her father rezoned A-2 to enable her to (1) board small pets including small exotic animals, (2) use the property as a quarantine for the Knoxville Zoo, and (3) perhaps "big cats." The rezoning request was approved in May 1992. The Ladd property remains as rezoned, that is, A-2. Whether it was encircled with quansitina [sic: concertina] razor wire, as proposed, does not appear.
The rezoning request was approved in May 1992. Ms. Ladd's plans never came to fruition owing to the death of her father, but her property remains zoned A-2.
Reiterating his earlier comments, the Chancellor held that:
The issue presented to the Chancery Court on remand is straight forward. The County would be acting arbitrarily or capriciously if it agreed to rezone property upon the petition of someone who was similarly situated to the petitioners, but denied the petitioner's request to rezone their property for the same or similar uses. (Emphasis added). The question becomes: Is the use proposed by Jane Todd Petruzzi and approved by the County Commission the same or sufficiently similar to the use being made of the petitioners' land so to render arbitrary or capricious the County's refusal to rezone the petitioners' property? The court finds that the use made of petitioners' land is significantly different from that proposed by Jane Ladd Petruzzi and that the County did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by denying petitioners' request while approving the request of Ms. Petruzzi.
Both uses are governed by the provisions of the ordinance which is reasonably specific about the types of uses which are intended to be regulated. The amended ordinance provides:
1103.2.3 Permitted uses and structures.
a. Animal shelters, preserves, reservations, kennels, livestock pens or yards and other places and uses intended for the keeping of wild, exotic, and other animals in a restrained or restricted space because of a potential threat to public health and safety.
The Chancellor then found that short term boarding of dogs, cats and "small exotics" while prohibiting lifetime housing of lions and tigers was not arbitrary "because such uses are not similar even though both are regulated by the same ordinance." We note that this finding ignores much of Ms. Ladd's testimony.
The plaintiffs were enjoined from housing exotic animals on Parcels 22.06 and 29.01 [except the pet tiger] and the action of the County in refusing to rezone the adjacent tract was held not to have been arbitrary. The plaintiffs appeal.
Because the issues presented for review to an extent are overlapping and repetitive we will discuss them collectively. See, Hutcherson v. Criner, 11 S.W.3d at 131, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Review is de novo on the record with a presumption of the correctness of any factual determination unless the evidence otherwise preponderates. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996). The standard of review respecting the issuance of injunctive relief is whether the Chancellor erred in exercising his discretion to do so.
The principal dispositive issue is whether the defendant's refusal to rezone the plaintiffs' property was arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory.
Secondary issues are (1) whether the amendment to the Zoning Ordinance affected the uses of A-1 property, (2) the validity of the Amendment to the Regional Zoning Ordinance, (3) the admissibility of evidence, and (4) equitable estoppel.
Ms. Parker purchased a nine-acre tract, identified as Parcel 22.06, on May 24, 1991. It was zoned A-1, the least restrictive of the zoning districts. She later acquired three adjoining tracts, also zoned A-1
A few months after acquiring the nine-acre tract, the Parkers informed the County that they intended to house a tiger thereon, a use permitted under the General Agricultural Classification. This precipitated the adoption of a Resolution, No. 91-09-02, on November 19, 1991, amending the Regional Zoning Ordinance. The amendment provided:
Section 1.Title II, Roane County Zoning Regulations is hereby amended by inserting a new section, 1103.2, creating a new district to be referenced as A-2, Special Agricultural District.
Section 2.The specifics of the district as follows:
1103.2 A-2. Special Agricultural District. This district is intended for application to rural areas intended for special agricultural uses and uses that are specifically or generally similar to agricultural uses that are or generally perceived to be a threat to the social and economic health, safety, and welfare of the county and its citizens.
1103.2.1 District determination criteria. The following criteria are provided as a guide for determining the appropriateness of an A-2 designation.
a. The initial district should encompass no less than one acre of land but may be increased in size in increments of less than one acre.
b. The district should be adjacent to either General Agricultural or industrially zoned properties and at least a mile from residentially zoned properties or...
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