Bd. of Comm'rs of Union Cnty. v. McGuinness
Decision Date | 15 August 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 81S01-1708-PL-529,81S01-1708-PL-529 |
Citation | 80 N.E.3d 164 |
Parties | The BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNION COUNTY, Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Joe MCGUINNESS, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Transportation and the Indiana Department of Transportation, Appellees (Defendants below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Appellant : James R. Williams, Matthew L. Kelsey, DeFur Voran LLP, Muncie, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellees : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Andrea E. Rahman, David L. Steiner, Deputy Attorneys General, Indianapolis, Indiana
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 81A01-1603-PL-696
The Board of Commissioners of Union County ("Union County") sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Transportation, and the Department itself (collectively "INDOT") alleging that INDOT was negligent in its highway repair efforts, causing damage to several neighboring septic systems of Union County residents. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding Union County did not have standing to sue INDOT for injury done to its residents. We agree, and affirm.
In 2010 or 2011, INDOT performed construction and repair work on U.S. Route 27 in Union County.1 While undertaking this project, INDOT allegedly caused "septic system issues" on three landowners' private property. Appellant's App. at 25. After broaching the matter with INDOT with unsatisfactory results, Union County filed this action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction against INDOT, seeking repair of the septic systems and "[a]n Order declaring [U.S.] highway 27 and any associated storm drain the responsibility of INDOT and not Union County, Indiana[.]" Appellant's App. at 25.
INDOT filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), asserting Union County lacked standing to sue and thus had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court agreed, granted the motion to dismiss, and subsequently denied Union County's motion to correct error. Union County appealed, and our Court of Appeals reversed, finding that a declaratory judgment was an appropriate vehicle for resolving the question of "responsibility" for U.S. Route 27, and Union County could maintain an action for injunctive relief on behalf of its citizens under third-party standing doctrines, specifically public standing, associational standing, and parens patriae authority. Bd. of Comm'rs of Union Cty. v. Hendrickson , 67 N.E.3d 1061, 1067–71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We hereby grant INDOT's petition to transfer, and vacate the Court of Appeals' decision below. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
"We review de novo the trial court's grant or denial of a motion based on Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6)." Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Kephart , 934 N.E.2d 1120, 1122 (Ind. 2010).2 In so reviewing, "we look at the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, with every inference drawn in its favor, to determine if there is any set of allegations under which the plaintiff could be granted relief." King v. S.B. , 837 N.E.2d 965, 966 (Ind. 2005). "A dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is improper unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts." Id.
Indiana Trial Rule 8(A) places a lower limit on a plaintiff's pleading obligation, requiring only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Nevertheless, "[a]though the plaintiff need not set out in precise detail the facts upon which the claim is based, [they] must still plead the operative facts necessary to set forth an actionable claim." Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Indiana , 845 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ind. 2006). Among such "operative" facts in a declaratory judgment action are those necessary to support that the plaintiff has personal standing to bring suit. See State ex rel. Cittadine v. Indiana Dep't of Transp. , 790 N.E.2d 978, 984 (Ind. 2003) ; see also Redev. Comm'n of Town of Munster v. Indiana State Bd. of Accounts , 28 N.E.3d 272, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied .
The general rule of standing holds that "the proper person to invoke the court's power" is limited to those "who have a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation and who show that they have suffered or were in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct [.]" Cittadine , 790 N.E.2d at 979. Our Court of Appeals found that Union County could maintain its declaratory judgment action, finding the allegations "may be viewed as akin to a dispute regarding ownership of or title to real property, which is an appropriate matter for resolution by declaratory judgment." Hendrickson , 67 N.E.3d at 1066.
But the inference necessary to adopt this viewpoint is that Union County has some underlying property interest at issue—and Union County has provided no facts or evidence in its pleadings to support that inference.3 Indeed, Union County has identified only INDOT as having control over U.S. Route 27, and three local landowners who own adjacent property. The only connection with U.S. Route 27 that Union County has pled is its physical presence within the county, which does not in and of itself reasonably support the inference that Union County has any responsibility for it, particularly since it is a federal highway that the State must maintain. See supra note 1. Moreover, it is not a foregone conclusion that Union County has any direct property interest at stake (in the absence of pled facts or evidence to the contrary), since U.S. Route 27 may merely rest upon a public right-of-way, rather than government property acquired through condemnation or eminent domain proceedings. See, e.g. , Contel of Indiana, Inc. v. Coulson , 659 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) ( ). Nor has Union County asserted in its pleadings that it owns property separate and apart from U.S. Route 27 which was impacted by the alleged actions of INDOT, or that Union County could have an interest in U.S. Route 27 due to the public right-of-way.
In short, by crafting its complaint to avoid any connection to U.S. Route 27, Union County has also managed to avoid pleading any personal interest in its own case. As such, the trial court did not err in dismissing Union County's declaratory judgment claim for lack of standing.
Union County also alleges a third-party interest in this suit, namely that INDOT's actions "may impact other properties and may implicate a broader public health and safety concern for Union County, Indiana."4 Appellant's App. at 25. Unlike declaratory judgment actions, a party may seek equitable relief (such as an injunction) on the basis of third-party standing. Cf . Cittadine , 790 N.E.2d at 984 ( ). While the general rule of standing requires a personal interest in the outcome of the case, there are a number of exceptions which permit third parties to prosecute actions despite lacking such an interest. INDOT discusses three such exceptions in its petition to transfer, which we shall address in turn: public standing doctrine, associational standing doctrine, and parens patriae authority.
As we discussed extensively in Cittadine , the public standing doctrine dispenses with the personal interest standing requirement "in cases where public rather than private rights are at issue and in cases which involve the enforcement of a public rather than a private right." 790 N.E.2d at 983. Cittadine cited forty Indiana Supreme Court decisions stretching back to 1852 permitting public standing in some shape or form, but all of them have at least one thing in common: the action was brought by a citizen. Indeed, that has been a critical aspect of the public standing doctrine since its inception in this State, because only a member of the public has standing to enforce rights granted to the public. See Hamilton v. State ex rel. Bates , 3 Ind. 452, 458 (1852) ; see also Cittadine , 790 N.E.2d at 984 ( ); Bd. of Comm'rs of Decatur Cty. v. State , 86 Ind. 8, 12–13 (1882) ( ). Union County is thus unable to assert the public standing doctrine, since it is not a citizen.
Unlike the public standing...
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