Bd. of Trs. for the Fairfield Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State
| Decision Date | 16 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 27417.,27417. |
| Citation | 409 S.C. 119,761 S.E.2d 241 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR the FAIRFIELD COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. STATE of South Carolina, Chester County School District, Fairfield County Treasurer, and State Department of Education, Respondents. Appellate Case No. 2012–212697. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Armand G. Derfner, of Derfner Altman & Wilborn, LLC, of Charleston, Alice F. Paylor and Rene Stuhr Dukes, both of Rosen Rosen & Hagood, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellant.
James S. Meggs, of Callison Tighe & Robinson, LLC, of Columbia, John Marshall Reagle, Allison Aiken Hanna and Kimberly Kelley Blackburn, all of Childs & Halligan, PA, of Columbia, Attorney General Alan Wilson, Assistant Deputy Attorney General J. Emory Smith, Jr., Wendy Bergfeldt Cartledge and Shelly Bezanson Kelly, all of Columbia, for Respondents.
In this direct appeal, the Board of Trustees for the Fairfield County School District (FCSD) appeal the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State of South Carolina, Chester County School District (CCSD), the Fairfield County Treasurer, and the State Department of Education (collectively Respondents). We affirm.
For the past four decades between 100 and 200 children residing in the Mitford Community of Fairfield County have been attending CCSD schools in the Great Falls area of Chester County. The CCSD schools are closer to the Mitford Community than are any FCSD schools. The Mitford students have been attending CCSD schools at no cost to the students or their families.
Mitford students' attendance at CCSD schools began as a result of a Federal 1970 desegregation order, which required the all African–American Mitford Elementary School be closed, and its students be given the choice of attending CCSD's Great Falls schools. In 1972, the General Assembly passed Act No. 1236, consolidating the Mitford Community into CCSD. This Act was repealed the following year based on an agreement between FCSD and CCSD respecting the Mitford Community's students' enrollment in CCSD's schools. Under this agreement, FCSD paid CCSD $25,000 per year for educational expenses.
In 2007, this long standing agreement began to break down and finally ended in the 2009–10 school year when no agreement was reached for that year or thereafter. In light of the school districts' failure to reach an agreement for payment to CCSD for the cost of educating Mitford Community's students in CCSD's schools and FCSD's refusal to continue negotiations, the General Assembly passed Act No. 294 of 2010 (Act No. 294) 1 in order to provide for a uniform arrangement between FCSD and CCSD.
Pursuant to section 59–63–485(C), CCSD has invoiced the Fairfield County Treasurer $1,838,703 for the expenses of educating the Mitford children for the past three school years.
FCSD filed suit against the Respondents seeking a declaratory judgment that Act No. 294 was unconstitutional. FCSD contended that Act No. 294 was unconstitutional special legislation in violation of S.C. Const. art. III, § 34(IX), “because it directly conflicts with and undermines South Carolina's general law governing residence requirements for school attendance and general law governing the financing of schools.” CCSD, the State, and FCSD filed cross motions for summary judgment as to the constitutionality of Act No. 294. The circuit court issued an order denying FCSD's motion and granting CCSD and the State's motions for summary judgment, holding that Act No. 294 was constitutional special legislation, and FCSD appealed.
“In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, [an appellate court] applies the same standard that governs the trial court under Rule 56, SCRCP: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Pittman v. Grand Strand Entm't, Inc., 363 S.C. 531, 536, 611 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2005).
The only issue before this Court is whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because FCSD failed to carry its burden of production. The parties agree that Act No. 294 is special legislation because the more general law found in S.C.Code Ann. § 59–63–480 (2004)2 applies to the transfer of students between school districts based upon geographic proximity. In addition, FCSD contends that Act No. 294 violates Article III, § 34(IX) because the General Assembly has failed to set forth any logical basis or sound reason for Act No. 294's enactment. We agree with the circuit court that FCSD failed to present any evidence that the General Assembly had neither a logical basis nor sound reason for enacting Act No. 294 and therefore affirm the circuit court order granting summary judgment.
Article III, § 34(IX), states in pertinent part: “where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.” Despite this language, it is well settled that Article III, § 34(IX) does not prohibit all special legislation, as this Court recently explained:
A law is general when it applies uniformly to all persons or things within a proper class, and special when it applies to only one or more individuals or things belonging to that same class. If the legislation does not apply uniformly, the inquiry then becomes whether the legislation creates an unlawful classification. However, the mere fact that a law creates a classification does not render it unlawful. Instead, the constitutional prohibition against special legislation operates similarly to our equal protection guarantee in that it prohibits unreasonable and arbitrary classifications. A classification is arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional, if there is no reasonable hypothesis to support it. Accordingly, special legislation is not unconstitutional where there is a substantial distinction having reference to the subject matter of the proposed legislation, between the objects or places embraced in such legislation and the objects and places excluded. Charleston County. Sch. Dist. v. Harrell, 393 S.C. 552, 558, 713 S.E.2d 604, 608 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
Thus, where a special law will best meet the exigencies 3 of a particular situation, it is not unconstitutional. Id. at 558, 713 S.E.2d at 608 (citing Med. Soc'y of S.C. v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 334 S.C. 270, 279, 513 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1999)). Restated, special legislation will survive a constitutional challenge where there is a logical basis and sound reason for resorting to such legislation. Id. (citing Horry County v. Horry County Higher Educ. Comm'n, 306 S.C. 416, 419, 412 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1991)). Additionally, while not exempt from the requirements of Article III, § 34(IX), this Court has recognized that the General Assembly has broad authority when enacting legislation that deals with education. Horry County, at 419, 412 S.E.2d at 423.
The circuit court found that FCSD presented no evidence tending to show that the General Assembly's enactment of Act. No. 294 violated the proscription of Article III, 34(IX). We agree.
FCSD's sole argument below and on appeal is that there is neither a logical basis nor a sound reason for this legislation because the transfer of these students could be provided for by existing general law. This argument, however, merely establishes that Act No. 294 is special legislation and is not probative of the second element that a challenger must establish, that is, whether the General Assembly failed to have a logical basis or sound reason for enacting Act No. 294. Therefore, the circuit court was correct in holding that FCSD had failed to present any evidence as to why there was neither a logical basis nor sound reason for enacting Act No. 294.
It is well settled that the non-moving party may not rely on mere allegations to resist summary judgment but must present some evidence in the form of affidavits or otherwise in support of its proposition. Woodson v. DLI Props., LLC, 406 S.C. 517, 753 S.E.2d 428 (2014). Because FCSD has failed to present any evidence beyond mere allegations that there is neither a logical basis nor sound reason for the enactment of Act No. 294, we must affirm the grant of summary judgment by the circuit court.4
AFFIRMED.
The majority agrees that Act No. 294 is special legislation; however, it affirms the grant of summary judgment because “FCSD failed to present any evidence that the General Assembly had neither a logical basis nor sound reason for enacting Act No. 294.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority myopically focuses on the procedural posture of the instant case and, in turn, effectively discounts the fundamental question regarding the constitutionality of Act No. 294. In my view, the majority's truncated analysis fails to fully address the constitutional propriety of Act No. 294. If one engages in a comprehensive analysis, I believe the result is clear that Act No. 294 is unconstitutional special legislation.
Our state constitution prohibits the enactment of certain special or local laws as it provides, “The General Assembly of this State shall not enact local or special laws ... where a general law can be made applicable.” S.C. Const. art. III, § 34, c. IX. “The purpose of the prohibition on special legislation is to make uniform where possible the statutory laws of this State in order to avoid duplicative or conflicting laws on the same subject.” Med. Soc'y of S.C. v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 334 S.C. 270, 279, 513 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1999). “The allowance of special legislation, where a general law could be made applicable, fosters ‘legislation by delegation,’ which is pernicious.” Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 284 S.C. 81, 90, 326 S.E.2d 395, 400 (1985) (citations...
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