Beach v. Beach

• Decision Date: 22 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 14-94-00566-CV,14-94-00566-CV
• Citation: 912 S.W.2d 345
• Parties: Randa Cramer BEACH, Appellant, v. Christopher Scott BEACH and Robert J. Piro, Appellees. (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 345

912 S.W.2d 345

Randa Cramer BEACH, Appellant, v. Christopher Scott BEACH and Robert J. Piro, Appellees.

No. 14-94-00566-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Houston (14th Dist.).

Nov. 22, 1995.

Wayne H. Paris, Houston, for appellant.

Robert J. Piro, Houston, for appellees.

Before LEE, HUDSON and EDELMAN, JJ.

OPINION

EDELMAN, Justice.

Randa Cramer Beach appeals the declaratory judgment granted in favor of Christopher Scott Beach and Robert J. Piro on the grounds that (1) the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, (2) the judgment is an advisory opinion, (3) Piro's intervention was untimely, (4) Piro had no justiciable interest in the proceedings in which he intervened, (5) the declaratory judgment determined tort liability, (6) the declaratory judgment purported to determine the liability of a non-party to the proceeding, (7) a declaratory judgment was not the proper method to determine this dispute, (8) the appellees improperly sought to enforce a divorce decree through the declaratory judgment motion, and (9) her motion for continuance should have been granted. We reverse.

On October 2, 1993, while their divorce action was pending, Randa and Christopher signed a "Mutual Release" (the "release") in which they released each other and their successors, assigns and legal representatives ¹ from liability for any action taken in connection with their divorce proceeding. On October 4, 1993, the judge of the 310th District Court signed their final divorce decree, which contained a detailed property division. Robert Piro acted as Christopher's attorney in the divorce action.

On February 10, 1994, Piro, as an intervenor, filed in the divorce case an action to enforce the divorce decree and for declaratory judgment. Anticipating that Randa might sue him for pleadings he had filed in the divorce action, Piro sought a declaratory judgment that Randa had no cause of action against him, and that the final decree of divorce terminated any such causes of action that she may have had. On March 2, Randa filed a motion to strike this intervention and to dismiss Piro's action. This motion was set for hearing on March 28.

On March 3, Randa filed a lawsuit against Piro in the 234th District Court for fraud, malicious prosecution and conspiracy.

On March 8, Christopher filed in the divorce action a motion to enforce the divorce decree and for declaratory judgment that Randa had no cause of action against either him or Piro. ² Randa again filed a motion to dismiss and a general denial, and this motion was also set to be heard on March 28.

On March 28, the 310th District Court denied Randa's motions to strike and dismiss Piro's action and Christopher's motion, and those matters were set for hearing on the merits.

On April 11, Randa filed in the divorce action a plea to the jurisdiction, and alternatively, a plea in bar and motion for continuance on the grounds that her case against Piro was currently pending in the 234th District Court. On April 13, the 310th District Court denied these motions, and entered a declaratory judgment that Piro was not liable to Randa for any cause of action based on his representation of Christopher in the divorce action. On April 25, the trial court entered the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. It is undisputed that Randa Cramer Beach executed the Mutual Release placed in evidence.

2. This action was filed approximately three weeks before the action by Plaintiff against Defendant was filed in [the 234th District Court].

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This Court has subject matter ³ and personal jurisdiction.

2. Neither the pleadings of Randa Cramer Beach nor the evidence suggests any reason why this court should not have heard this matter.

3. Neither the pleadings of Randa Cramer Beach nor the evidence raised any issue in avoidance of or in defense to the Release such as would show the Release was not enforceable according to its terms.

4. The filing of the Motion by Mr. Piro did not dissolve or affect the confidentiality provisions of the final decree.

In her second and seventh points of error, Randa claims that Piro's intervention should have been barred as untimely, and that Christopher's motion and Piro's intervention should have been stricken because the mutual release was not part of the divorce decree, and, thus, could not be enforced through a motion to enforce the decree. Because we find these points dispositive of the appeal, we address them first.

Once final judgment is rendered in a case, an intervention cannot be filed therein unless the judgment is set aside. First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex.1984); Comal County Rural High Sch. Dist. No. 705 v. Nelson, 314 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex.1958). Similarly, only one final judgment can be rendered in any lawsuit except where otherwise specifically provided by law. TEX.R.CIV.P. 301. Where a second final judgment is entered which does not vacate or replace the first final judgment, the second judgment is a nullity. Mullins v. Thomas, 136 Tex. 215, 150 S.W.2d 83, 84 (1941); Azbill v. Dallas County Child Protective Serv. Unit, 860 S.W.2d 133, 139 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993, no writ).

After rendition of a divorce decree, the trial court retains the power to enforce the property division. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 3.70(c) (Vernon 1993). A court order or property division may be enforced by filing a motion in the court that rendered the decree by any party affected by the order or decree. Id. § 3.70(a). However, the trial court generally may not modify the property division, and its enforcement orders are limited to clarification of the decree and may only specify more precisely the manner of effecting it. Id. § 3.71(a). An...