Bean v. Bean
| Decision Date | 03 November 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 18974,18974 |
| Citation | 170 S.E.2d 654,253 S.C. 340 |
| Parties | Mrs. Vera Gray BEAN, Appellant, v. Charles William BEAN, Jr., Respondent. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Perrin & Perrin, Spartanburg, for appellant.
Loy E. Bryant, Spartanburg, C. E. Saint-Amand, Gaffney, for respondent.
This action was instituted by Mrs. Vera Gray Bean, the appellant, against Charles William Bean, Jr., the respondent, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Section 10--2001 et seq., of the Code. The purpose of the action is to have the court construe the deed hereinafter referred to and to determine the rights and interests of the parties to this action in and to the real estate conveyed by said deed.
It appears from the record that on May 12, 1955, C. W. Bean, Sr., by his deed, conveyed certain real estate in Spartanburg and Union Counties to his wife, Mrs. Vera Gray Bean. The deed contains the following provisions, out of which the controversy arises:
(1) The granting clause: 'unto the said Vera Gray Bean for and during the term of her natural life or widowhood, and in the event of her remarriage, to my son, Charles William Bean, Jr., his heirs and assigns forever.'
(2) The habendum clause: 'TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the said Premises before mentioned unto the said Vera Gray Bean, her Heirs and Assigns forever.'
(3) The warranty clause: 'And I do hereby bind Myself and my Heirs, Executors, and Administrators to warrant and forever defend all and singular the said premises unto the said Vera Gray Bean, her Heirs and Assigns, against me and my Heirs and against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part thereof.'
It is the position of the appellant that under the provisions of the aforesaid deed, properly construed, she is the owner in fee simple of the real estate described therein. The respondent denies that the appellant is owner in fee simple of said real estate but alleges that her estate therein is limited to the term of her natural life or widowhood, with remainder to him in fee simple upon her death or remarriage.
This case was referred to the Master in Equity for Spartanburg County. After a full hearing he filed his report, recommending that the court issue its decree declaring and adjudicating that the aforesaid deed conveys to the appellant a fee simple title to the said real estate, subject, however, to the conditional limitation that if she should remarry all of her right, title and interest in and to said property would terminate and said right, title and interest would vest in the respondent. It was further recommended that the aforesaid deed conveys no interest in and to said property to the respondent other than a contingent remainder in fee, to vest only upon the remarriage of the appellant.
The exceptions to the report of the Master were heard by The Honorable Wade S. Weatherford, Jr., Resident Judge, and he issued his order reversing the Master and holding that the appellant 'has ownership of the lands in question for her life or widowhood, and that the remainder interest in the land is now vested absolutely in fee simple in the respondent.'
The sole question for determination here is whether the trial judge erred in holding that the deed of C. W. Bean, Sr. conveyed the property therein described to the appellant for life or widowhood with the remainder interest therein vested in the respondent in fee simple absolute.
In construing a deed it is elementary that the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the parties, unless that intention contravenes some well settled rule of law or public policy. Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdale, 246 S.C. 414, 143 S.E.2d 803. In ascertaining such intention the deed must be construed as a whole, and effect given to every part thereof, if such can be done consistently with law. Southern Railway Co. v. Smoak, 243 S.C. 331, 133 S.E.2d 806. Intention is a term of art and signifies the meaning of the writing, Gowdy v. Kelley, 185 S.C. 415, 194 S.E. 156; however, the intention of a grantor will not be allowed to prevail if it runs counter to an established rule of law. Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495, 159 S.E.2d 46.
The rule in this State is that where an incomplete or indefinite estate is conveyed by the granting clause, as for instance where no words of inheritance accompany the grant, or where the granting clause creates a life estate, resort may be had to the habendum for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the grantor and thus a life estate may be enlarged into a fee simple estate. Chavis v....
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Bennett v. Investors Title Ins. Co.
...to every part thereof, if such can be done consistently with law. Wayburn, 270 S.C. at 42, 239 S.E.2d at 892; Bean v. Bean, 253 S.C. 340, 343, 170 S.E.2d 654, 655 (1969); Alexander v. Burnet, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 189, 196 (1851); see also First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank of Columbia v. ......
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Bennett v. Investors Title Ins. Co., 4153.
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