Beasley v. Yale University, No. CV02 046 02 60 (CT 10/3/2005)

• Decision Date: 03 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. CV02 046 02 60,CV02 046 02 60
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Lynne Beasley et al. v. Yale University Opinion No.: 90488

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Unpublished Opinion

Lynne Beasley et al. v. Yale University Opinion No.: 90488

No. CV02 046 02 60

Superior Court of Connecticut

Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven

October 3, 2005

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#119)

EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, JUDGE.

On January 18, 2002, the plaintiffs, Lynne Beasley, Christian Beasley, Emily Beasley, and Angus Beasley,¹ filed a five-count complaint against the defendant, Yale University (Yale). This action arises out of injuries and losses allegedly sustained as a result of Lynne Beasley's fall from a seating platform at Yale University on January 21, 2000.

In count one, the plaintiffs allege negligence on the part of Yale due to its failure to correct, remedy, properly inspect, warn, and reasonably maintain the seating platform in a safe condition. In count two, Christian Beasley, the husband of Lynne Beasley, alleges a loss of consortium, and, in counts three, four, and five, Christian Beasley, Emily Williams (the daughter of Lynne Beasley) and Angus Beasley (the son of Lynne Beasley) allege bystander emotional distress respectively.

On April 4, 2002, Yale filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint and alleging the special defense of comparative negligence. The plaintiffs filed a reply denying the allegations of the special defense and the pleadings were closed on the same date. Subsequently, on March 23, 2005, Yale filed a counterclaim against Angus Beasley in common-law indemnification, alleging that Angus Beasley was responsible for constructing the allegedly defective seating platform and, as a result, responsible to indemnify Yale for all damages and costs incurred from the plaintiffs' claims.

On April 4, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a motion to strike Yale's counterclaim, accompanied by a memorandum of law in support. On April 27, 2005, Yale filed a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion to strike and, on May 9, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a reply to Yale's memorandum. The matter was heard on the short calendar on July 11, 2005.

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [cause of action] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[A] counterclaim is a cause of action existing in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff and on which the defendant might have secured affirmative relief had he sued the plaintiff in a separate action . . . A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a cause of action and may properly be used to challenge the sufficiency of a counterclaim." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Romano's Auto Service, 4 Conn.App. 495, 496, 495 A.2d 286 (1985). "The standard of review for granting a motion to strike is well settled . . . [The court] must take as true the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint and must construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heim v. California Federal Bank, 78 Conn.App. 351, 359, 828 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 911, 832 A.2d 70 (2003).

The plaintiffs move to strike Yale's counterclaim on three grounds: (1) General Statutes §52-584 prohibits counterclaims after the pleadings have closed; (2) the statute of limitations on Yale's counterclaim has run and; (3) Angus Beasley withdrew as a party before the counterclaim was filed.² In support of the motion, the plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations codified at §52-584 prohibits Yale from asserting a counterclaim after the pleadings have closed, and that Practice Book §§10-58 and 10-60 require leave of the court to file subsequent pleadings. They further maintain that Yale's counterclaim asserts a negligence claim against Angus Beasley, and since the counterclaim was filed more than two years from the date of Lynne Beasley's injuries, the two-year statute of limitations in §52-584 has run. Finally, they argue that Yale's claim "would appear to be one indemnification, and not appropriately asserted by [a] counterclaim." Yale first counters, without any discussion or reference to any legal authority, that a motion to strike is not the proper procedural vehicle to challenge the legal sufficiency of a counterclaim on the basis of a statute of limitations defense; rater the proper procedure would be "for the plaintiffs to file a special defense and move for summary judgment." "[A] claim that an action is barred by . . . the statute of limitations must be pleaded as a special defense, not raised by a motion to strike . . . [T]here are two exceptions to that holding. Those exceptions relate to situations in which a motion to strike, filed instead of a special defense of a statute of limitations, would be permitted. If all of the facts pertinent to the statute of limitations are pleaded in the complaint and the parties agree that they are true, or if a statute creating the cause of action on which the plaintiff relies fixes the time within which the cause of action must be asserted, a motion to strike would be allowed." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Girard v. Weiss, 43 Conn.App. 397, 415, 682 A.2d 1078, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 946, 686 A.2d 121 (1996). There is no dispute that in the present case the dates alleged in the pleadings are factually true. As discussed more thoroughly later on, the dispute is purely a question of law as to which is the applicable statute of limitations. Because the motion to strike falls within the first exception to pleading a special defense, it is properly before the court.

Next, Yale argues that since its counterclaim does not assert a personal injury action against Angus Beasley but rather an action for indemnification, General Statutes §52-598a, not §52-584, is the appropriate statute of limitations, which has not yet run. Yale further asserts that Practice Book §10-10 expressly authorizes a defendant to file a counterclaim seeking indemnification for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against that defendant.

In the plaintiffs' reply memorandum they argue that regardless of whether the counterclaim alleges a personal injury or an indemnification claim, the counterclaim arises out of Lynne Beasley's personal injuries and losses, and, as a result, §52-584, the two-year limitation period therein is the applicable statute. The statute of limitations in §52-598a, on the other hand, they explain, would not apply until after a judgment or settlement had been rendered or entered into on behalf of the plaintiffs against Yale.

"Section 52-598a sets forth the statute of limitations for actions for indemnification and provides 'an action for indemnification may be brought within three years from the date of the determination of the action against the party which is seeking indemnification by either judgment or settlement.' " Sivilla v. Philips Medical Systems of North America, Inc., 46 Conn.App. 699, 711, 700 A.2d 1179 (1997). "The legislature enacted [§52-598a] in response to the Appellate Court's decision in Protter v. Brown Thompson & Co., 25 Conn.App. 360, 593 A.2d 524, cert. granted. 220 Conn. 910, 597 A.2d 33 (1991) (appeal withdrawn). In that case, the court ruled that the statute of limitations for indemnification began to run upon the commission of the negligent conduct underlying the original action. The fourth party plaintiff's action for indemnification, therefore, was barred before the right to indemnification even accrued. [Section 52-598a] 'legislatively overruled' this decision." Republic Ins. Co. v. Pat DiNardo Auto Sales, Inc., 44 Conn.Sup. 207, 212, 678 A.2d 516 (1995), aff'd, 41 Conn.App. 686, 677 A.2d 21, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 906, 682 A.2d 1005 (1996).

Regardless of whether the action for indemnification is brought during the course of the underlying claim or after a judgment has been entered, §52-598a is still the applicable statute of limitations for the indemnification claim. "The-purpose of [§52-598a] is to prevent the...