Beattie v. Farnsworth Middle School

• Decision Date: 09 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98-CV-0399 (LEK/DRH).,98-CV-0399 (LEK/DRH).
• Citation: 143 F.Supp.2d 220
• Parties: Patricia BEATTIE, Plaintiff, v. FARNSWORTH MIDDLE SCHOOL, the Guilderland Central School District, Blaise Salerno, Deborah Marcil, Roger Levinthal, Nancy Davis, Peggy Donovan, and William Adams, in their Individual and Representative Capacities as Aiders and Abettors, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

Page 220

143 F.Supp.2d 220

Patricia BEATTIE, Plaintiff, v. FARNSWORTH MIDDLE SCHOOL, the Guilderland Central School District, Blaise Salerno, Deborah Marcil, Roger Levinthal, Nancy Davis, Peggy Donovan, and William Adams, in their Individual and Representative Capacities as Aiders and Abettors, Defendants.

No. 98-CV-0399 (LEK/DRH).

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

December 9, 1998.

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Cusick, Hacker, & Murphy, LLP (John E. Higgins, of counsel), Latham, NY, for Plaintiff.

Hancock & Easterbrook, LLP (Renee L. James, of counsel), Syracuse, NY, for Defendants.

Memorandum-Decision and Order

KAHN, District Judge.

In this sex discrimination action brought under federal and state law, Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The critical issues presented are whether Defendants' alleged conduct constitutes a compelling showing of a continuing violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the purposes of extending any applicable statute of limitations and whether a viable claim for which relief can be granted has been stated. This Court holds that although for purposes of Plaintiff's Title VII sexual harassment claim, facts sufficient to make a compelling showing of a continuing violation have not been alleged, other valid claims for which relief can be granted have been stated. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Since September 1987, Plaintiff Patricia Beattie has worked part-time for the Guilderland Central School District (the "District") as a paraprofessional, more commonly known as a teacher's aide. During the period of time in question, her duties included work as a Principal's Office assistant and general monitor in the cafeteria and hallways of Farnsworth Middle School ("Farnsworth").

On January 16, 1996, the Plaintiff claims she reported to Farnsworth's then Acting Principal, Defendant Deborah Marcil ("Marcil"), an allegation of sexual harassment directed against Farnsworth art teacher, Defendant Roger Levinthal ("Levinthal"). More than one year later on March 18, 1997, Plaintiff was issued a formal reprimand by the District pursuant to a counter-allegation of sexual harassment directed against the Plaintiff by Levinthal, which she claims was without merit and in retaliation for her allegations detailed in the pending Complaint. The Plaintiff contends that prior to the reprimand in her ten years of employment with the District, she had never been subject to employer sanction. As a result of the reprimand, District employees who directly participated in the counter-allegation investigation, including Levinthal, Marcil, Farnsworth art teachers Nancy Davis ("Davis") and Peggy Donovan ("Donovan"), District Human Resources Administrator William Adams ("Adams"), and Superintendent of Schools Blaise Salerno ("Salerno"), are alleged to have conspired and retaliated against the Plaintiff for her initial complaint.¹

The Plaintiff claims that from January 1995 through some unidentified time in 1997, she was "sexually harassed, followed, leered at, stared at, kissed, inappropriately touched, intimidated, retaliated against, and humiliated" by Defendant Levinthal. Comp. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff contends that between January and July 1995, Levinthal made repeated unwelcome comments of attraction to her. Id., at ¶ 27. More specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that while working in Farnsworth's cafeteria on January 12, 1995, Levinthal threw his arms around her and forcibly kissed her on the mouth in front of at least two teachers and an unnumbered group of students. Less than one month later on February 8, 1995, Plaintiff alleges Levinthal repeated his conduct of January 12th, hugging and kissing her in Farnsworth's cafeteria. Once again, on June 21, 1995, Plaintiff contends Levinthal hugged and forcibly kissed her as she entered Farnsworth's cafeteria in furtherance of her assigned duties. Id., at ¶¶ 23 — 27. Following this third incident, and unlike after the January and February 1995 incidents, the Plaintiff verbally communicated to Levinthal that his behavior was unwelcome. Id., at ¶ 27. ("Stop. No more hugs. No more kisses.").

Plaintiff contends that in the wake of a January 16, 1996 meeting with then Acting Principal Marcil regarding Levinthal's conduct, no action was undertaken by Farnsworth or the District to remedy these past instances of alleged harassment. Instead at the January 16, 1996 meeting, Plaintiff claims Marcil merely responded to the allegation with a statement of her personal friendship with Levinthal and notation of his family status as a husband and father.

Approximately six months later, on June 6, 1996, Plaintiff contends she was approached by Levinthal regarding an upcoming class trip to Riverside Amusement Park for which both apparently were slated to work. Levinthal allegedly expressed his discomfort with the prospect that the two would be on the trip together, because "it bothered him when the Plaintiff was around." Comp. at ¶ 32. In response, Plaintiff withdrew from participation in the Riverside trip. Eight days later, on June 14, 1996 and apparently just prior to the close of the academic year, Farnsworth Principal Penny Heath restricted the Plaintiff's general hallway monitoring duties, informing her that she was not to monitor the hallway where Defendant Levinthal's classroom was located. Two weeks later, Plaintiff, her attorney, and a union representative met with Marcil and Adams regarding Plaintiff's sexual harassment allegations directed against Levinthal. No mention was made at this late June 1996 meeting of Levinthal's counter-allegation of sexual harassment directed against the Plaintiff.

At the beginning of the following academic year, September 1996, the Plaintiff apparently was informed by another Acting Principal, Arnold Rothstein, that Levinthal was prohibited from entering the Farnsworth cafeteria during Plaintiff's work hours unless accompanied by a supervisor. At some unspecified time within the next three months, Rothstein was replaced as Acting Principal, with Deborah Marcil once again assuming the position. According to the Plaintiff, Levinthal's unsupervised presence in the cafeteria soon thereafter resumed. During this time, Levinthal is alleged to have engaged in unwanted staring at the Plaintiff. Comp. at ¶¶ 37, 47. The staring apparently was of sufficient continuity and severity as to prompt the Plaintiff to lodge another internal complaint in February 1997, this time with Adams and Salerno. Comp. at ¶ 47.

On September 5, 1996, the Plaintiff was interviewed by an attorney hired by the District regarding Levinthal's counter-allegation of sexual harassment directed against her. The Plaintiff claims she was asked at that meeting to comment on the substance of a June 4, 1996 letter from Marcil to Adams regarding Levinthal's counter-allegation. Presentation of the letter thus informed the Plaintiff, for what she claims to be the first time, of Levinthal's counter-allegation. In February 1997, the Plaintiff learned of further interviews conducted by the District into Levinthal's counter-allegation. On March 10, 1997, Plaintiff was orally informed by Superintendent Salerno that the District had found her allegations to be without merit and Levinthal's counter-allegation to be with merit. On March 17, 1997, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC"). One day later, she received a formal reprimand from the District. On March 9, 1998, this Complaint was filed.²

Plaintiff alleges violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985, and Section 290 et seq. of the New York State Rights Law ("HRL").³ Defendants contend facts asserted are time-barred from consideration and that the charged conduct does not constitute sexual harassment, retaliation, or a deprivation of constitutional rights.

DISCUSSION

Because this Court's assessment of the pending motion is limited to factual assertions and materials enumerated in the Complaint, it is disposed of as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and is not considered as if a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See F.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.1985). "When deciding a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted, the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true" and afford the non-moving party all favorable inferences therefrom. See Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir.1995) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1991)). A court should dismiss pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only where it is clear that a plaintiff cannot establish any set of facts sufficient to sustain a claim. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980); see also Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir.1986). With this standard of review in mind, the pending motion is considered.

I. Sexual Harassment Claims

Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In addition to prohibiting traditional sex discrimination, Title VII has been interpreted to proscribe sexual conduct "requiring people to work in a discriminatory hostile or abusive environment." See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399...