Beazley v. De Kalb County

• Decision Date: 15 September 1953
• Docket Number: No. 18253,18253
• Citation: 77 S.E.2d 740,210 Ga. 41
• Parties: BEAZLEY v. DE KALB COUNTY et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 740

77 S.E.2d 740

210 Ga. 41

BEAZLEY v. DE KALB COUNTY et al.

No. 18253.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 15, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Counties and municipal corporations can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by law, and a grant of power to such corporations must be strictly construed; and the corporation can exercise no powers except such as are expressly given or are necessarily implied from express grants of other powers. If there is a reasonable doubt of the existence of a particular power, the doubt is to be resolved in the negative.

2. The word 'terminal' as used in the Revenue Certificate Act of 1937, Ga.L.1937, p. 761, Code Ann.Supp. Chapter 87-8, is defined to be a place provided by or for common carriers, whether by land, water, or air, for the purpose of receiving and discharging passengers or for the purpose of receiving and delivering freight, including buildings and structures incidental to those purposes, such as shelters or enclosures for the convenience and comfort of passengers or for the care and safety of freight pending shipment and delivery to consignees or connecting carriers, and does not include storage warehouses wherein space is to be rented to customers for definite periods of time for the permanent storage of goods, wares, and merchandise until used or disposed of in the usual course of business.

3. Under the restrictive provisions of article 7, section 7, paragraph 5 of the Constitution of 1945, Code Ann. § 2-6005, that governmental subdivisions of the State shall issue revenue anticipation certificates only to provide funds for such facilities and undertakings as are 'specifically authorized and enumerated' by the acts of the General Assembly there referred to, the County of DeKalb is not authorized to issue such revenue certificates for the acquisition or construction and equipping of warehouses to be used in the conduct of a general storage warehouse business, which is ordinarily carried on by private enterprise, such an undertaking not being properly included within the definition of the word 'terminal' as used in the Revenue Certificate Law, and not being 'specifically authorized and enumerated' therein.

4. A county or municipality cannot exercise the power of eminent domain or use public funds to engage in a business of a private nature, such as the operation of a general storage warehouse business, and funds arising from the sale of revenue anticipation certificates are 'public funds.'

Robert W. Separs, Wm. G. Grant, Grant, Wiggins, Grizzard & Smith, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Spalding, Sibley, Troutman & Kelley, Atlanta, for parties at interest not parties to record.

MacDougald, Troutman, Sams & Schroder, Atlanta, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Wayman E. Cobb, J. Robin Harris, Julius McCurdy, Roy Leathers, Sol. Gen. Decatur, for defendant in error.

Moise, Post & Gardner, Atlanta, for parties at interest not parties to record.

HAWKINS, Justice.

This case involves the right of DeKalb County to issue revenue anticipation certificates in the sum of $12,000,000 for the acquisition and construction of so-called 'truck and railroad freight terminal facilities' under what are commonly referred to as the Revenue Certificate Laws of 1937, Ga.L.1937, p. 761, as amended by the act approved March 14, 1939, Code Ann.Supp. Chapter 87-8. Certiorari was granted because the case deals with a matter of importance and great public concern, in that it involves a construction of these important public statutes which will be of frequent application, and dealing with the powers and duties of public officials of every political subdivision of the State, such as counties, cities, and towns, and the application of a constitutional provision, art. 7, § 7, par. 5, Code Ann. § 2-6005, to these statutes, and presents a question of importance with State-wide application which has not previously been passed upon by this court. It might also be stated here, as will be pointed out more fully hereinafter, that the case involves one of the fundamental principles and foundation stones upon which our system of government was founded, which is free enterprise.

Under the amendment of 1943 to article 7, section 7, paragraph 1 of the Constitution of 1877, and under the Constitution of 1945, article 7, section 7, paragraph 5, Code Ann. § 2-6005, it is expressly provided that revenue anticipation certificates shall be issued only to provide funds for the purchase, construction, extension, repair, or improvement of such facilities and undertakings as are 'specifically authorized and enumerated' by said act of 1937 as amended by said act of 1939.

Facilities and undertakings 'specifically authorized and enumerated' by these acts fall within the following general classifications: (1) causeways, tunnels, viaducts, bridges, and other crossings, highways, parkways, airports, docks, piers, wharves, terminals; (2) systems of waterworks and sewerage; (3) dormitories, laboratories, libraries, fairs and exhibitions; (4) parks, playgrounds, athletic fields, etc.

The resolution of the county commissioner designates the facility and undertaking here proposed as 'truck and railroad freight terminal facilities,' and therefore it becomes necessary to construe the acts and define the word 'terminals' as there used, and to determine whether, under the facts of this record, the proposed undertaking comes within that designation. In doing so, we are confronted first with the well-established general rule that counties and municipal corporations can exercise only such powers as are conferred on them by law, and a grant of power to such corporations must be strictly construed; and such a corporation can exercise no power except such as are expressly given or are necessarily implied from express grant of other powers, and if there is a reasonable doubt of the existence of a particular power, the doubt is to be resolved in the negative. Albany Bottling Co. v. Watson, 103 Ga. 503, 30 S.E. 270; Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission of Ga., 149 Ga. 1, 98 S.E. 696, 5 A.L.R. 1; Lockwood v. Muhlberg, 124 Ga. 660, 662, 53 S.E. 92; Irwin v. Torbert, 204 Ga. 111, 116, 49 S.E.2d 70, and cases there cited.

In addition to this general rule of strict construction, we have in the instant case the emphatic and mandatory restrictive provisions, City of Valdosta v. Singleton, 197 Ga. 194, 211, 28 S.E.2d 759, of the 1943 amendment to the Constitution of 1877, and article 7, section 7, paragraph 5 of the Constitution of 1945, Code Ann. § 2-6005, that such municipalities shall issue revenue anticipation certificates only to provide funds for such facilities and undertakings as are 'specifically authorized and enumerated' by the acts of the General Assembly referred to.

It thus appears that 'terminals' are expressly authorized and enumerated in the act of 1937, and the question is presented, what is a 'terminal' within the meaning of that word as used in that act. Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd Ed. 1951) defines the word 'terminal' as: '(a) Either end of a carrier line, as a railroad, trucking, or shipping line or airline, with freight and/or passenger stations, yards, and offices; (b) Any freight or passenger station central to a considerable area or a junction station of a carrier line; * * * (d) a town lying at the end of a railroad--more properly called a terminus.' As pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its opinion, Beazley v. DeKalb County, 87 Ga.App. 910, 75 S.E.2d 657, 'terminals' as used in the statute is given the same significance and position as 'highways,' 'parkways,' 'airports,' 'docks,' 'piers,' and 'wharves,' each and every word referring to ways and means of transporting freight and passengers, and Code, § 102-102 provides that the ordinary significantion shall be applied to all words, except words of art, or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter; and in all interpretations the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view, at all times, the old law, the evil, and the remedy. With the words of the statute and these rules in mind, the conclusion is inescapable that the word 'terminal' as used in the Revenue Certificate Law means only a place provided by or for common carriers, whether over rail, over water, over public highway, or in the air, for the purpose of receiving and discharging passengers, or for the purpose of receiving and delivering freight, including buildings and structures incidental to those purposes, such as shelters and enclosures for the comfort and convenience of passengers or for the care and safety of freight pending shipment or delivery to consignee or to connecting carriers.

That the word 'terminals' appearing in the Revenue Certificate Act was used by the General Assembly in the sense above indicated is evidenced by the context and by the meanings of the words with which it is associated. As already pointed out, it is used in connection with the words 'highways,' 'parkways,' 'airports,' 'docks,' 'piers,' and 'wharves,' all having reference to ways, means, and facilities of transportation, a subject matter in which the general public is concerned, and over which the government has always...