Beck v. Claymont School Dist.

• Decision Date: 17 August 1979
• Citation: 407 A.2d 226
• Parties: Jeffrey P. BECK and Harry R. Beck, Plaintiffs, v. CLAYMONT SCHOOL DISTRICT and Archie F. Rapposelli, James M. T. Scanlan, James J. Elder, John C. Fannin, Jr., and Margaret M. Reese, as and constituting the Board of Education of Claymont School District, Defendants.
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 226

407 A.2d 226

Jeffrey P. BECK and Harry R. Beck, Plaintiffs, v. CLAYMONT SCHOOL DISTRICT and Archie F. Rapposelli, James M.

T. Scanlan, James J. Elder, John C. Fannin, Jr., and

Margaret M. Reese, as and constituting the Board of

Education of Claymont School District, Defendants.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.

Submitted May 22, 1979.

Decided Aug. 17, 1979.

Arthur Inden, Richard A. Levine and David C. McBride, of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.

James T. McKinstry and David B. Stratton, of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for defendants.

Dana S. Shreve, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, amicus curiae.

WALSH, Judge.

In this negligence action, the plaintiffs seek recovery from the Claymont School District for medical expenses and injuries sustained by the minor plaintiff when he struck a cable while operating a motorcycle on School District property. The School District has moved to dismiss on the ground that it is immune from suits sounding in tort under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs have, in turn, moved for partial summary judgment on the same issue and, in view of the recourse by both parties to matters outside the pleadings, the Court will view the conflicting positions as cross-motions for summary judgment. In view of the possible impact of this decision upon the State and its agencies, the Department of Justice was granted permission to participate in the briefing as Amicus curiae.

Plaintiffs mount a broad attack upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it has developed in the decisional law of this State. While recognizing the impact of the seminal decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. v. State, Del.Supr., 187 A.2d 71 (1962), they, nonetheless, contend that the Court misinterpreted the constitutional basis ¹ for the doctrine in holding that only the General Assembly could waive its force. Plaintiffs view the constitutional basis as establishing the right to bring such suits with only the procedure for so doing left to legislative regulation. Plaintiffs' argument finds support in a decision interpreting a similar constitutional provision with opposite results. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). In any event, plaintiffs argue, the doctrine is an anachronism, ill-suited to the modern view that the sovereign, least of all, should evade its responsibility to respond to the tort claims of its citizens. Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978); Campbell v. State, Ind.Supr., 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972); Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).

While plaintiffs' plea for abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity has merit, it is misdirected. In Shellhorn, the Supreme Court left no doubt that the doctrine is a viable defense to tort claims and has subsequently applied it, although with reluctance, to suits against State agencies. Pajewski v. Perry, Del.Supr., 363 A.2d 429 (1976); Donovan v. Delaware Water & Air Resources Com'n, Del.Supr., 358 A.2d 717 (1976). Regardless of the historical basis for the doctrine it remains in effect and binds this Court until such time as it is legislatively removed.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been limited in application, however, by two rulings of the Delaware Supreme Court which bear significance to this case. In Varity Builders, Inc. v. Polikoff, Del.Supr., 305 A.2d 618 (1973), the Court ruled that grant of county governmental authority under a "home rule" statute (9 Del.C. § 1101), resulted in a legislative waiver of New Castle County's sovereign immunity. In City of Wilmington v. Spencer, Del.Supr., 391 A.2d 199 (1978), the Court construed the language of the City of Wilmington's charter to also constitute a waiver of its sovereign immunity. In neither Polikoff Nor Spencer did the Court find an express legislative waiver of immunity but reasoned that the "power to sue and be sued", an incident of governmental authority, was incompatible with the principle of sovereign immunity.

Plaintiffs contend that even if this Court finds the principle of sovereign immunity viable, it does not confer immunity upon the School District since it is not the "State", in the constitutional sense, and thus the immunity announced in Shellhorn does not extend to such governmental entities. To the contrary, the School District argues that as an agency of the State ² and a sharer of its sovereignty, it is equally immune from tort suits. Plaintiffs argue that local school districts, as they have evolved under Delaware law, are more analogous to political subdivisions than integral arms of the State. As previously noted, since the ambit of sovereign immunity has been judicially denied to municipalities and counties as political subdivisions of the State under Spencer and Polikoff this argument deserves analysis.

In Delaware, school districts function to discharge the State's commitment to operate a free public school system. While Article X, Section 1 of the Delaware Constitution requires that the General Assembly provide for such a system, the method and format of the system is not prescribed. The General Assembly has elected to delegate certain aspects of this function to certain non-corporate public bodies subdivided on a geographical basis with certain policy powers reserved to a supervisory state agency the State Board of Education. Brennan v. Black, Del.Supr., 104 A.2d 777 (1954); Corder v. City of Milford, Del.Super., 196 A.2d 406 (1963); DuPont v. Mills, Del.Supr., 196 A. 168 (1937). For the most part, the governing bodies of local school districts are elected by the residents of the various districts. Subject to State guidelines, school board members may set tax rates (14 Del.C. § 1902); issue bonds and pledge the full faith and credit of the district, but not the State (14 Del.C. Ch. 21); condemn property (14 Del.C. S 2303); hire employees and establish their pay scale (14 Del.C. § 1304); and enter into collective bargaining agreements (14 Del.C. Ch. 40). On the fiscal level, the local boards have broad discretion in expending funds to maintain and protect school property (14 Del.C. § 1055).

Although there is a sharing of educational and fiscal policy with the State, the school district functions as a separate political entity. Indeed, the comprehensive definition in the School District Reorganization Act of 1968 refers to a school district, not as an agency of the State, but as a geographic subdivision thereof. ³ As noted, the General Assembly is free to adopt any format to provide a general educational system in the State and, presumably, could have done so directly and exclusively through State agencies. ⁴ It has, however, elected to share that responsibility with local political subdivisions, conferring upon them certain incidents of sovereignty. In Re Opinion of Justices, Del.Supr. 246 A.2d 90 (1968). The broad powers of the local school board include the ". . . susceptibility to suit and the power to litigate." Mount Pleasant School Dist. v. Warder, Del.Super., 375 A.2d 478, 480 (1977).

While the Claymont School District is an instrumentality established by the State to discharge a public purpose, this fact does not render it an agency of the State. Entities established by municipal or home rule charters spring from a common source but, as previously noted, do not share sovereign immunity. The most important factor to be considered in assessing whether a specific activity or undertaking is so closely state-connected as to render it an appendage of State sovereignty or an autonomous political entity is the degree of discretion exercised by the governing body in the area under scrutiny. In the area of fiscal expenditure and personnel the school districts have been deemed sufficiently independent of State control that they do not share the State's immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. ⁵ Morris v. Board of Education of Laurel Sch. Dist., D.Del., 401 F.Supp. 188 (1975); Gordenstein v. University of Delaware, D.Del., 381 F.Supp. 718 (1974). While school districts are hybrid entities to the extent they reflect a sharing of State and local control, the same observations might be made of other political subdivisions, whose functioning is subject to legislative control despite the granting of limited autonomy. Thus, the New Castle County government prior to achieving home rule status, was considered subject to suit. NA-JA Construction Corporation v. Roberts, D.Del., 259 F.Supp. 895 (1966). In rejecting the contention that the Levy Court of New Castle County was so integral a part of State government as to share its sovereign immunity the Court noted:

"The point of inquiry, then, should be whether the suit, no matter how entitled, is one in which the right asserted and the relief asked is against the State. So viewed, the answer is clear. This suit, properly entitled, not only is against the Levy Court of New Castle County but also affects the right of a party to recover monies, not from the State, but from the county for alleged breach of a contract which the county had full power to enter into. The right asserted and the relief asked are against the county. A judgment against the defendant would thus be paid, not from the State, but rather the county, treasury. The contract forming the basis of the suit is, thus, not of State concern." (259 F.Supp. 899)

The School District asserts that any judgment obtained by plaintiffs against it might become a lien upon its property and require the expenditure of state funds to discharge. This argument assumes the reverse of the funding mechanism of local school districts as it exists in Delaware. The State provides merely a basic grant on a pupil unit basis in stated categories: ...