Beck v. Dye

Decision Date03 August 1939
Docket Number27295.
Citation200 Wash. 1,92 P.2d 1113
PartiesBECK et ux. v. DYE et ux.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Action by George Beck and Ida Beck, his wife, against A. E. Dye and Lillian G. Dye, his wife, for injuries sustained by Ida Beck when struck by defendants' automobile while crossing a street intersection. From a judgment for plaintiffs defendants appeal.

Reversed with directions to grant a new trial.

JEFFERS J., BLAKE, C.J., and MAIN, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Malcolm Douglas, judge.

Skeel, McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Uhlmann and Smith & Matthews, all of Seattle, for appellants.

Shank, Belt, Rode & Cook, of Seattle, for respondents.

STEINERT Justice.

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian from the impact of an automobile while crossing a street intersection. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs, husband and wife. Motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict having been denied, judgment on the was entered, from which defendants, also husband and wife, have appealed. The plaintiff wife will be referred to hereinafter as though she were the sole respondent, and the defendant husband will be referred to as though he were the sole appellant.

As grounds for reversal it is contended (1) that respondent failed to prove any negligence of appellant constituting the proximate cause of the injuries; (2) that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law; and (3) that the court erred in admitting testimony regarding statements made by unidentified bystanders shortly after the accident. The first two contentions relate to the sufficiency and conclusive effect of the evidence, and will be considered together.

A challenge by a defendant to the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of plaintiff's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom, and requires that the evidence be interpreted most strongly against the defendant. Weinman v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 175 Wash. 73, 26 P.2d 395; Buttnick v. J. & M., Inc., 186 Wash. 658, 59 P.2d 750; White v. Consolidated Freight Lines, 192 Wash. 146, 73 P.2d 358; Vercruysse v. Cascade Laundry Co., 193 Wash. 184, 74 P.2d 920; Perren v. Press, 196 Wash. 14, 81 P.2d 867; Gibson v. Spokane United Railways, Wash., 84 P.2d 349.

The facts, as the jury reasonably might have found them in support of its verdict, may be stated thus: The accident occurred on a Saturday afternoon at about three o'clock, in the intersection of Third Avenue and Union Street, which is in the downtown district of Seattle. Third Avenue runs in a northerly and southerly direction; Union street runs in an easterly and westerly direction. Above the center of the intersection is suspended an automatic traffic signal light which operates on a sixty-five second cycle, as follows: The light remains green for north and south traffic, and red for east and west traffic, for twenty-eight and one-half seconds; it then turns red in all directions for a period of four seconds, during the last two seconds of which a bell rings; the light then turns green for east and west traffic, continuing red for north and south traffic, and so remains for twenty-eight and one-half seconds; it then turns red again in all directions for another period of four seconds, during the last two seconds of which the bell rings.

Appellant was driving south along Third Avenue toward Union street; abreast of him was another automobile proceeding in the same direction. The green signal light was in his favor until he arrived at a point about one hundred thirteen feet north of Union street. At the same time, respondent and about fifteen or twenty other people were standing on the sidewalk at the southwest corner of the intersection waiting for the signal light to flash green for east and west traffic. When the light changed to green there was no automobile traffic within the intersection and the group of pedestrians moved forward, inside the lines of the cross-walk, toward the opposite side of the street. The respondent was in the front rank of four people and slightly ahead of the other three. The light having turned red for north and south traffic, the automobile which was abreast of appellant came to a stop. Appellant, however, continued into and across the intersection at a speed of about twenty-five miles per hour, and without sounding his horn. Ordinance No. 64692 of the city of Seattle provides: 'On streets where traffic at intersections is controlled by traffic control signals or by police officers, pedestrians shall not cross a roadway against a red or 'STOP' signal and shall not cross at any place except in a marked or unmarked crosswalk. A pedestrian crossing or starting across in any such crosswalk on a green or 'GO' signal shall have the right-of-way over all vehicles, including those making turns, until such pedestrian has reached the opposite curb, and it shall be unlawful for the operator of any vehicle to fail to yield the right-of-way to any such pedestrian.'

Appellant's car, passing rapidly across the immediate line of travel of the front rank of pedestrians, brushed the coat of one of them and in all probability would have struck two of them had not others hastily pulled them backward.

Respondent, who had then reached a point in the street about ten feet from the west curb, was evidently not aware of appellant's approach and was proceeding forward, when suddenly she came in violent contact with the right side of appellant's car, as a result of which she was thrown to the pavement and severely injured.

The evidence most favorable to appellant was to the effect that he entered the intersection while the green light was still in his favor, that he was then travelling about ten or fifteen miles per hour, and that at the time of the impact his speed had been reduced to about five or six miles per hour; that he did not see respondent until just immediately Before the impact; and that respondent came from the curb, without looking to the right or left, and walked directly against the side of his car.

Obviously, there was a direct conflict in the evidence with reference both to the negligence of appellant and its causative effect and to respondent's contributory negligence. The jury reasonably might have believed and adopted either version. The rule is that where, on a controverted question of fact, there is evidence, or there are justifiable inferences from evidence, upon which reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, the question becomes one of fact for the jury, and not for the court, to decide. Ahrens v. Anderson, 186 Wash. 182, 57 P.2d 410; Boyd v. Cole, 189 Wash. 81, 63 P.2d 931; Corbaley v. Pierce County, 192 Wash. 688, 74 P.2d 993; Gibson v. Spokane United Railways, Wash., 84 P.2d 349; Shephard v. Smith, Wash., 88 P.2d 601.

Appellant strenuously contends that respondent at no time looked to her left, else she would have seen appellant's automobile; that she took no precaution for her own safety, but walked blindly into the side of his car. From this, he concludes that she was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

The jury well may have believed that respondent did what an ordinarily prudent person would have done under like or similar circumstances, that appellant's failure to stop his car on seeing the continued approach of the pedestrians was negligence, and that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injuries to respondent.

Respondent had the right, under the circumstances, to assume that no automobile would enter the intersection against a traffic signal and contrary to law, or would interfere with her lawful progress when the signal was in her favor, and she was entitled to rely upon such presumption until she knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, the contrary. Church v. Shaffer, 162 Wash. 126, 297 P. 1097; Woods v. Greenblatt, 163 Wash. 433, 1 P.2d 880; Mathias v. Eichelberger, 182 Wash. 185, 45 P.2d 619.

In support of his contention, appellant cites a number of cases of which the one most pertinent here is Estill v. Berry, 193 Wash. 10, 74 P.2d 482. In that case, a pedestrian, on a dark, blustery night in December, was proceeding from the southwest corner of a street intersection toward the opposite curb. At a point about ten or twelve feet out in the street, she suddenly came in contact with the right side of an automobile which, coming from the north, was passing in front of her, and as a result of the impact she was thrown some distance on the pavement. We held that the pedestrian was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. That case, however, is distinguishable from this in several respects. In the former case, there were no signal lights regulating the flow of traffic at the particular place. The driver of the automobile in that case, after stopping at the arterial sign on the north side of the intersection, was proceeding across in low gear, at a slow rate of speed, and was not violating any traffic ordinance. The lights of his car were shining and were plainly visible. The pedestrian was shielding the left side of her face with her arm as a protection against the weather. Her collision with the car was not due to the negligence of the driver, for he was not guilty of any negligence, but was solely the result of her failure to take reasonable precaution under the existing circumstances. In the case at bar, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict, and in arriving at its verdict the jury must have found that the appellant was guilty of one or more acts of negligence and that respondent, obedient to the traffic signal and moving with...

To continue reading

Request your trial
128 cases
  • State v. McCollum
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • September 27, 1943
    ... ... Adams v. Building Service Employees International Union, ... Local No. 6, 197 Wash. 242, 84 P.2d 1021; Fornili v ... Auto Mechanics' Union Local No. 297 of International ... Ass'n of Machinists, 200 Wash. 283, 93 P.2d 422; ... United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 93 ... P.2d 772; Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International ... Woodworkers of America Local No. 46, 4 Wash.2d 62, 102 ... P.2d 270, and Shively v. Garage Employees Local Union ... No. 44, 6 Wash.2d 560, 108 P.2d 354, which held contrary ... to ... ...
  • Brewer v. Copeland
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1975
    ...which would negative the thought that it might have been made with design or premeditation. See, also, Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113, 127 A.L.R. 1022 (1939). The determination of whether the state trooper's testimony was admissible under the res gestae rule was within the sound dis......
  • State v. Young
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1980
    ...(1958) a six factor test for determining the admissibility of spontaneous exclamations set out by the Washington court in Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113 (1939). In Ward, we stated that to determine admissibility, an alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the f......
  • State v. Pugh
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 31, 2009
    ...it is an event speaking through the person, as distinguished from a person merely narrating the details of an event." Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 10-11, 92 P.2d 1113 (1939) (summarizing numerous earlier cases). The theory underlying admissibility of statements under the res gestae doctrine wa......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
14 books & journal articles
  • Hearsay Rule
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2017 Testimonial evidence
    • July 31, 2017
    ..., 7 Ill. App. 2d 316, 129 N.E.2d 440, 54 ALR 2d 1060 (1955); Tillman v. Commonwealth , 185 Va. 46, 37 S.E.2d 768 (1946); Beck v. Dye , 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113, 127 ALR 1022 (1939); Donker v. Powers , 230 Mich. 237, 202 N.W. 989 (1925); State v. Guffey , 39 S.D. 84, 163 N.W. 679 (1917). Je......
  • Rule 803 EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY — REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE DECLARANT IS AVAILABLE AS A WITNESS
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Rules and C.R.S. of Evidence Annotated (CBA)
    • Invalid date
    ...cases indicate hesitancy in upholding the statement alone as sufficient, Garrett v. Howden, 73 N.M. 307, 387 P.2d 874 (1963); Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113 (1939), a result which would under appropriate circumstances be consistent with the rule. Permissible subject matter of the st......
  • Hearsay rule
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2018 Testimonial evidence
    • August 2, 2018
    ..., 7 Ill. App. 2d 316, 129 N.E.2d 440, 54 ALR 2d 1060 (1955); Tillman v. Commonwealth , 185 Va. 46, 37 S.E.2d 768 (1946); Beck v. Dye , 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113, 127 ALR 1022 (1939); Donker v. Powers , 230 Mich. 237, 202 N.W. 989 (1925); State v. Guৼey , 39 S.D. 84, 163 N.W. 679 (1917). Jer......
  • Hearsay Rule
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2020 Testimonial evidence
    • August 2, 2020
    ..., 7 Ill. App. 2d 316, 129 N.E.2d 440, 54 ALR 2d 1060 (1955); Tillman v. Commonwealth , 185 Va. 46, 37 S.E.2d 768 (1946); Beck v. Dye , 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113, 127 ALR 1022 (1939); Donker v. Powers , 230 Mich. 237, 202 N.W. 989 (1925); State v. Guffey , 39 S.D. 84, 163 N.W. 679 (1917). Je......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 provisions

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT