Becker v. State of Nebraska

• Decision Date: 06 April 1970
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 1495L.
• Citation: 310 F. Supp. 1275
• Parties: Carl BECKER, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

310 F. Supp. 1275

Carl BECKER, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, Respondent.

Civ. No. 1495L.

United States District Court, D. Nebraska.

April 6, 1970.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Nicholas J. Lamme, Fremont, Neb., for petitioner.

Ralph H. Gillan, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

VAN PELT, District Judge.

Carl Becker is an inmate at the Nebraska Penal and Correction Complex serving a 5-year sentence imposed by the District Court of Dodge County, Nebraska, on September 27, 1968 for the crime of possession of a forged instrument. He seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U. S.C.A. § 2241 alleging he was denied his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

On September 30, 1968, petitioner filed with the sentencing court an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The court construed this as a petition seeking relief under the Nebraska Post Conviction Act and denied the motion. Petitioner sought to appeal this denial. On March 13, 1969 his appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court was dismissed for failure to file briefs. There is some indication that a brief was actually tendered and that it was refused because it was not in acceptable form. Following its earlier decisions this court finds the exhaustion of state remedies sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. See Meter v. State, Civil 1227L (D.Neb. 1969) unreported. Counsel was appointed for the petitioner. An evidentiary hearing was held. The case is now ready for decision.

Petitioner, in his brief, has set forth a chronology of events which has been most helpful to the court. We find these dates and events supported by the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. Exhibit numbers supporting certain of the statements have been added to this chronology.

                              CHRONOLOGICAL SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
                    1965
                         September 28,    Complaint for Possession of a Forged Instrument
                                          filed in Justice of the Peace Court Exhibit 1
                                          Warrant issued on Complaint. Exhibit 1
                         December 20,     Petitioner arrested in Sioux City, Iowa on Nebraska
                                          Warrant. Exhibit B, filing #6
                                          Petitioner appeared in Municipal Court; hearing
                                          date set
                                          Petitioner confined to jail
                    1966
                         January 21,      Case dismissed, petitioner released. Exhibit B
                                          filing #6
                         April 1,         Petitioner sentenced to five years in Iowa State
                                          Penitentiary for False Impersonation
                         April 27,        Detainer from Nebraska placed against Petitioner
                                          Exhibit 3
                                          Petitioner advised that Detainer had been placed
                                          against him.
                         April 28,        Petitioner signed Agreement on Detainers. Exhibit
                                          4
                         June 14,         Petitioner given another notice that Detainer
                                          was placed against him. Exhibit 5
                                          Petitioner granted permission to write Sheriff
                                          Homer Brainard Exhibit 5.
                
                

                    1967
                         January 11,      Letter from Sheriff Homer Brainard sent to Mr.
                                          R. D. King acknowledging Petitioner's request
                                          for a speedy trial. Exhibits 6 and 7
                         August 1,        Original date set for petitioner's parole. Exhibit
                                          9
                         August 7,        Petitioner wrote Sheriff Brainard advising of
                                          the parole. Exhibits 8 and 9
                         August 18,       Petitioner again wrote Sheriff advising of parole.
                    1967
                         September 1,     Petitioner released into custody of Dodge County
                                          Sheriff's Department.
                         September 8,     Arraignment, bond set, Ray C. Simmons appointed
                                          as Petitioner's counsel. Exhibit 1
                         September 25,    Petitioner posted $1,000.00 bail bond. Exhibit
                                          1
                         October 8-9,     Petitioner in Iowa City, Iowa for eye examination.
                                          Exhibit 2
                    1968
                         June 23          Petitioner arrested in Vancouver, Washington.
                                          Exhibit 2
                         August 13,       Petitioner picked up by Dodge County Sheriff's
                                          Department. Exhibit 2
                         August 19,       Date Superior Court was to have held fugitive
                                          warrant hearing. Exhibit 2
                         September 3,     Entered plea of "Not Guilty". Exhibit 2
                                          Ray C. Simmons moved to withdraw; Motion
                                          granted. Exhibit 1
                         September 19,    Trial of action at which Petitioner entered plea
                                          of "Guilty"; Petitioner took stand and gave testimony
                                          as to denial of speedy trial. Exhibits 1
                                          and 2
                         September 26,    Petitioner sentenced to five years in Nebraska
                                          Penal and Correctional Complex. Exhibit 1
                                          Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed alleging
                                          denial of constitutional right to a speedy
                                          trial.
                         September 30,    Petition filed September 26 denied.
                         October 10,      Petitioner filed Notice of Appeal and other
                                          pleadings.
                    1969
                         April 7,         Mandate of Nebraska Supreme Court filed dismissing
                                          appeal.
                

It is the contention of the respondent that the petitioner did not demand a speedy trial at any time. The court specifically finds such a request was made as early as May of 1966 and was reasserted in August of 1967 (Exhibits 4 and 5). No action was taken by the State of Nebraska to bring petitioner to trial until September 1, 1967 (Exhibit 1). For reasons which will appear herein, the Court concludes that the period of time to be considered in determining whether the petitioner was denied a speedy trial is that period from May, 1966 to September, 1967, which is a span of sixteen months.

The United States Supreme Court has recently decided two cases which bear directly upon the issue herein presented. In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1967), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is enforcible against the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment as "one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution." Id. at 226, 87 S.Ct. at 995.

Last term, the Court further clarified this Sixth Amendment right in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed.2d 607 (1969). In Smith, the Court ruled that the fact that an individual may be serving a sentence in another jurisdiction does not relieve the state from the obligation of providing him with a speedy trial on pending charges upon his request or demand.

The question arises in this case as to the retroactivity of Klopfer and Smith. Although it appears that the Supreme Court has not yet considered this question, it is believed that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed. 2d 882 (1966) wherein it was held that the decision rendered in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966) was to receive only prospective application gives adequate support to the view that the Smith and Klopfer decisions are to be applied retrospectively. Klopfer announces the right to a speedy trial as a basic and fundamental right. It is such rights, under the rationale of Johnson, supra, which are entitled to retrospective application. See Needel v. Scafati, 412 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1969).

The decision in Smith is particularly relevant to the instant case. Since this is a case of first impression in this district, a discussion of the Smith rationale is necessary. Of critical importance is an examination of the remedies available in this court if petitioner's rights are found to have been abrogated.

The facts in Smith may be summarized as follows: Petitioner was indicted in Texas in 1960 while a prisoner in the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. A detainer was placed against him. He made several attempts to gain a speedy trial on the Texas charge culminating in a mandamus action in the Texas Supreme Court. That court, relying upon the theory that two separate sovereigns were involved, refused to grant the requested writ of mandamus. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Smith, 393 U.S. at 383, 89 S.Ct. at 580.

The Court in Smith notes the reasons underlying the necessity for guaranteeing a speedy trial to those accused of crimes. Relying upon United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966), it observed that this right "protects at least three basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American legal system: `1 to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, 2 to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and 3 to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.'" Smith, 393 U.S. at 378, 89 S.Ct. at 577.

The Court points out that these demands are aggravated and compounded in the case of an accused who is imprisoned in another jurisdiction.

"First, the possibility that the defendant already in prison might receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is postponed. Secondly, under procedures now widely practiced, the duration of his present imprisonment may be increased, and the conditions under which he must serve his sentence greatly worsened, by

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