Beckham v. Cline

• Citation: 10 So.2d 419,151 Fla. 481
• Parties: BECKHAM v. CLINE et al.
• Decision Date: 29 September 1942
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

10 So.2d 419

151 Fla. 481

BECKHAM v. CLINE et al.

Florida Supreme Court

September 29, 1942

Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1942.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Polk County; R. H. Rowe Judge.

Smith & Petteway, of Lakeland, for appellant.

Thomas W Bryant and E. Snow Martin, both of Lakeland, and Mabry Reaves, Carlton & White, of Tampa, for appellees.

BUFORD, Justice.

Appeal brings for review judgment on demurrer sustained to amended declaration.

The pertinent facts alleged in the amended declaration in effect are: That defendants on the 29th day of January, 1941, were practicing physicians in Lakeland, Polk County, Florida; that on the 30th day of January, 1941, petition was filed in and office of and before the County Judge of Polk County by five persons alleging that plaintiff Virginia T. Beckham was personally known to each of such persons and that to the knowledge of such persons the mental condition of said Beckham was sufficient to justify the belief that said Beckham was then insane.

It is further alleged that pursuant to the allegations and prayer of said petition the County Judge on said date by his order appointed R. L. Cline and J. D. Griffin, practicing physicians, and Elberta Marshall as an Examining Committee to examine the said Beckham to determine whether or not she was insane in the manner prescribed by law and to make report to the said court.

It is further alleged:

'That it thereupon became and was the duty of said defendants, within a reasonable time after notice of their said appointment, to secure the presence of the plaintiff before them and to actually and personally see and examine the plaintiff as to her mental and physical condition at the time of such examination. That the said defendants, through negligence or malice and in wanton disregard of their duty aforesaid, did not secure the presence of the plaintiff before them and did not actually or personally see and examine the plaintiff as to her mental or physical condition; neither did the defendants make any attempt or effort whatever to examine the plaintiff. That notwithstanding their negligent or malicious failure to perform their duty toward the plaintiff as aforesaid, the said defendants, together with the said Elberta Marshall, constituting said examining committee appointed as aforesaid, did on the 30th day of January, 1941, sign and make a report to the County Judge of said County wherein and whereby they reported to said Judge that they had personally seen and examined the plaintiff and found that she was insane and that she required confinement and mechanical restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, a true copy of said report being hereto attached and made a part hereof. That the plaintiff was not insane at the time said report was signed and made as aforesaid nor at any other time nor was she laboring under any hallucination, neither did she require confinement and mechanical restraint to prevent self-injury or violence to others, all of which the defendants could and would have discovered and learned had they personally seen and examined the plaintiff, as it was their duty to do. That as the direct and proximate result of the negligence or maliciousness of the defendants in failing to make any examination of the plaintiff, as aforesaid, the County Judge aforesaid did, on the 30th day of January, 1941, without knowledge of the failure of the defendants to perform their duty as aforesaid, enter a Decree, based upon said report, adjudging the plaintiff to be insane and that she be committed to the Florida State Hospital, and directing the Sheriff of said county to forthwith deliver the plaintiff to the superintendent of the Florida State Hospital, a true copy of said Decree being hereto attached and made a part hereof; and pursuant to said Decree, and as the direct and proximate result of the negligence or maliciousness of the defendants as aforesaid, the plaintiff was, at about 8:00 o'clock A.M. on the 31st day of January, 1941, without any knowledge of said insanity proceedings against her and without any opportunity to communicate with any friend or relative or legal counsel, forcibly and without her consent taken into custody by the Sheriff of Polk County, hand-cuffed, and transported on said date by said Sheriff to the Florida State Hospital at Chattachoochee, Florida, and there delivered by said Sheriff to the superintendent of said hospital for confinement, and the plaintiff was then and there unlawfully restrained of her liberty and confined in said hospital against her will and consent until the 15th day of April, 1941. That on the 24th day of May, 1941, pursuant to a petition filed on behalf of the plaintiff, the County Judge of Polk County entered an Order adjudging that the decree finding the plaintiff insane and ordering her committed to the Florida State Hospital was entered without jurisdiction and vacating and setting aside said Decree of insanity as wholly null and void ab initio, a copy of said Decree being hereto attached as a part hereof.'

Then follow allegations of the result and damage flowing from such alleged wrongful act.

There is no difference between the legal effect of the allegations of the First and Second Counts of the Declaration.

Demurrer was interposed as to each Count of the Declaration and, amongst other grounds, the following appears:

'3. It affirmatively appears from said Count that the findings and report of the defendants therein complained of, made as members of a committee appointed to inquire into plaintiff's sanity, were made in a judicial proceeding and were pertinent thereto and are therefore absolutely privileged.'

'5. Said Count affirmatively shows that the defendants were quasi judicial officers, and that what they did was in the scope of their duties as such, and are therefore immune from suit.'

Appellant states the question involved here for our determination as follows:

'Where the members of an examining committee appointed to examine an alleged insane person and report to the County Judge the result of such examination negligently or maliciously failed to secure the presence of the supposed insane person and did not actually or personally see and examine such person as to her mental or physical condition nor even attempt so to do, but reported to the County Judge that they had personally seen and examined such person and found her insane and requiring mechanical restraint, and the County Judge, relying on such report, without knowledge of the committee's failure to make or attempt to make any examination, entered an order decreeing such person insane and committing her to the Florida State Hospital, where she was confined against her will and consent, when, as a matter of fact, such person was not insane and did not require mechanical restraint, which fact the members of such committee would have discovered and learned had they personally seen and examined here as it was their duty to do, will an action for damages by such person lie against the members of such committee?'

This case is differentiated from that of Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 113 So. 378, for several reasons. In the Fisher case it was not alleged that the defendants made no examination of the plaintiff. Neither is it alleged that at the time of the inquiry and commitment of Mrs. Fisher she was sane. In this case the declaration alleges that at the time of her commitment the plaintiff was sane and it alleges that if the defendant physicians constituting members of the committee appointed had seen and examined her they would have found that she was sane. The appointment by the County Judge under which the defendants are alleged to have acted, directed the defendants, together with Elberta Marshall 'as an examining committee to examine said Virginia Beckham to determine whether or not she is insane in the manner prescribed by the law and to make report to this court.' The committee, therefore, was without any authority to make any report to the court without first having examined Virginia Beckham to determine whether or not she was insane.

The law, as it stood at the time of the proceedings here involved (Sec. 2309 and Sec. 2311, R.G.S., 3655 and 3657, C.G.L.), conferred quasi judicial powers upon the physicians who were appointed on the examining committee in such cases. When such appointments had been made the liberty of the person whom the committee had been appointed to examine was in their hands. Before they were authorized to make any report, or, in other words, to have jurisdiction to make any report to the court concerning the mental condition of the person under consideration, they were required both by the statute and the terms of the order authorizing them to report, to see and examine that person. If they failed to see and examine the person named in the appointment they were without any authority to make report of their findings, and if they so acted they necessarily made such report at their peril. If such person was committed to the asylum for the insane because of such unauthorized report when and if in fact such person is not insane, then such person has a cause of action against such physicians for false imprisonment. This is true, not because of any error in judgment or misstatement of findings, but because the physicians by certifying that they have made an examination, which they have not made, have thereby caused the plaintiff to be restrained of her liberty without due process of law, when, had an examination been made, she would (as is alleged) have been found by the said physicians of the committee to have been sane. This is true because the statutes, supra, provide that after the examination...