Beckman v. Com.

• Decision Date: 12 April 1979
• Citation: 388 N.E.2d 678,377 Mass. 810
• Parties: Elmer Richard BECKMAN v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 678

388 N.E.2d 678

377 Mass. 810

Elmer Richard BECKMAN v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Feb. 8, 1979.

Decided April 12, 1979.

Ellen Y. Suni, Boston (Michael R. Sobol, Boston, with her), for plaintiff.

William L. Pardee, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of a single justice of this court denying the plaintiff's request for relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, and G.L. c. 231, § 118. The plaintiff Beckman now presses only his arguments relating to G.L. c. 211, § 3.

Beckman was indicted in May of 1978 with six other persons by the Middlesex county grand jury for various violations of the Massachusetts General Laws, including attempted arson, arson, accessory before the fact to breaking and entering in the nighttime, conspiracy to commit arson, and burning a building with intent to defraud.

Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a "Motion for Reciprocal Discovery" seeking disclosure of the following materials: (1) All documents, papers, books, photographs, tangible objects, or copies of portions thereof, intended for use by the Commonwealth or by the defense as evidence at trial. (2) Results or reports of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the Commonwealth or of the defense which are intended for use as evidence at trial. (3) Beckman's written notice of alibi defense. (4) Beckman's written notice of insanity defense. (5) Beckman's written notice of intention to rely on an affirmative defense or a defense based on a license, claim of authority or ownership, or exemption. (6) Names and addresses of witnesses whom the prosecution and the defense intend to call at trial. This motion was allowed by a Superior Court judge, and Beckman claimed an exception. Another Superior Court judge denied a similar motion of the Commonwealth as to another defendant, in so far as that motion concerned the matters disputed here.

Thereafter, Beckman filed a petition pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, and c. 231, § 118, seeking review of the trial judge's order by a single justice of this court. Beckman requested an opportunity to present affidavits, oral argument, and a memorandum to substantiate his position. The single justice did not allow Beckman to present evidence or argue his case, but instead, issued an order which summarily denied his request for relief and stated that Beckman has "full appellate review in the event of a conviction." Beckman appealed to the full court.

Beckman now seeks relief under c. 211, § 3, only as to certain parts of the motion allowed in the trial court. We consider only the question whether the single justice should have afforded a hearing to Beckman with opportunity for the parties to present briefs and arguments. We think the better course would have been to afford such a hearing.

This court's power and duty of "general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction" is designed under the specific wording of G.L. c. 211, § 3, as amended through St.1973, c. 1114, § 44, to "correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly provided." We agree with Beckman's premises offered in this case that this power is used sparingly and that certain standards have been developed by the court to guide it in its exercise of discretion at the interlocutory stages of criminal proceedings. Thus, review will only be granted where there are substantial claims alleging violation of the appellant's substantive rights. See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 844, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973); Barber v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 236, 239, 230 N.E.2d 817 (1967). Most important, the error complained of must be irremediable so that an order for a new trial in the normal process of appeal will not put the defendant in statu quo. See Whitmarsh v. Commonwealth, 366 Mass. 212, 215, 316 N.E.2d 610 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 957, 95 S.Ct. 1945, 44 L.Ed.2d 446 (1975); Gilday v. Commonwealth, 360 Mass. 170, 171, 274 N.E.2d 589 (1971).

Beckman does not argue against those parts of the trial judge's order which go no farther than this court has permitted in several cases in which we have...