Beckman v. Meadville & Cambridge Springs Street Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1907
• Docket Number: 176
• Citation: 219 Pa. 26,67 A. 983
• Parties: Beckman v. Meadville & Cambridge Springs Street Railway Company, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

67 A. 983

219 Pa. 26

Beckman v. Meadville & Cambridge Springs Street Railway Company, Appellant

No. 176

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 25, 1907

Argued April 30, 1907

Appeal, No. 176, Jan. T., 1907, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Crawford Co., May T., 1906, No. 36, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Byrninnia Beckman v. Meadville &amp Cambridge Springs Street Railway Company. Reversed.

Trespass to recover damages for death of plaintiff's husband. Before THOMAS, P.J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The court refused binding instructions for defendant. [1]

The court charged in part as follows:

[We say to you as a matter of law, as between Mr. Beckman and his legal representatives and this defendant company, it could not relieve itself of its obligation to Mr. Beckman by giving a contract to some other company to repair its cars, or to operate its cars, and if the cars were being hauled on the contract of another company and results in an injury to Mr Beckman, that would not relieve the defendant. You see, the companies operated by agents; a corporation cannot run a car; they must have persons to do so; and when the Meadville & Cambridge Springs Street Railway Company hired the Meadville Traction Company to repair its cars, the Meadville Traction Company and the persons working for it were the servants or agents of the Cambridge Springs line and the Meadville & Cambridge Springs Street Railway Company is responsible for the negligence, not only of themselves, but for the negligence of those with whom they have contracted to do work in and about their line and cars. Nor does it matter for the purpose of this case, whether the employees who were operating this car were employees of the Meadville Traction Company, or of the Meadville & Cambridge Springs Street Railway Company. It may be there is some obligation and rights existing between these companies, but if the agent of the company that undertook to take John F. Beckman over its line was guilty of negligence which resulted in the death of Mr. Beckman, the Cambridge Springs Company is responsible for that act of the Meadville Traction Company. It is responsible for the acts of its servants, and if the cars were being operated, as we say, it does not matter, for the purposes of this case, as to whether the persons operating those cars were at that time working for the Meadville Traction Company, or for the Meadville & Cambridge Springs Street Railway Company, providing they were acting for the defendant company as their agent or servants, and providing further, that they were guilty of negligence which resulted in the death of Mr. Beckman. You can readily see that a trolley company could not delegate its right to use its road to some other person unless the legislature permitted it to do so, and thereby relieve itself from obligation to a person that it had obligated itself to carry safely over its line. The only possible question that might arise as to this is as to whether or not these men were acting under the authority of neither company.]

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $3,450. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned among others were (1, 10) above instructions, quoting them.

Judgment reversed and judgment directed to be entered for the defendant non obstante veredicto.

J. P. Hunter, of Lyon, Hunter & Burke, with him A. G. Church, for appellant. -- The rule of res ipsa loquiter has no application, as the car causing the collision was operated solely by the Meadville Traction Company, and even if a presumption of negligence arises from the fact that the passenger was injured in the collision, that presumption was rebutted when it was shown that the car causing the collision was operated by the traction company on its own tracks, and by its own employees: Meier v. Penna. R.R. Co., 64 Pa. 225; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. MacKinney, 124 Pa. 462; Thomas v. Phila. & Reading R.R. Co., 148 Pa. 180; Fredericks v. Northern Cent. R.R. Co., 157 Pa. 103; Fleming v. Ry. Co., 158 Pa. 130.

As the colliding car was being solely operated by the traction company, the defendant company was not liable for the negligence of the crew of that company: Van Steuben v. Central R.R. of N.J., 178 Pa. 367.

The men operating the colliding car were not the servants or employees of the defendant: Catawissa R.R. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. 186; Keck v. R.R. Co., 206 Pa. 501.

The car causing the collision was being operated by the traction company on its own road, and by its own employees. The defendant is not responsible for any negligence occurring in such operation: Wright v. Midland Ry. Co., Law Rep. 8 Exch. 137; Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421; Murray v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 32 L.R.A. 539; Peters v. Rylands, 20 Pa. 497; Rauch v. Lloyd & Hill, 31 Pa. 358; Sullivan v. R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 234; McElroy v. R.R. Co., 58 Mass. 400; White v. R.R. Co., 136 Mass. 321; Kearney v. Central R.R. of N.J., 167 Pa. 362; McGovern v. Union Traction Co., 192 Pa. 344; Penna. R.R. Co. v. Spicker, 105 Pa. 142.

James P. Colter, with him Thos. J. Prather and Manley O. Brown, for appellee. -- The defendant was liable: Peters v. Rylands, 20 Pa. 497; Rauch v. Lloyd, 31 Pa. 358; Littlejohn v. R.R. Co., 20 N.E. Repr. 103; Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wendell, 175; White v. R.R. Co., 136 Mass. 321; Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N.H. 9; McElroy v. Nashua, etc., R.R. Co., 58 Mass. 400; Wabash, etc., Ry. Co. v. Peyton, 106 Ill. 534; R.R. Co. v. Barron, 72 U.S. 90; Brady v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 114 Fed. Repr. 100; Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451; Sullivan v. R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 234; Oil Creek, etc., Ry. Co. v. Keighron, 74 Pa. 316.

Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, MESTREZAT, POTTER and ELKIN, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MITCHELL:

The essential facts so far as they concern the liability of the defendant are not in dispute. The tracks at the point where the accident occurred were the property of the Meadville Traction Company, but were in joint use by that company and the defendant under a traffic agreement. For the purposes of this case, therefore, they are to be considered as the property of each in turn while in use by it. Under the agreement the cars of defendant were to be cleaned and repaired by the traction company. Two cars of defendant had been delivered under...