Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1921
• Docket Number: No. 1748.,1748.
• Parties: MULHALL v. NASHUA MFG. CO.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

115 A. 449

MULHALL

v. NASHUA MFG. CO.

No. 1748.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Hillsborough.

Nov. 1, 1921.

Transferred from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Branch, Judge.

Proceeding by Jane Mulhall under the Workmen's Compensation Act to obtain compensation for personal injuries, opposed by the Nashua Manufacturing Company, the employer. There was an award of compensation and the case is transferred from the superior court on employer's exceptions. Case discharged.

Bill in equity to determine the amount of compensation due plaintiff under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Trial by the court. Decree for the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was injured, while in the employ of the defendant, on August S, 1919, The accident arose out of and in the course of the plaintiff's employment, and was not caused in part or in whole by any serious or willful misconduct on her part. No formal notice of the accident was given to the defendant, nor was any claim for compensation made by the plaintiff until March 20, 1920, when the following letter was sent to the defendant by plaintiff's counsel:

"March 20, 1920. Nashua Mfg. Co., Nashua, N. H—Gentlemen: On Friday, August 8, 1919, Jane Mulhall of 12 Church Street, Nashua. N. H., was injured in the spool room of your mill. Your doctors have attended her to date. She is still disabled. Your insurance company up to now has delayed adjustment of the matter. Wherefore this paper gives you notice that Miss Mulhall claims compensation for said injury under the act. Yours truly, Thos. J. Leonard, for Jane Mulhall."

The employer was in no way prejudiced by the want of a notice of the accident, inasmuch as its agents were immediately informed, and the plaintiff was sent to the defendant's infirmary for treatment. The evidence tended to prove that the plaintiff was under the daily observation and treatment of the defendant's mill doctor for a year after the accident. The court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the full term of 300 weeks from the date of the accident; that the average weekly earnings of the plaintiff when at work on full time during the preceding year was $15 per week; and that she is therefore entitled to compensation in the sum of $2,250.

The defendant excepted to the denial of its motion to dismiss the bill because no claim for compensation was made within six months from the occurrence of the accident. The defendant also excepted to the following findings of fact as against the law and the evidence, namely: (1) That the defendant is estopped to set up the defense of the failure of the plaintiff to make a claim for compensation within the statutory period of six months; (2) that the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $2,250 as compensation; (3) that justice does not require that any deduction shall be made on account of the treatment given plaintiff by the mill doctor. The defendant further excepted to the denial of its motions that the decree in favor of the plaintiff be vacated and the verdict set aside.

Thomas J. Leonard, Doyle & Doyle, and Marshall D. Cobleigh, all of Nashua, for plaintiff.

Lucier & Lucier and Alvin J. Lucier, all of Nashua, for defendant.

SNOW, J. "No proceedings for compensation under this act shall be maintained unless notice of the accident as hereinafter provided has been given to the employer as soon as practicable after the happening thereof, * * * and unless claim for compensation has been made within six months from the occurrence of the accident, * * * but no want or defect or inaccuracy of a notice shall be a bar to the maintenance of proceedings unless the employer proves that he is prejudiced by such want, defect, or inaccuracy. Notice of the accident shall apprise the employer of the claim for compensation under this article, and shall state the name and address of the workman injured, and the date and place of the accident. * * *" Laws 1911, c. 163, § 5.

The defendant concedes that the plaintiff is excused for her failure to give it notice of the accident, as required by section 5, since the court has found that it was not prejudiced thereby, but contends that plaintiff's failure to make a claim for compensation within six months from the occurrence of the accident is a bar to her recovery. Defendant's position raises the question whether or not it was the legislative intent thus to distinguish between the requirements as to the giving of notice of an accident on the one hand and us to the making of a claim for compensation on the other, by making the former excusable and the latter absolute.

In ascertaining the meaning of any statute, the circumstances under which the language is used, the evil to be remedied, the object sought to be attained, and the general policy and theory upon which the legislation proceeds are material to be considered. Barker v. Warren, 46 N. H. 124, 125; Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9, 126, 193, 16 Am. Rep. 82; Brimblecom v. O'Brien, 69 N. H. 370, 46 Atl. 187; Stanyan v. Peterborough, 69 N. H. 372, 374, 46 Atl. 191; Opinion of Justices, 72 N. H. 605, 607, 55 Atl. 943; State v. National Bank. 75 N. H. 27, 32, 70 Atl. 542, 21 Ann. Cas. 1204; Clough v. Railroad, 77 N. H. 222, 230, 90 Atl. 863.

Workmen's Compensation Acts have been adopted by all the nations of Western Europe and by a majority of the American states, including all those that have any considerable industrial development. These statutes have been enacted in response to public sentiments and beliefs, widely prevalent, that the burdens, delays, inadequate relief and unequal operation of the common-law remedies as applied to industrial accidents rendered them unsuited to modern conditions. The evils of the common-law remedies, which were not noticeable in the days of small and scattered shops, few employees, and simple tools, became intolerable in the days of crowded factories, equipped with complicated and dangerous machinery. The changes incident to this industrial development had not only largely increased the opportunities for avoidable injury, but had multiplied the dangers of inevitable accidents.

"The application of the principles of the common law to suits for personal injuries sustained in hazardous employments resulted in many cases in injustice; * * * it filled the courts with litigation; it became the fruitful source of perjury; it engendered bitterness between employer and employee; it resulted in * * * economic waste, and it turned out an army of maimed and helpless people as dependents upon the charity of friends or the public. * * * The loss has fallen upon those least able to bear it. * * *" American Coal Co. v. Allegany County Com'rs, 128 Md. 564, 574, 98 Atl. 143, 146, 147. "The remedy to the * * * workman has been uncertain, slow and inadequate. * * * Injuries * * * formerly occasional hare been frequent and inevitable. * * *" State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466. "The terrible economic waste, the overwhelming temptation to the commission of perjury, and the relatively small proportion of the sums recovered which comes to the injured parties" by common-law actions "condemn them as * * * inadequate to meet the difficulty." Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 337, 133 N. W. 215, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489. The common-law system of dealing with actions by employees against employers for personal injuries is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions, uneconomic, unwise, and unfair. Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 685, L. R. A. 1916A, 358, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 154; American Coal Co. v. Allegany County Com'rs, supra. "It resulted, it was widely believed, in injustice both to the employer who was sometimes the victim of unjust or excessive claims and to the employee who had to bear the necessary risks of the business and who was often delayed in the enforcement of a just claim and burdened with the expenses of a protracted litigation. The danger was ever present that an employee or his family might become dependent upon public support because no relief could be given for injuries to employees or for the death resulting from such injuries. This old and unsatisfactory system of negligence law was the evil to which the Legislature addressed itself when it enacted the Compensation Act." Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co., 219 N. Y. 469, 477, 114 N. E. 795, 797.

Beginning in Germany in 1884, in England in 1897, and in the American states in 1910, legislative bodies have attempted to solve this distinctly modern problem by the substitution of the compensation principle in the place of liability for negligence. The theory of the legislation is that the risk of injury, not due to the willful misconduct of the workman, should be borne in the first instance by the employer and ultimately by the consumer of the product of the industry. This is the practical operation of the statutes, whether optional or compulsory, since the employer may protect himself by adding the premium paid for insurance, and the cost of administering the law, to the overhead charges of his business as a basis for determining the cost and the price of his product, thus transferring the burden to the consumer. Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398, 401; Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 63 Okl. 52, 162 Pac. 938, 940; Chandler v. Indus. Com., 55 Utah, 213, 184 Pac. 1020, 1021, 8 A. L. R. 930; Deaver v. Napier, 139 Minn. 219, 166 N. W. 187; State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 195, 117 Pac. 1101, 1113, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466.

"The compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be considered damages. * * * The right to compensation arises out of the relation existing between employer and employee; * * * the costs and expenses of conducting the business, * * * including compensation for injuries to employees, * ** must be taxed to the business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the whole cost and expense of conducting the business * * * is added to the cost of the articles that are...