Beddoe-Greene v. Basic, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2012 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. PC 2011-4617 |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
| Parties | RACHEL KARINA BEDDOE-GREENE, ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE ESTATE OF GEOFFREY BEDDOE v. BASIC, INC.; BAYER CROPSCIENCE, INC., f/k/a AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC.; BIRD INC.; CERTAINTEED CORP.; D.A.P.; GENERAL REFRACTORIES COMPANY; GEORGIA PACIFIC LLC.; HASBRO, INC.; INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CO.; KELLY MOORE PAINT COMPANY, INC.; METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; MOBIL OIL CORP.; P.I.C. CONTRACTORS, INC.; PACKINGS & INSULATIONS CORPORATION; UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION f/k/a UNION CARBIDE CHEMICALS & PLASTICS COMPANY, INC.; YALE UNIVERSITY AND JOHN DOE (fictitious name) |
DECISION
In the instant negligence action, Defendant Yale University ("Yale") moves to dismiss Plaintiff Rachel Karina Beddoe-Greene's ("Plaintiff") complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff's complaint arises from the death of Plaintiff's decedent, Geoffrey Beddoe ("Decedent"), from alleged asbestos exposure during his employment with Dimeo Construction Company ("Dimeo"). Plaintiff objects to Yale's Motion. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). For the reasons stated herein, resolution of Yale's Motion is stayed pending jurisdictional discovery as to(1) Yale's relationship with Dimeo, (2) the percentage of Yale's Rhode Island sales of apparel as compared to Yale's total sales of apparel, and (3) Yale's contacts with Rhode Island relative to Yale's Rhode Island Furniture Archive.
On August 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed an action against Yale and sixteen other defendants, alleging their involvement in Decedent's death from asbestosis. Plaintiff alleged that Decedent was "injuriously exposed to asbestos" during his employment as a field manager for Dimeo from 1985 to 2010. Compl. ¶ 1. Dimeo is a Rhode Island corporation. Yale does not dispute that it contracted with Dimeo for the performance of construction and renovation work.1 According to Plaintiff, Decedent was exposed to asbestos while working on Yale-owned premises in New Haven, Connecticut. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 17.
Yale moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of its Motion, Yale filed an affidavit from Cary Scapillato, the Assistant Vice President and Controller of Yale University. Scapillato testified that Yale is a Connecticut corporation with a principal place of business in Connecticut. Yale's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1, Aff. of Cary Scapillato ¶ 6 ("Scapillato Aff."). She stated that Yale is not incorporated in Rhode Island and has not applied for or received authorization to do business in Rhode Island. Scapillato Aff. ¶¶ 5, 13. Scapillato also indicated that neither Yale, nor its corporate officers or representatives, maintains apresence in Rhode Island. Scapillato Aff. ¶ 7. She stated that Yale does not earn fee revenues in Rhode Island, nor does it have any phone listings, bank accounts, or offices in this forum. Scapillato Aff. ¶¶ 8, 12. Scapillato further testified that Yale has not purchased or leased any real or personal property in Rhode Island. Scapillato Aff. ¶ 9. She acknowledged that Yale owns one parcel of real property in South Kingston, Rhode Island, which it received as a donation. Scapillato Aff. ¶ 9. She testified, however, that Yale earns no income from this land and neither occupies nor leases it. Scapillato Aff. ¶ 9. Finally, Scapillato stated that Yale "does not, on an internet website or otherwise, actively target advertising specifically to Rhode Island." Scapillato Aff. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff objected to Yale's Motion to Dismiss and disputed Yale's assertions that Yale lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Rhode Island to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction. In support of her argument, Plaintiff cited: (1) the relationship between Yale and Dimeo; (2) the literature Yale sends advertising its educational services to Rhode Island high school students; (3) the income Yale receives annually from the tuition of Rhode Island residents attending Yale; (4) the involvement of Rhode Island Yale alumni in the school's admissions and scholarship funding processes; (5) the presence of Yale athletic teams and personnel in Rhode Island for sporting events; (6) the participation of Yale employees at academic events in Rhode Island; (7) the availability of Yale clothing for purchase in Rhode Island; and (8) the maintenance of a Rhode Island Furniture Archive at the Yale University Art Gallery in New Haven, Connecticut.
To withstand a non-resident defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss acomplaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, "a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction." Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, 836 A.2d 1113, 1118 (R.I. 2003) (citing Ben's Marine Sales v. Sleek Craft Boats, 502 A.2d 808, 809 (R.I. 1985)). When reviewing prima facie jurisdiction, the trial justice must "examine the pleadings, accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, and view disputed facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Cassidy v. Lonquist Mgmt. Co., LLC, 920 A.2d 228, 232 (R.I. 2007). The trial justice "may rely on affidavits and discovery to establish the jurisdictional facts," but must consider such evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as well. Ben's Marine Sales, 502 A.2d at 810. A prima facie case exists "when the requirements of Rhode Island's long-arm statute are satisfied." Cerberus Partners, 836 A.2d at 1118.
Rhode Island's long-arm statute governs the state's jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. It provides in pertinent part:
"Every foreign corporation, every individual not a resident of this state or his or her executor or administrator, and every partnership or association, composed of any person or persons not such residents, that shall have the necessary minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island, and the courts of this state shall hold such foreign corporations and such nonresident individuals or executors or administrators, and such partnerships or associations amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case not contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States." G.L. 1956 § 9-5-33 (2011).
This statutory language "permits the exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the United States Constitution." Rose v. Firstar Bank, 819 A.2d 1247, 1250 (R.I. 2003). Constitutional due process requires that the non-resident defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state, such that theexercise of personal jurisdiction "does not 'offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Cerberus Partners, 836 A.2d at 1118 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). To make this determination, this Court must examine the facts of a particular case, and consider whether, given such facts, the nonresident defendant should "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in this forum. Id.
Jurisdiction comes in two forms: specific and general. Plaintiff asserts that Yale's contacts with Rhode Island are such that this Court may properly hear Plaintiffs action pursuant to either type of jurisdiction. Alternatively, Plaintiff asks this Court to afford her additional time to perform jurisdictional discovery regarding Yale's contacts with Rhode Island. This Court shall address questions of specific and general jurisdiction in turn.
A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant "if the claim sufficiently relates to or arises from any of [the] defendant's purposeful contacts with the forum." Id. at 1119. This inquiry focuses on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Id. (quoting Md. Cent. Collection Unit v. Bd. of Regents for Educ. of the Univ. of R.I., 529 A.2d 144, 151 (R.I. 1987)). To determine whether specific jurisdiction exists, this Court must examine whether Yale "purposefully availed [itself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the State of Rhode Island thereby invoking the benefits and protections of this state's laws . . . ." Almeida v. Radovsky, 506 A.2d 1373, 1375 (R.I. 1986) (citations omitted).
Demonstrating specific jurisdiction is not an onerous task. Although there must be a relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, the relationship "need not be terribly robust . . . ." Cerberus Partners, 836 A.2d at 1119. At bottom, the analysis boils down to whether the non-resident "defendant's conduct and connection with the forum [s]tate are such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." See id. at 1121 ().
Plaintiff further alleges that Yale "had an ownership interest in the premises where [Decedent] was injuriously exposed to asbestos." Compl. ¶ 17.
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, this Court must consider all allegations and evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Cassidy, 920 A.2d at 232. It is undisputed that some sort of agreement or series of agreements existed between Yale and Dimeo, a Rhode Island corporation. Absent this arrangement, Decedent allegedly would not have been exposed to asbestos. Thus, there is a relationship between Yale, Rhode Island, and this litigation. Cerberus Partners, 836 A.2d at 1119.
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