Bedell v. Reagan

• Decision Date: 21 June 1963
• Citation: 192 A.2d 24,159 Me. 292
• Parties: Ormand W. BEDELL and Patricia Bedel: v. William A. REAGAN, Ill.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 24

192 A.2d 24

159 Me. 292

Ormand W. BEDELL and Patricia Bedel: v.William A. REAGAN, Ill.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

June 21, 1963.

Harvey & Harvey, by Joseph E. Harvey, Biddeford, for plaintiffs.

Verrill, Dana, Walker, Philbrick & Whitehouse, by John A. Mitchell, Portland, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN, SIDDALL, and MARDEN, JJ.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

The plaintiffs are husband and wife.The husband owned and operated an automobile in which his wife was a passenger.The automobile collided with one driven by the defendant.For consequential injuries and losses the plaintiffs instituted this two-fold complaint against the defendant who answered upon the merits, denying liability.

Defendant sought recourse to Rule 14(a), Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, 155 Me. 504, and in the role of a third-partyplaintiff filed his complaint against the plaintiff husband who was designated therein as third-party defendant.This sequential complaint ascribed the collision to the negligent conduct of the (plaintiff husband)third-party defendant and charged him with an obligation to contribute to and/or indemnify for damages sustained by the (defendant) third-partyplaintiff because of the collision and damages for which the (defendant) third-partyplaintiff may be adjudged to be beholden to the plaintiff wife in her action against the (defendant) third-partyplaintiff.

The plaintiffs responded to this posterior complaint with a denial of the negligence and liability of the (plaintiff husband)third-party defendant and moved for the dismissal of the subsequent complaint for the assigned reasons that a plaintiff in one and the same action cannot be made a third-party defendant and that, in as much as the plaintiff wife has no right to recovery in tort against her spouse, the husband can have no obligation of contribution or indemnity for damages inflicted upon his wife.

After a hearing the trial Justice denied and dismissed the third-party complaint.The (defendant) third-partyplaintiff appeals from that ruling.

Rule 14(a), M.R.C.P., supra, reads as follows:

'When Defendant May Bring in Third Party.At any time after commencement of the action a defendant as a third-partyplaintiff may cause to be served a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to such third-partyplaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.The person so served, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-partyplaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-partyplaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13.The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-partyplaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim.The third-party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-partyplaintiff.The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-partyplaintiff, and his failure to do so shall have the effect of the failure to state a claim in a pleading under Rule 13(a).The third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his countercliams and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13.Any party may move for severance, separate trial, or dismissal of the third-party claim; the court may direct a final judgment upon either the original claim or the third-party claim above in accordance with the provisions of Rule 54(b).A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-party defendant.'

Because of legal disability the Bedells as reciprocal spouses may not maintain causes of action, the one against the other, for negligent tort.Anthony v. Anthony, 135 Me. 54, 55, 188 A. 724.

The instant case is not a single action but is obviously and in truth two separate causes of action procedurally combined or joined by grace of the commendable provisions of Rule 20, M.R.C.P., 155 Me. 510.Chevassus v. Hurley, D.C., 8 F.R.D. 410, 413.

Ormand W. Bedell is not a party to the action of his wife against the defendant Reagan.Ormand W. Bedell may be liable to Reagan, the third-partyplaintiff, in contribution for a part of any recovery by Mrs. Bedell against Reagan as amongst the parties the possibilities are contingent and multiple, e. g., that the plaintiff spouses exercised due care, that one or both of them was or were guilty of contributory negligence, that the defendant was proximately negligent or dutifully careful or that the collision was an unavoidable misadventure.In such a complex conceivably a judgment might be rendered favorable to Mrs. Bedell and adverse to her husband and to Reagan.Kimball v. Bauckman, 131 Me. 14, 19, 158 A. 694.

There is an enforceable right of contribution amongst negligent participating or joint tortfeasors:

'* * * when the parties are not intentional and wilful wrongdoers, but are made wrongdoers by legal inference or intendment, are involuntary and unintentional tort-feasors * * *.It is an equitable right founded on acknowledged principles of natural justice and enforceable in a court of law.'Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 451, 104 A. 815, 816.

Maine Civil Practice, Field and McKusick, Rule 14, Reporter's notes at page 186 observes:

'This rule is similar to Federal Rule 14 * * * When a defendant believes that a third person, not a party to the action, is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim, he may bring such third person into the case as a party by service upon him of a summons and complaint.Thus the entire controversy can be settled in a single proceeding.* * * Impleader cannot be used by a defendant who contends that it is the third party instead of the defendant who is liable to the plaintiff.'

In its commentary applicable to Rule 14(a), Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, 155 Me. 504, and to Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Practice and Procedure, Barron and Holtzoff-Wright, contains inter alia the following:

' § 421. * * * only a person who is secondarily liable to the original defendant may be brought in.

' § 426.Subdivision (a) of this rule, both as originally drafted and as later amended, permits a defendant to bring into the action a third-party defendant, 'who is or may be liable to him' for all or part of the plaintiff's claim.Thus impleader is authorized to bring in a third party who would necessarily be liable over to the defendant for all or any part of plaintiff's recovery, whether by way of * * * contribution * * * or otherwise.

'* * * The third-party claim need not be based upon the same theory as the main claim.And impleader is proper even though the third-party's liability is contingent, and cannot be established until the original defendant has been held liable.'

The rationale of the disability of reciprocal spouses as litigants against each other is the legal unification of husband and wife and the preservation of domestic peace and felicity.Should, however, a passenger wife injured by the participating or joint negligence of her driver husband and of a third party be permitted to recover the entire amount of her damages from the third party who is denied his equitable right to contribution from her husband solely because of the husband's marital status, then such third party would be unjustly required not only to compensate for his own fault but also to pay the pecuniary equivalent of the husband's wrong.The third party would be penalized because of the marital fact which to him can only constitute an accidental under such circumstances.The mystical concept of personal, wedded unity and the paternalistic...