Beebe v. Kansas City

• Citation: 34 S.W.2d 57,327 Mo. 67
• Decision Date: 05 January 1931
• Docket Number: 29326
• Parties: Russell Theodore Beebe, by Carl A. Beebe, His Next Friend, v. Kansas City, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

34 S.W.2d 57

327 Mo. 67

Russell Theodore Beebe, by Carl A. Beebe, His Next Friend, v. Kansas City, Appellant

No. 29326

Supreme Court of Missouri

January 5, 1931

Rehearing Overruled January 5, 1931.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court; Hon. Clarence A. Burney Judge.

Affirmed.

John T Barker and Robert J. Ingraham for appellant.

(1) Plaintiff who was fourteen and one-half years of age, was riding a bicycle without any light on it after midnight. He was familiar with the street and had been over it several times. He knew it was rough and had many holes in it. He knew that more than one-half of the street was smooth, but he voluntarily rode into the rough part of it and was clearly guilty of contributory negligence which will bar recovery. Waldmann v. Construction Co., 233 S.W. 245; Welch v. McGowan, 262 Mo. 719; Wheat v. St. Louis, 179 Mo. 579; Woodson v. Street Railways Co., 224 Mo. 701; Solomon v. Duncan, 185 S.W. 1144; Diamond v. Kansas City, 120 Mo.App. 189; Kaiser v. St. Louis, 185 Mo. 374; Coffey v. Carthage, 186 Mo. 585; Solomon v. Duncan, 194 Mo.App. 522. (2) Plaintiff was fourteen and one-half years of age when injured. He was unusually bright and intelligent. He was riding a bicycle, which is a very simple device. His acts are to be judged by the same standards as an adult. The court erred in instructing the jury that it should take into consideration his age, experience, mentality and capacity. This instruction is only proper in case of an infant. McGee v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 546; Walker v. Railroad, 193 Mo. 483; Payne v. Railroad, 136 Mo. 585; Battles v. Railways Co., 178 Mo.App. 628; Cherry v. Railroad, 163 Mo.App. 63; Hight v. Bakery Co., 168 Mo.App. 460; Herdt v. Koenig, 137 Mo.App. 608; Graney v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 678; Winter v. Van Blarcom, 258 Mo. 424; Berry v. Milling Co., 304 Mo. 307; Shaw v. Railroad Co., 184 S.W. 1154; Marshall v. Railways Co., 209 S.W. 932; Shields v. Costello, 229 S.W. 413; Henry v. Railway Co., 141 Mo.App. 355; Schulz v. Smercina, 1 S.W.2d 120. (3) Even if this court should hold that this "infant" instruction was proper for a boy nearly fifteen years of age, it was erroneous because not submitting to the jury the question of the ability of the boy to understand and appreciate the danger. Fink v. Railroad, 161 Mo.App. 330; Longree v. Mfg. Co., 120 Mo.App. 497; Schmitz v. Railroad, 119 Mo. 276; McGee v. Railroad, 214 Mo. 546; Battles v. Railways Co., 178 Mo.App. 628; Cherry v. Railroad, 163 Mo.App. 62; Graney v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 679; Berry v. Milling Co., 304 Mo. 308. (4) The court instructed the jury upon behalf of the defendant that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff throughout the entire case. Then the court instructed the jury upon behalf of plaintiff that the burden of proof was upon the defendant to establish the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The jury naturally thought this meant that the defendant's evidence must establish such negligence. The rule is universal that if the plaintiff's own evidence shows contributory negligence, the case must be taken from the jury. Cook v. Railway Co., 94 Mo.App. 425; Cash v. Sonken-Calamba Co., 17 S.W.2d 927; Hardcastle v. Pullman Co., 10 S.W.2d 935; Kleinlein v. Foskin, 13 S.W.2d 655.

Walter H. Maloney and Cowgill & Popham for respondent.

(1) Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and the general demurrer was properly overruled. Bethel v. St. Joseph, 171 S.W. 42; Beebe v. Kansas City, 17 S.W.2d 608; Ross v. Hoffman, 269 S.W. 679; Law v. St. Louis, 239 S.W. 124; Torrence v. Pryor, 210 S.W. 430. (2) The burden of establishing the pleaded defense of contributory negligence was on defendant and the instruction properly so declared and is a proper instruction. Beebe v. Kansas City, 17 S.W.2d 608. (3) The verdict is not excessive. Breen v. U. Rys. Co., 204 S.W. 521; Shaw v. Kansas City, 196 S.W. 1091; Wagner v. Const. Co., 220 S.W. 890; Jackman v. Ry. Co., 231 S.W. 978; Evans v. Explosives Co., 239 S.W. 487; Manley v. Wells, 292 S.W. 67.

OPINION

Gantt, P. J.

Action to recover for personal injuries. Plaintiff by next friend charged defendant with failure to exercise ordinary care to keep one of its streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel. The answer was a general denial with plea of contributory negligence. The reply was a general denial. Judgment for $ 12,000, and defendant appealed.

Plaintiff was fourteen years and seven months of age at the time of injury. His father had judgment for loss of services resulting from the injury, which judgment was affirmed by the Kansas City Court of Appeals. [Beebe v. Kansas City, 17 S.W.2d 608.] Defendant contended in that case that its demurrer at the close of the evidence should have been sustained for the reason the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The Court of Appeals overruled the contention. In this case it makes the same contention.

There is evidence tending to show that plaintiff was a delivery boy for a pharmacy at 51st Street and Troost Avenue, Kansas City, Missouri; that he made deliveries by traveling on his bicycle and had been so engaged for eight days before injury; that on September 6, 1926, he worked from six p. m. to twelve-ten a. m.; that he then proceeded on his unlighted bicycle toward home; that in doing so he traveled north on the east side of Troost Avenue; that when he reached a point on said avenue between 48th and 49th Streets, and while traveling six to ten miles an hour, the front wheel of his bicycle ran into a deep crevice in the paving, causing him to be thrown to the pavement and injured; that at the time there was an unlighted street light located nearby which, if lighted, would have afforded light to that part of the avenue; that plaintiff did not know of this crevice and did not see it while traveling on the night in question over that part of the unlighted avenue; that he did see crevices or holes some distance south of the place of injury, but was able to do so because the street light serving that part of the avenue was lighted; that he had ridden over that part of the avenue several times in an automobile and noticed the pavement was rough and in bad condition; that he had also driven his bicycle over that part of the avenue two or three times and noticing the rough condition of the paving traveled on the street-car track, which was in better condition; that he did not on these occasions notice the crevice causing his injury or other large crevices or holes in the pavement.

In ruling the demurrer this evidence must be taken as conclusive. It therefore appears that plaintiff knew the pavement was rough. On his way home he saw crevices to his right some distance south of place of injury and where the pavement was lighted from a nearby street light. However, he did not know of large crevices before he rode over the pavement on this night. As he approached the place of injury at a moderate rate of speed, he could see to travel, but could not see crevices in the unlighted part of the pavement. He was traveling on the proper side of an avenue which the defendant undertook to light in the nighttime for use by the public. Under the circumstances he cannot be convicted of negligence as a matter of law for riding an unlighted bicycle over this part of the avenue in the nighttime. He was authorized "to assume that the municipality has exercised ordinary care to keep its streets reasonably safe for travel in the general and usual mode." It follows the demurrer was well ruled. [Beebe v. Kansas City, supra, 17 S.W.2d 608; Bethel v. St. Joseph, 184 Mo.App. 388, l. c. 390, 171 S.W. 42.]

Defendant challenges an instruction which follows:

"The court instructs the jury that in defense of this action defendant has interposed the plea that plaintiff was guilty of negligence which contributed to his alleged injuries, and in this connection you are further instructed that the defense of contributory negligence is a special defense and the burden of proof is upon defendant Kansas City to establish such defense by the preponderance of the evidence that is, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, and unless you believe from the evidence that defendant has established such defense by the greater weight of the credible evidence in this case, then you cannot find for defendant Kansas City upon said issue.

"If you believe from all the evidence that plaintiff at all times referred to in evidence exercised such care for his own safety as would usually be exercised by an ordinarily careful and prudent person of the then age, intelligence and capacity and experience of plaintiff, then you cannot find him guilty of contributory negligence or that he was guilty of any...