Beehler v. Fremont County

• Decision Date: 14 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. 33496.,33496.
• Citation: 182 P.3d 713,145 Idaho 656
• Parties: Susan J. BEEHLER and Roger C. Beehler, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FREMONT COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Fremont County Sheriff's Department, and Brian Loseke, an individual, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

182 P.3d 713

145 Idaho 656

Susan J. BEEHLER and Roger C. Beehler, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FREMONT COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Fremont County Sheriff's Department, and Brian Loseke, an individual, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 33496.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

April 14, 2008.

M. Patrick Duffin, Ammon, for appellant.

Anderson Nelson Hall Smith PA, Idaho Falls, for respondent. Blake G. Hall argued.

GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge.

Susan J. and Roger C. Beehler (the Beehlers) appeal from the dismissal of their complaint for failure to file a written undertaking pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-610. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2004, Susan was arrested for driving under the influence near Island Park, Idaho. Deputy Brian Loseke transported Susan to the Fremont County Sheriff's Office in St. Anthony, Idaho. During the course of this trip, Deputy Loseke stopped the car twice to allow Susan to urinate by the side of the road. The second time Deputy Loseke stopped, he did not remove Susan's handcuffs; she fell due to the icy conditions, purportedly injuring her knee. Susan was unable to pick herself up, requiring assistance from Deputy Loseke.

Two years later, the Beehlers filed a complaint against Deputy Loseke, Fremont County, and the Fremont County Sheriff's Department (the Respondents), alleging negligence. They claimed that Susan's injuries required surgery, and will continue to require surgery for normal functioning of her knee. They sought monetary damages for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, limitation of activities, and other physical and mental injuries. The Respondents moved to dismiss on the ground that the Beehlers had failed to file a written undertaking as required by I.C. § 6-610 for a suit against a law enforcement officer arising out of the performance of his duties. After considering oral arguments and briefing by the parties, the district court dismissed the Beehlers's complaint as to all parties for failure to comply with I.C. § 6-610. The Beehlers appeal, challenging the applicability of I.C. § 6-610 to claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), I.C. §§ 6-901 to 6-929.

II. DISCUSSION

The Beehlers contend that I.C. § 6-610 does not apply to actions within the ITCA. Specifically, they assert that I.C. § 6-918A supersedes I.C. § 6-610, and that section 6-610 is not a mandatory provision. The Respondents point to this Court's decision in Greenwade v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 119 Idaho 501, 808 P.2d 420 (Ct.App.1991), for the proposition that I.C. § 6-610 applies to cases brought under the ITCA.

The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which we exercise free review. Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 133 Idaho 353, 358, 986 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Ct.App. 1999). When interpreting a statute, we will construe the statute as a whole to give effect to the legislative intent. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990); Corder, 133 Idaho at 358, 986 P.2d at 1024. The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd results. Messenger, 118 Idaho at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388; Corder, 133 Idaho at 358, 986 P.2d at 1024. When statutes conflict, a later or more specific statute controls over an earlier or more general statute. Johnson v. Boundary Sch. Dist. No. 101, 138 Idaho 331, 335, 63 P.3d 457, 461 (2003); Hyde v. Fisher, 143 Idaho 782, 786, 152 P.3d 653, 657 (Ct. App.2007). Separate statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously, if at all possible, so as to further the legislative intent. Cox v. Mueller, 125 Idaho 734, 736, 874 P.2d 545, 547 (1994); State v. Resendiz-Fortanel, 131 Idaho 488, 489, 959 P.2d 845, 846 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 540, 861 P.2d 107, 110 (Ct.App.1993).

Idaho Code Section 6-610 begins by defining law enforcement officers as "any court personnel, sheriff, constable, peace officer, state police officer, correctional, probation or parole official, prosecuting attorney, city attorney, attorney general, or their employees or agents," as well as other peace officers or those with the duty to enforce laws of this state. I.C. § 6-610(1). It then instructs that:

[b]efore any civil action may be filed against any law enforcement officer or service of civil process on any law enforcement officer, when such action arises out of, or in the course of the performance of his duty, or in any action upon the bond of any such law enforcement officer, the proposed plaintiff or petitioner, as a condition precedent thereto, shall prepare and file with, and at the time of filing the complaint or petition in any such action, a written undertaking with at least two (2) sufficient sureties in an amount to be fixed by the court. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure diligent prosecution of a civil action brought against a law enforcement officer, and in the event judgment is entered against the plaintiff or petitioner, for the payment to the defendant or respondent of all costs and expenses that may be awarded against the plaintiff or petitioner, including an award of reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court.

I.C. § 6-610(2). The section goes on to state that the defendant in such a suit may object at any time to the plaintiff's failure to file a bond. I.C. § 6-610(4). If the defendant objects to the lack of a bond, "the judge shall dismiss the case." I.C. § 6-610(5). Dismissal in this circumstance is mandatory. Monson v. Boyd, 81 Idaho 575, 578, 582, 348 P.2d 93, 94 (1959) ("Where the complaint shows on its face, or where it is made to appear by evidence in support of a motion to dismiss, that the action is against peace officers and arises out of or in the course of the performance of the duty of such officers, if I.C. § 6-610 has not been complied with, the action must be dismissed.").

This Court previously addressed whether I.C. § 6-610 applies to claims under the ITCA and found that it does. Greenwade, 119 Idaho at 503, 808 P.2d at 422. Although the tort claims in that case were dismissed primarily for failure to file a notice of tort claim pursuant to I.C. §§ 6-905 and 6-908, this Court also affirmed the dismissal as to the sheriff defendant on the alternate basis that Greenwade failed to file a written undertaking as required by I.C. § 6-610. The Beehlers provide no acceptable reason why Greenwade should not be followed here.

Instead, the Beehlers assert that I.C. § 6-918A supersedes I.C. § 6-610 because both statutes address attorney fees. Attorney fees may be assessed in cases covered by the ITCA only if "the party against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith in the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action." I.C. § 6-918A. Furthermore, "[t]he right to recover attorney fees in legal actions for money damages that come within the purview of this act shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of this act and not by any other statute or rule of court, except as may be hereafter expressly and specifically provided or authorized by duly enacted statute of the state of Idaho." I.C. § 6-918A (emphasis added). It is the language of exclusivity that leads to the Beehlers's argument, but their interpretation of the effect of I.C. § 6-918A is incorrect. Section 6-918A is the exclusive means for determining when a party is entitled to receive attorney fees in an action pursuant to the ITCA. This is distinguishable from the purpose of I.C. § 6-610, which creates a fund from which attorney fees can be paid if a law enforcement officer is successful in defending a civil suit. Section 6-610 does not define the standard for awarding attorney fees to a law enforcement officer. Additionally, I.C. § 6-610 specifically applies to "any civil case." The plain meaning of I.C. § 6-610 necessarily includes a claim in tort as one of the civil cases to which it applies. Furthermore, courts must construe a statute under the assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed. D & M Country Estates Home-Owners Ass'n v. Romriell, 138 Idaho 160, 165, 59 P.3d 965, 970 (2002); Druffel v. State Dep't of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 856, 41 P.3d 739, 742 (2002); City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994). Section 6-918A of the ITCA was enacted in 1978, nearly twenty-five years after I.C. § 6-610. Given that the ITCA applies to suits against the government, governmental entities, and their employees, and that law enforcement officers are employees of governmental entities, the Idaho Legislature knew that law enforcement officers might be sued in tort pursuant to the ITCA, and a bond would be required for such a suit pursuant to I.C. § 6-610. If the legislature wished to eliminate the bond requirement in suits under the ITCA, such steps could have been taken. There is no indication that the legislature intended I.C. § 6-918A to terminate the applicability of I.C. § 6-610 in tort claims.

The Beehlers also assert that Idaho case law has made I.C. § 6-610 permissive instead of mandatory. Citing Hyde v. Fisher, 143 Idaho 782, 152 P.3d 653, and Kent v. Pence, 116 Idaho 22, 773 P.2d 290 (Ct.App. 1989), they claim that a bond is no longer required for a suit against a law enforcement officer, and that the purpose behind I.C. § 6-610 has been fulfilled by I.C. § 6-918A. In Hyde, this Court considered the bond requirement of I.C. § 6-610 as it applied to indigent prisoners. Trial courts can waive all or a portion of court fees for indigent prisoner litigants pursuant to I.C. § 31-3220A. Indigent non-prisoners are guaranteed similar protections pursuant to I.C. § 31-3220 but unlike section 31-3220A, section 31-3220 provides that for indigent nonprisoners, the court may authorize the...